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THE “GUARANTEE” CLAUSE 
Ryan C. Williams∗ 
Article IV’s command that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government” stands as one of the few remaining lacunae in the 
judicially enforced Constitution.  For well over a century, federal courts have viewed the 
provision — traditionally known as the Guarantee Clause but now referred to by some as 
the “Republican Form of Government” Clause — as a paradigmatic example of a 
nonjusticiable political question.  In recent years, however, both the Supreme Court and 
lower federal courts have signaled a new willingness to reconsider this much-criticized 
jurisdictional barrier in an appropriate case, leading many to predict that its eventual 
demise is only a matter of time. 
The interpretive possibilities inherent in a judicially enforceable Guarantee Clause have 
tantalized generations of constitutional theorists, leading to a significant body of research 
attempting to uncover what was meant by the provision’s oblique reference to “a 
Republican Form of Government.”  But this research has almost completely ignored a 
separate inquiry that is equally critical to understanding the provision’s meaning and 
significance — namely, what it means for the United States to “guarantee” such republican 
government to the states. 
This Article seeks to shed new light on the original meaning of the term “guarantee” in 
the Guarantee Clause by looking to an unexpected source — namely, eighteenth-century 
treaty practice.  The language of the Guarantee Clause closely parallels language that was 
frequently used in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century treaties.  The interpretation of such 
treaty provisions was informed by well-settled background principles of international law, 
which attached particular legal significance to the term “guarantee.”  As used in 
eighteenth-century treaties, the term “guarantee” signified a diplomatic commitment 
whereby one nation pledged its support to the protection of some preexisting right or 
entitlement possessed by another sovereign.  Importantly, however, such provisions were 
deemed to exist solely for the benefit of the guaranteed sovereign and conferred no separate 
rights or entitlements on the nation pledging the guarantee. 
Viewing the Guarantee Clause through the lens of eighteenth-century treaty practice casts 
significant doubt on claims by modern scholars that the provision should be understood 
as a repository of judicially enforceable individual rights.  Rather, both the text of the 
provision and contextual evidence regarding its original understanding strongly suggest 
that the provision more likely reflected a quasi-diplomatic, treaty-like commitment on the 
part of the federal government to its quasi-sovereign component states.  This evidence lends 
new, and heretofore unappreciated, support to the Supreme Court’s longstanding practice 
of treating Guarantee Clause claims as beyond the scope of judicial cognizance. 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1867, Senator Charles Sumner famously likened the Article IV 
Guarantee Clause to “a sleeping giant in the Constitution.”1  Nearly a 
century and a half later, and despite persistent prodding from scholars,2 
litigants, and even the occasional judge,3 the giant continues to slumber.  
The roots of this somnolence are conventionally traced to the Supreme 
Court’s 1849 decision in Luther v. Borden,4 which has long been con-
strued as requiring that all constitutional challenges based on the Clause 
be treated as involving nonjusticiable political questions.5 
There are signs, however, that the giant may be starting to stir.  The 
political question doctrine is a shadow of what it once was, having been 
dealt a critical blow by the Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in Baker v. 
Carr.6  In Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton,7 one of its most thor-
ough recent engagements with the doctrine, the Court continued the 
trend of diminishing its scope.  The Zivotofsky Court reinforced and 
elaborated the Court’s previously articulated limitation of political ques-
tions to only those situations involving either “a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment” or “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it.”8 
As the force of the political question doctrine has waned in other 
domains, the use of that doctrine to insulate Guarantee Clause chal-
lenges from any form of judicial review has grown increasingly difficult 
to defend.  The refusal of federal courts to entertain challenges under 
the Guarantee Clause has drawn criticism from a veritable “who’s who” 
of modern constitutional theorists, including Professors Akhil Amar,9 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
 2 See infra notes 9–13 (citing scholarly critiques of the political question limitation on Guaran-
tee Clause claims). 
 3 See infra p. 605 (discussing recent case law that suggests that certain Guarantee Clause claims 
may be justiciable). 
 4 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
 5 Id. at 46–47; see also, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184 (1992) (“The view 
that the Guarantee Clause implicates only nonjusticiable political questions has its origin in  
Luther . . . .”).  But see Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1911–13 (2015) (contending that this understanding of Luther is mistaken and 
that claims under the Clause were not held to be nonjusticiable until the Court’s decision in Pac. 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)). 
 6 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 7 566 U.S. 189 (2012).  
 8 Id. at 195 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)). 
 9 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 276–80 (2005); Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, 
and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 753–54 (1994). 
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Jack Balkin,10 Erwin Chemerinsky,11 John Hart Ely,12 and Laurence 
Tribe.13  The courts themselves have also begun to question the 
longstanding assumption that Luther compels a categorical prohibition 
on adjudicating Guarantee Clause claims.  In its most significant recent 
pronouncement on the Clause, the Supreme Court nudged open the door 
to future Guarantee Clause litigation by suggesting “that perhaps not all 
claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political ques-
tions.”14  And though lower courts have been relatively cautious in tak-
ing up the Court’s invitation, a handful of lower court decisions have 
concluded that the political question doctrine no longer stands as an 
inflexible barrier to adjudicating claims under the Guarantee Clause.15  
For example, in its 2014 decision in Kerr v. Hickenlooper16 — subse-
quently vacated on alternative jurisdictional grounds — the Tenth  
Circuit concluded that the political question doctrine posed no obstacle 
to federal adjudication of a claim that a state constitutional amendment 
adopted through a voter initiative process conflicted with the constitu-
tional guarantee of a “Republican Form of Government.”17 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 241–42 (2011) (asserting federal courts are, like 
Congress, “required to guarantee republican government where it is institutionally appropriate for 
them to do so,” id. at 242). 
 11 Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 849, 864–69 (1994). 
 12 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 118 
n.* (1980). 
 13 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 398 (2d ed. 1988); see also, e.g., 
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 287–89, 300 
(1972); Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional 
Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 560–65 (1962); Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: 
Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1479 (2005) (“[T]he Guarantee Clause should be a proper 
subject for judicial review when it is invoked as a guarantor of individual rights.”); Ethan J. Leib, 
Redeeming the Welshed Guarantee: A Scheme for Achieving Justiciability, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 
143, 148–49 (2002); Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 887, 920–31 (1994); cf. Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) 
(“The clause guaranteeing to each state a republican form of government has been held not to be 
justiciable, and although this result has been powerfully criticized, . . . it is too well entrenched to 
be overturned at our level of the judiciary.” (citations omitted)). 
 14 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
582 (1964)). 
 15 See, e.g., Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court, 373 F.3d 219, 226–29 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 
(rejecting a Guarantee Clause challenge on the merits); Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. 
Superior Court, 148 P.3d 1126, 1137–39 (Cal. 2006) (relying in part on the Guarantee Clause to hold 
tribal sovereign immunity did not bar enforcement of state law); Vansickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 
223, 234 (Kan. 1973) (concluding that Guarantee Clause claims are justiciable). 
 16 744 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem.) (directing the lower 
court to reconsider the decision in light of Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015)), remanded to 824 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 17 Id. at 1176, 1180.  On remand from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the 
state legislator plaintiffs in the case lacked Article III standing and remanded the case to the district 
court.  Kerr, 824 F.3d at 1217. 
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In view of these developments, several scholars have predicted that 
the eventual demise of the political question barrier to judicial enforce-
ment of the Guarantee Clause is only a matter of time.18  The possibility 
of a Guarantee Clause jurisprudence freed from the shackles of Luther 
and the political question doctrine has long fascinated constitutional 
scholars.  The Clause has been suggested as support for a broad range 
of doctrinal innovations, extending from the relatively narrow and mod-
est — such as providing firmer textual grounding for the Court’s reap-
portionment precedents from the 1960s19 or its more recent federalism 
decisions20 — to the novel and ambitious.  The innovative judicial uses 
that scholars have suggested for the Clause include refashioning (or per-
haps eliminating) the law of direct democracy in the states,21 providing 
for federal judicial regulation of partisan gerrymandering,22 grounding 
a federal constitutional right to an adequate public school education,23 
and many more.24 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Leaving the Empty Vessel of “Republicanism” Unfilled: An Argu-
ment for the Continued Nonjusticiability of Guarantee Clause Cases, in THE POLITICAL QUES-
TION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 75, 76 (Nada  
Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007) (contending that “there is good reason to believe 
that the Court will soon consider claims arising under the Guarantee Clause”); Chemerinsky, supra 
note 11, at 851 (“[T]he time is clearly approaching in which the Court may be quite willing to reject 
the view that cases under the Guarantee Clause should always be dismissed on political question 
grounds.”). 
 19 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1717–18 (1999) 
(arguing that the Guarantee Clause, rather than the Equal Protection Clause, would have provided 
a more natural textual source of the Warren Court’s reapportionment decisions); Michael W. 
McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 103, 105–07 (2000) (same). 
 20 See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for 
a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36 (1988) (contending that the Clause “prohibits the federal 
government from interfering with state sovereignty” and “thus provides a more definite limit on 
national power than the ambiguous language of the [T]enth [A]mendment”); cf. Fred O. Smith, Jr., 
Awakening the People’s Giant: Sovereign Immunity and the Constitution’s Republican Commitment, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1990–93 (2012) (contending that the Guarantee Clause might provide 
a stronger textual foundation than would the Eleventh Amendment for state sovereign immunity). 
 21 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1539–45 
(1990); Hans A. Linde, When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not “Republican Government”?, 17  
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159, 160–61 (1989). 
 22 See, e.g., Jarret A. Zafran, Note, Referees of Republicanism: How the Guarantee Clause Can 
Address State Political Lockup, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1418, 1453–55 (2016). 
 23 See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 13, at 560 (“[U]niversal free public education, not a requisite to 
[a republican] government 150 years ago, must unavoidably be deemed so today.”); cf. Mitchell 
Franklin, Interposition Interposed: I, 21 LAW TRANSITION 1, 12 (1961) (suggesting that the  
Guarantee Clause gives the federal government power to maintain “a system of public education, 
in states which have wrecked, weakened, terrorized, or abandoned the public school system in order 
to avoid integration”).  
 24 See, e.g., Samuel B. Johnson, The District of Columbia and the Republican Form of Govern-
ment Guarantee, 37 HOW. L.J. 333, 386–91 (1994) (suggesting that the Guarantee Clause might be 
used to protect Washington, D.C., residents’ right to local self-government); Note, A Niche for the 
Guarantee Clause, 94 HARV. L. REV. 681, 696–99 (1981) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause should 
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But this enthusiasm for a judicially enforceable Guarantee Clause is 
not universally shared.  Professor Richard Hasen, for example, views 
the “republicanism” to which the Clause refers as “an empty vessel” that 
can “be filled by whatever individual right the particular writer desires 
the courts to enforce.”25  Given this potential for interpretive malleabil-
ity, Hasen worries that judicial enforcement of the Guarantee Clause 
could “take . . . very serious questions about political structure out of 
the political process and leave them in the hands of judges to ossify in 
constitutional decisions binding on the entire nation.”26 
Both the putative promise of the Guarantee Clause and its potential 
for mischief hinge on how the Clause will ultimately be interpreted by 
the courts.  And given the relative dearth of Supreme Court case law 
construing the Clause, there is strong reason to believe that the courts’ 
emergent Guarantee Clause doctrine will be shaped to a significant ex-
tent by historical evidence regarding the Clause’s original meaning and 
purpose.27  The Tenth Circuit in Kerr explicitly alluded to such a role 
by pointing to “the Federalist Papers, founding-era dictionaries, records 
of the Constitutional Convention, and other papers of the founders”28 as 
possible sources from which to obtain “judicially manageable guidance” 
regarding the provision’s meaning and proper application.29 
The original meaning of the Guarantee Clause has already been the 
subject of extensive scholarly commentary.30  But virtually all of this 
scholarship has focused on attempts to determine the original meaning 
of the provision’s reference to “a Republican Form of Government.”31  
By contrast, the original meaning of the provision’s operative com-
mand — namely, the instruction that the United States “guarantee” such 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
be used to protect certain forms of individual rights against state infringement); Note, The Rule of 
Law and the States: A New Interpretation of the Guarantee Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561, 561 (1984) 
(contending that the Guarantee Clause could be used to inhibit states from denying practical legal 
effect to rights recognized by state law). 
 25 Hasen, supra note 18, at 82. 
 26 Id. at 85. 
 27 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Essay, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 325, 326 (2009) (suggesting that originalism may be “most useful” in “cases of constitu-
tional first impression”). 
 28 Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1178 (10th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) 
(mem.), remanded to 824 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 29 Id. at 1179. 
 30 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 9, at 276–81; WIECEK, supra note 13, at 11–50; Amar, supra note 
9, at 761–73; Bonfield, supra note 13, at 516–30; Merritt, supra note 20, at 29–36; Robert G. Natelson, 
A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 807, 824–25 (2002). 
 31 This language has been so central to modern debates about the Clause’s meaning that several 
prominent scholars have taken to referring to the provision as the “Republican Form of Government 
Clause” rather than the Guarantee Clause.  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 9, at 276–81; McConnell, 
supra note 19, at 106. 
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a government to each state — has received remarkably little serious 
scholarly consideration.32 
This paucity of scholarly attention devoted to the original meaning 
of the term “guarantee” is somewhat curious.  The meaning of the term 
is crucially important to understanding the Clause’s actual meaning and 
operation.  Neither the nature of any duties the Clause imposes on the 
federal government nor the scope of any powers the Clause confers can 
be fully understood without a clear sense of what, exactly, was meant 
by “guarantee.”33  And yet, the term itself is something of a constitu-
tional anomaly.  The word “guarantee” appears nowhere else in the fed-
eral Constitution of 1787 nor in any of the Amendments that were ratified 
within the first decade after its adoption.  The language of “guarantee” is 
also conspicuously absent from many of the pre-Founding sources that are 
often pointed to as having influenced the federal Constitution’s design, 
such as the Articles of Confederation, the Declaration of Independence, 
early state constitutions, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.34  In  
the absence of more definitive clues regarding the term’s originally un-
derstood meaning, most scholars have been content to either ignore the 
problem or to throw up their hands and declare the term hopelessly 
ambiguous.35 
But such declarations of interpretive impossibility are of questionable 
reliability absent evidence that the interpreter has exhausted all of the 
potentially relevant historical sources that might plausibly bear on a pro-
vision’s original meaning.  And one important category of eighteenth-
century legal documents has been almost completely overlooked by prior 
scholarship addressing the Guarantee Clause’s original meaning — 
namely, international treaties. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 See, e.g., Jacob M. Heller, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Guarantee Clause Regulation 
of State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1737 (2010) (noting that “besides a few cursory pages 
in the occasional law review article on the Clause, no court or scholar has seriously considered the 
word’s meaning or its implications for how the Clause should be implemented” (footnote omitted)). 
 33 See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 13, at 3 (observing that some of “the most important questions 
in the clause’s history” have turned upon the “precise definition” of the term); Heller, supra note 32, 
at 1737 (“Understanding what it means for the United States to ‘guarantee’ a republican form is 
central to understanding how the Clause was meant to be enforced.”). 
 34 See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1148 n.128 (2003) (identifying “the Declaration of  
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the secret proceedings of the Continental Congress, 
the early state constitutions, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787” as among the “pre-Founding 
sources” that can help to “establish general background understandings or interpretive baselines for 
determining the original public meaning of the later-adopted Constitution”).  
 35 See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 13, at 75 (contending that “the ambiguity of the word ‘guaran-
tee’ . . . was so great” as to amount to a “blank check[] to posterity”).  But see Bonfield, supra note 
13, at 523 (citing one Founding-era dictionary as evidence of the term’s meaning); Heller, supra note 
32, at 1737–45 (examining contemporaneous dictionary definitions and drafting and ratification 
history bearing on the term’s meaning). 
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The language of “guarantee” recurred repeatedly throughout  
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century treaties.  By the late eighteenth cen-
tury, the term “guarantee” had taken on a fairly well-established term-
of-art meaning that signified an engagement whereby one state party to 
a treaty promised to aid another state in its peaceable enjoyment of par-
ticular rights against interference by third parties.36  The term could be 
used to signify either a mutual obligation between the state parties to a 
treaty or, in the term’s more technical sense, a particular kind of treaty-
enforcement mechanism whereby the contracting parties would invoke 
the aid of a third party to monitor compliance with the treaty’s terms.37  
As explained by Emer de Vattel, the most widely recognized authority 
on the law of nations in the early Republic,38 the term “guarantee,” when 
used in a treaty, signified a commitment on the part of a guaranteeing 
state “to maintain the conditions of [a] treaty, and to cause it to be ob-
served,” including, if necessary, through the “use of force against the 
party” that breached its commitments.39 
This international law meaning of “guarantee” has gone almost com-
pletely unmentioned in the significant body of scholarship addressing 
the original meaning of the Guarantee Clause.  And to some extent this 
inattention is unsurprising.  To a modern reader, accustomed to viewing 
the Constitution as a municipal law document designed for the govern-
ance of a unitary republic, the relevance of eighteenth-century treaty 
practice may seem far from obvious.  But recent decades have seen 
growing scholarly awareness of the significant role that international 
law principles and practices played in shaping the Constitution’s con-
tent.40  One important insight of this scholarship has been to recognize 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 See, e.g., HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. III, ch. II, § 10, 
at 192 (Philadelphia, Carey, Lea & Blanchard 1836) (describing a “guarantee” as “an engagement 
by which one state promises to aid another where it is interrupted, or threatened to be disturbed in 
the peaceable enjoyment of its rights by a third power”). 
 37 See infra section I.B, pp. 615–20 (discussing technical meaning of “guarantee” under  
eighteenth-century law of nations). 
 38 Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington Administra-
tion, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 373, 404 (2012) (“[F]rom the beginning of the United States through well 
after the founding period, Vattel was the preeminent authority on the law of nations.”); see also U.S. 
Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 462 n.12 (1978) (“The international jurist most 
widely cited in the first 50 years after the Revolution was” Vattel.). 
 39 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. II, ch. XVI, § 235 (Belá Kapossy & Richard 
Whitmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758).  Although Vattel was baptized under the name “Emer,” 
his name has often been mistakenly rendered in the German form “Emerich.”  See Belá Kapossy & 
Richard Whitmore, Introduction, in VATTEL, supra, at i, ix n.1. 
 40 See, e.g., David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
932, 989–1015 (2010) (discussing influence of international law principles and concerns in the draft-
ing process).  
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the extent to which relations among the states and between the individ-
ual states and the federal government were assimilated to the model of 
international relations between independent sovereign nations.41 
To be sure, the Articles of Confederation and, more significantly, the 
federal Constitution of 1787 bound the states together in a manner that 
deprived them of many sovereign attributes that independent nations 
would have enjoyed.42  But the consolidation effected by the union was 
neither intended nor understood by members of the Founding genera-
tion to deprive states of their independent sovereign capacities entirely.43  
To the contrary, as Professor Thomas Lee observes, “the founding gen-
eration . . . perceived the States as sovereign nation-states in some re-
spects and accordingly drafted constitutional text to incorporate certain 
useful international law rules.”44  The close textual affinity between the 
language of the Guarantee Clause and similarly worded provisions in 
eighteenth-century treaties thus suggests a strong — though heretofore 
unrecognized — possibility that the Guarantee Clause itself may have 
been modeled on such an international law paradigm.45 
Viewing the language of the Guarantee Clause through the lens of 
eighteenth-century international law casts new light on modern debates 
regarding the Clause’s potential doctrinal significance.  In particular, an 
international law perspective on the Clause’s original meaning casts 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 See, e.g., ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
124–26 (2010) (emphasizing the influence of international law theorists such as Hugo Grotius and 
Samuel von Pufendorf on eighteenth-century ideas of American federalism); Thomas H. Lee, Mak-
ing Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 
1027, 1031 (2002) (explaining that “the Founders understood the States as sovereign entities bound 
together in an interdependent coexistence very much like the community of nations, and they there-
fore frequently consulted international law and political theory to craft rules conducive to a peaceful 
and mutually respectful coexistence”); Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federal-
ism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 
93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 832–38 (1999) (arguing that constitutional references to the “States” implic-
itly recognized their sovereign rights under international law).  
 42 See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 259–60 (1992) (observing that “[m]uch of 
the Constitution addresses the task of creating one nation out of separate states,” id. at 259, and 
pointing to, inter alia, the Privileges and Immunities, Full Faith and Credit, Extradition, and Free 
Navigation Clauses as well as the constitutional prohibitions on war and diplomacy by states as 
meaningful constraints on state sovereignty).  
 43 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 168 (1996) (“[T]he new federal system would 
occupy a middle ground between a confederation of sovereign states and a consolidated nation.”). 
 44 Lee, supra note 41, at 1049; see also, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 
720 (1838) (characterizing the states of the union as “sovereign within their respective boundaries, 
save that portion of power which they have granted to the federal government, and foreign to each 
other for all but federal purposes”).  
 45 In his 2002 article, Lee did briefly allude to the possibility of an international law influence 
on the Guarantee Clause.  See Lee, supra note 41, at 1051–53.  But that article, which focused 
principally on the original meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, did not address the textual simi-
larity between the Clause and eighteenth-century treaty documents that is the focus of this Article. 
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considerable doubt on those readings of the provision that would treat 
it as a safeguard of individual rights against state government.46  Both 
the language of the Clause and relevant background principles of  
eighteenth-century international law strongly suggest that the Clause 
was designed to protect the rights of states in their sovereign govern-
mental capacities, not the individual rights of those states’ respective 
citizens.47 
Moreover, the international law perspective on the Clause’s back-
ground suggests that the federal courts’ traditional reluctance to treat 
the provision as judicially enforceable may be defensible even under the 
modern deracinated conception of the political question doctrine.  Crit-
ics of the political question limitation on the Clause’s judicial enforce-
ment have long maintained that the Clause is not meaningfully distin-
guishable from other provisions that have been held justiciable.48  But 
viewing the Clause against the backdrop of eighteenth-century interna-
tional law suggests the intriguing possibility that the provision may have 
embodied a quasi-diplomatic commitment of the type that would have 
been viewed as committed to the political branches of government ra-
ther than the judiciary.49 
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I briefly surveys the pre-
dominant eighteenth-century dictionary definitions of the term “guaran-
tee” and examines the specialized legal connotations the term conveyed 
when invoked in the international treaty context.  Part II examines 
Founding-era evidence suggesting that the language of the Guarantee 
Clause may have been deliberately modeled on similar “guarantee” pro-
visions in international treaties.  Though the evidence supporting this 
specialized term-of-art understanding is not unequivocal, the case for 
understanding the Clause in its international term-of-art sense is far 
stronger than existing scholarship has recognized.  Part III considers the 
potential significance this term-of-art reading might have for modern 
judicial doctrine interpreting the Clause.  In particular, Part III contends 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 46 See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 13, at 524–25 (arguing that the Clause “impos[es] an obligation 
on the United States to protect the people in their individual capacity from unrepublican govern-
ance”); Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 851 (arguing that “the Guarantee Clause should be regarded 
as a protector of basic individual rights and should not be treated as being solely about the structure 
of government”); Anya J. Stein, Note, The Guarantee Clause in the States: Structural Protections 
for Minority Rights and Necessary Limits on the Initiative Power, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343, 
343 (2010) (contending that the Guarantee Clause “provides essential structural protections for in-
dividual rights”).  
 47 See infra section III.A, pp. 674–79. 
 48 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 871 (“[T]here is no reason why ‘republican form of 
government’ is more lacking in standards than ‘due process’ or ‘equal protection.’”); Louise Weinberg, 
Luther v. Borden: A Taney Court Mystery Solved, 37 PACE L. REV. 700, 736–38, 747–52 (2017) 
(contrasting Luther with Baker, in which the Court deemed justiciable a constitutional challenge 
implicating putatively similar concerns).  
 49 See infra section III.B, pp. 679–87. 
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that accepting the term-of-art interpretation of the Clause should, at a 
minimum, lead to the conclusion that standing to invoke the Clause is 
limited to state governments in their institutional, governmental capac-
ities and not to individual state citizens.50  Part III also explores the 
argument that claims under the Guarantee Clause may have been orig-
inally viewed as inappropriate for judicial resolution51 — a conclusion 
that, while consistent with current doctrine, has been widely viewed as 
lacking a robust foundation in constitutional text and history. 
I. THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MEANINGS OF “GUARANTEE” 
A.  Dictionary Definitions of “Guarantee” and “Guaranty” 
In modern parlance, to “guarantee” something means roughly to pro-
vide a formal assurance or promise.52  To “guarantee” a particular con-
dition or state of affairs under this meaning is thus equivalent to prom-
ising or assuring its continued existence.53  Most modern discussions of 
the Guarantee Clause assume that the relevant eighteenth-century 
meaning more or less tracks this modern meaning.54 
But most eighteenth-century dictionary definitions of the term “guar-
anty,” the more common spelling of the term when used as a verb,55 
provided a more specific definition that connected the term to the per-
formance of a stipulation, contract, or — especially — a treaty.56  For 
example, the 1786 edition of Samuel Johnson’s famous Dictionary of the 
English Language defined “guaranty” as meaning “[t]o undertake to se-
cure the performance of any articles,” with “articles” defined in the rel-
evant sense as “[t]erms” or “stipulations.”57  The second edition of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 Infra section III.A, pp. 674–79. 
 51 Infra section III.B, pp. 679–87. 
 52 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 554 (11th ed. 2006). 
 53 Many modern constitutions use the term in this sense.  See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The 
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or prefer-
ence, shall forever be guaranteed in this State . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18(a) (“Trial by jury is 
guaranteed as provided in article one of this constitution.”). 
 54 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 852 (“[T]he Guarantee Clause should be regarded as 
assuring basic political rights” to individuals. (emphasis added)); Merritt, supra note 20, at 25 (“The 
guarantee clause . . . promises each state a government based on popular control.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 55 Heller, supra note 32, at 1737 n.117 (noting that the spelling used in the Guarantee Clause 
was “peculiar”).  
 56 See id. at 1737–38 (quoting THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 306 (London, C. Dilby 2d ed. 1789)) (observing that “[m]ost dictionaries at 
the time of the founding defined ‘guaranty’ as to ‘secure the performance’ of a stipulation, contract, 
or treaty between parties” (footnote omitted)). 
 57 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C. 
Rivington et al. 6th ed. 1785) [hereinafter JOHNSON 1785].  One of the few modern discussions of 
the Guarantee Clause to give specific attention to the meaning of “guaranty” focuses on a 1773 
edition of Johnson’s Dictionary, which provides several alternative senses of the term, including 
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Thomas Sheridan’s Complete Dictionary of the English Language, pub-
lished in 1789, defined the term in a manner that more strongly sug-
gested a link to treaties in particular: “To undertake to secure the per-
formance of a treaty or stipulation between contending parties.”58  To 
similar effect was Frederick Barlow’s Complete English Dictionary, 
published in 1772, which defined “guaranty” to mean: “[T]o undertake 
to see the articles of any treaty performed.”59  Other dictionaries pub-
lished at around the same time similarly linked the concept of a “guar-
antee,” or the act of guarantying, with the performance of an obligation 
arising from either an agreement in general60 or a treaty specifically.61 
When one turns to dictionary definitions of the related noun form 
“guarantee,”62 the term’s connection to treaties comes through even 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
“[t]o watch by way of defence and security,” “[t]o protect” or “defend,” “[t]o preserve by caution,” 
and “[t]o provide against objections.”  Heller, supra note 32, at 1738 (quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, 
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. Strahan et al. 5th ed. 1773)).  But in 
the prior edition of Johnson’s Dictionary, published in 1770, the only definition of “guaranty” is 
consistent with that provided in the text above — namely, “[t]o undertake to secure the performance 
of any articles.”  1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, 
W. Strahan et al. 4th ed. 1770).  Moreover, the definitions provided for the word that follows “guar-
anty” — the verb “to guard” — are nearly verbatim copies of the definitions provided for “guaranty” 
in the 1773 edition.  Id. (providing definitions of “to guard” that include “[t]o watch by way of 
defence and security,” “[t]o protect” or “defend,” “[t]o preserve by caution,” and “[t]o provide against 
objections”).  This pattern strongly suggests that the definitions provided in Johnson’s 1773 edition 
were inadvertently transposed from the neighboring entry, “to guard” — an inference that is sup-
ported by the fact that the edition following the 1773 revision, which was published in 1785, defined 
“guaranty” and “to guard” in a manner consistent with the 1770 edition, not the 1773 edition.  See 
JOHNSON 1785, supra. 
 58 SHERIDAN, supra note 56, at 306 (emphasis added). 
 59 1 FREDERICK BARLOW, THE COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London, Frederick 
Barlow 1772) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DIC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, Vernor & Hood et al. 2d ed. 1795) (defining 
guaranty as “[t]o undertake to secure the performance of a stipulation between contracting parties”).  
The eighteenth-century meaning of the term “treaty” largely tracks the modern meaning of the term 
as a formal convention or compact between nations.  See, e.g., NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL 
ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Edinburgh, Neill & Co. 25th ed. 1783) (defining 
“treaty” as “a covenant or agreement between several nations for peace, commerce, navigation, 
etc.”); 2 JOHNSON 1785, supra note 57 (defining “treaty” as “[a] compact of accommodation relating 
to publick affairs”).  But see Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 
77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 166–71 (1998) (contending that most Founding-era dictionaries failed to cap-
ture a distinction recognized by leading authorities on the law of nations between “treaties” and less 
formal or temporary international agreements that were referred to using other terms).    
 60 See, e.g., 1 JOHNSON 1785, supra note 57 (defining guarantee as “[a] power who undertakes 
to see stipulations performed”). 
 61 See, e.g., JAMES BARCLAY, A COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY  
(London, J.F. & C. Rivington et al. 1792) (“To undertake to see the articles of any treaty kept.”); 
JOHN WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY AND EXPOSITOR OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (London, G.G.J. & J. Robinson & T. Cadell 1791) (“To undertake to see the perfor-
mance of a treaty or stipulation between contending parties.”). 
 62 Again, a spelling pattern that the Guarantee Clause itself did not track.  See supra note 55 
and accompanying text. 
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more clearly.  For example, the 1783 edition of Nathan Bailey’s An Uni-
versal Etymological English Dictionary defined “guarantee” when used 
as a noun to mean “a person agreed on to see articles performed in trea-
ties between Princes.”63  John Ash’s 1795 Dictionary of the English  
Language defined “guarantee” as “[a] state or power which engages for 
the performance of a treaty or stipulation between contracting parties.”64  
Likewise, James Barclay’s Complete and Universal English Dictionary 
defined “guarantee” to mean “a power who undertakes to see the condi-
tions of any league, peace, or bargain performed.”65  Other contempo-
rary dictionaries offered definitions of “guarantee” that were broadly 
consistent.66 
Although it is certainly appropriate to exercise caution in ascribing 
too much significance to dictionary definitions,67 the sheer frequency 
with which eighteenth-century dictionaries connected the concepts of 
“guarantee” and “guaranty” with the observance of treaties and similar 
international agreements suggests a strong possibility that members of 
the Founding generation may have been more attentive to the connec-
tion between the language of “guarantee” and international law concepts 
than are most individuals today.68  A member of the Founding genera-
tion thumbing through any of a number of available lexicons of the pe-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 BAILEY, supra note 59.  Bailey’s dictionary did not include a separate definition for the verb 
form of the term.  Id. 
 64 1 ASH, supra note 59 (emphasis added). 
 65 BARCLAY, supra note 61. 
 66 See, e.g., FRANCIS ALLEN, A COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London, J. Wilson & J. 
Fell 1765) (“[A] power who undertakes to see the conditions of any league, peace, or bargain per-
formed.”); WILLIAM PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Edinburgh,  
David Willison 1775) (“[O]ne who sees covenants performed.”); WALKER, supra note 61 (“A power 
who undertakes to see stipulations performed.”).  At least one Founding-era dictionary offered a 
definition of the term “guarantee” that tracked its term-of-art meaning under eighteenth-century 
international law quite closely.  See THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London, Toplis & Bunney 18th ed. 1781) (“[A] prince or other person 
appointed by some other agreeing parties to see justice done between them.”); cf. infra notes 85–87 
and accompanying text (discussing Vattel’s similar description of “guarantee”). 
 67 See, e.g., Gregory A. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era 
to Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 367–81 (2014) 
(noting that definitions in Founding-era dictionaries may be insufficient, incomplete, inapplicable, 
imprecise, or incorrect). 
 68 The concept of “guarantee” still has some salience in modern international treaty law.  See 
generally Peter E. Harrell, Note, Modern-Day “Guarantee Clauses” and the Legal Authority of Mul-
tinational Organizations to Authorize the Use of Military Force, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 417 (2008) 
(discussing continuing significance of guarantee provisions in modern treaties).  However, guarantee 
provisions have largely fallen out of favor among international legal actors since the mid-twentieth 
century.  See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Consent-Based Humanitarian Intervention: Giving Sover-
eign Responsibility Back to the Sovereign, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 499, 556 (2013) (observing that 
“[s]tates, of their own accord, generally began eschewing such arrangements by the mid-twentieth 
century, primarily because of accusations that such treaties were used to further coercive, colonialist 
aims”). 
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riod for guidance regarding these terms’ meanings would have been ap-
prised that the terms had some particular connection to the observance 
of treaties.  Such a reader might reasonably have considered the possibility 
that international law — or the “law of nations” as it was then known69 — 
might have something important to say about the meaning of “guarantee” 
when used in a public law document such as the Constitution.70 
B.  “Guarantee” as an International Law Term of Art 
Writing a few decades after the Founding period, diplomat and in-
ternational law scholar Henry Wheaton described the “convention of 
guarantee” as “one of the most usual international contracts.”71  As used 
in eighteenth-century treaties, the term “guarantee” typically carried one 
of two connotations.  First, the term was sometimes used to signify a 
reciprocal promise between contracting nations to safeguard one an-
other’s rights, privileges, or territories.  A prominent example of this 
form of reciprocal guarantee appeared in the 1778 Treaty of Alliance 
between the United States and France, whereby the United States com-
mitted to “guarantee” the possessions of France in America and France 
pledged to “guarantee” the United States “their liberty, sovereignty and 
independence, absolute and unlimited.”72  Although this usage of the 
term “guarantee” to refer to reciprocal obligations of the contracting 
treaty partners was common, Vattel viewed the usage as imprecise.  He 
advised that such reciprocal obligations were more properly character-
ized as “treaties of alliance” for particular specified objectives.73 
The more technical meaning of “guarantee” signified a commitment 
on the part of a third-party nation to enforce the terms of a treaty, in-
cluding, if necessary, through the use of force.74  To appreciate the sig-
nificance of this latter form of guarantee provision, it is necessary to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 69 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 
VA. L. REV. 729, 731 n.1 (2012) (referring to customary international law as the modern equivalent 
of the eighteenth-century law of nations). 
 70 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 923, 968 (2009) (describing “division of linguistic labor” whereby nonspecialist speakers 
encountering a seemingly technical term may “defer understanding of the term . . . to those who 
were members of the relevant [expert] group and those who shared the understandings of the mem-
bers of the relevant group”).  
 71 WHEATON, supra note 36, pt. III, ch. II, § 10, at 192. 
 72 Treaty of Alliance Between the United States of America and His Most Christian Majesty, 
U.S.-Fr., art. XI, Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 6. 
 73 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVI, § 238; see also GEORG FRIEDRICH DE MARTENS, 
SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, 337 n.* (William Cobbett trans., Philadelphia, Thomas 
Bradford 1795) (1789) (observing that “[t]he reciprocal guarantee of the contracting parties is of a 
different nature” and that “such a guarantee” could be of “no effect with regard to the maintenance 
of” a bilateral treaty). 
 74 See infra notes 85–96 and accompanying text (discussing Vattel’s account of “guarantee”  
provisions).  
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have a general understanding of certain background principles of  
eighteenth-century international law, and particularly the central role of 
violence and self-help as mechanisms of enforcing international legal 
obligations.75  The eighteenth-century law of nations permitted one na-
tion who believed itself wronged by another’s violation of its interna-
tional obligations to wage offensive war, both to obtain redress for its 
injuries and to punish the offender.76  A treaty violation, which was 
itself a violation of the law of nations, could thus be invoked by an 
offended state as an excuse for war.77 
The importance of war and lesser forms of state-to-state coercion 
raised a two-fold problem for states seeking enforceable treaty commit-
ments: First, coercion was a fairly blunt instrument and was not always 
practicably available to a state seeking to enforce its treaty rights.  This 
was a particular problem for weak states seeking to enforce their rights 
against more powerful nations.  Second, entering into a treaty could 
subject the state itself to the risk of reprisal in the event it was later 
unable to comply with its commitments.  Even a nation that scrupu-
lously adhered to its treaty commitments faced some residual risk that 
a stronger counterparty could use a purported violation as a pretext for 
invasion or intermeddling.78 
These dangers of treaty opportunism were mitigated to some extent 
by the potential reputational consequences that might attend either 
overt violations or transparently pretextual assertions of violations.79  
But reputation alone was an uncertain safeguard, particularly in cases 
where either the treaty itself or the evidence asserted in support of a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 75 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009) (“As the law of nations was understood in the late eighteenth century, 
each nation had certain perfect rights relative to other sovereigns . . . .  Violation of a nation’s per-
fect right gave that nation just cause to wage war.”). 
 76 See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67–68 (offenses against the law of 
nations “are principally incident to whole states or nations; in which case recourse can only be had 
to war; which is an appeal to the God of hosts, to punish such infractions of public faith, as are 
committed by one independent people against another”); 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC 
PACIS LIBRI TRES bk. 2, ch. XX, § 40, at 504 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1646) (acknowledging authority of sovereigns to wage war to punish 
those who “excessively violate the law of nature or of nations”); MARTENS, supra note 73, at 265–
66 (“Forcible means are . . . the only ones that are left to sovereigns who acknowledge no judge or 
superior.”); VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. III, ch. III, §§ 28, 41 (acknowledging the lawfulness of 
offensive wars of this type). 
 77 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XV, § 221 (“He who violates his treaties, violates at the 
same time the law of nations . . . .”); id. bk. IV, ch. IV, § 54 (stating that a refusal of indemnification 
for violating a treaty of peace provides the injured party with “a very just cause for taking up arms 
again”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 37 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“The just causes of 
war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treaties or from direct violence.”). 
 78 See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVIII, § 335 (noting risk of pretextual invocations 
of international law violations as an excuse for “having recourse to arms”). 
 79 See id. ch. XII, § 163 (discussing reputational consequences of dishonoring treaties). 
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claimed violation was open to dispute.80  The pledging of oaths and 
other religious rituals in connection with treaties might provide some 
additional assurance,81 though the security provided extended only so 
far as the pledging sovereign’s own moral or religious scruples de-
manded.82  An exchange of hostages by the contracting states could pro-
vide some more tangible level of assurance.83  But by the late eighteenth 
century, this practice had largely fallen into disuse.84 
“Convinced by unhappy experience” that nations did not always 
scrupulously adhere to their commitments, treaty designers sought other 
mechanisms to assure performance, the “efficacy” of which would “not 
depend” solely “on the good-faith of the contracting parties.”85  By the 
late eighteenth century, one of the most familiar enforcement mecha-
nisms was provided by the practice of guarantee.86  Vattel described the 
role of guarantee provisions in the following terms: 
When those who make a treaty of peace, or any other treaty, are not per-
fectly easy with respect to its observance, they require the guaranty of a 
powerful sovereign.  The guarantee promises to maintain the conditions of 
the treaty, and to cause it to be observed. . . . The guaranty is a kind of 
treaty, by which assistance and succours are promised to any one, in case 
he has need of them, in order to compel a faithless ally to fulfil [sic] his 
engagements.87 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 Cf. id. ch. XVII, § 262 (observing that “fraud seeks to take advantage . . . of the imperfection 
of language, and that men designedly throw obscurity and ambiguity into their treaties, in order to 
be provided with a pretense for eluding them upon occasion”).   
 81 See id. ch. XV, § 223 (discussing use of oaths in treaties).  
 82 Cf. id. §§ 223–224 (discussing occasional practice of popes purporting to release Catholic sov-
ereigns from obligations they had pledged in treaties with other nations). 
 83 See id. ch. XVI, §§ 245–261 (describing the “very ancient institution,” id. § 245, of requiring 
hostages as security for the performance of treaties).  Alternatively, a nation might deliver valuable 
property or territory to another nation as a pledge for performance of its treaty commitments.  Id. 
§ 241. 
 84 See Heinz Duchhardt, Peace Treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era, in PEACE 
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 45, 48–49 (Randall Lesaffer 
ed., 2004) (noting that provisions for the exchange of hostages “disappeared more or less silently 
from the treaty practice,” id. at 48, in the eighteenth century and characterizing a provision in the 
1748 Peace of Aix-La-Chapelle providing for such exchange as “a latecomer in this respect,” id. at 
48–49). 
 85 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVI, § 235. 
 86 Vattel addresses the guarantee mechanism first in his chapter discussing the various mecha-
nisms for assuring the performance of treaties.  See id.  
 87 Id.; see also, e.g., J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITIC LAW 359 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., London, J. Nourse 1752) (“Another way . . . of securing peace, is, when princes or 
states . . . become guarantees, and engage their faith, that the articles shall be preserved on both 
sides . . . .”); MARTENS, supra note 73, at 337 (“In general, a guarantee engages to maintain the 
treaty, in promising to lend assistance to the party who shall complain of an infraction of it, and 
who shall demand such assistance.”); 8 SAMUEL FREIHERR VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF 
NATURE AND NATIONS bk. VII, ch. VIII, at 856 (George Carew trans., London, J. Walthoe et al. 
4th ed. 1729) (noting that guarantees “engage their Faith, that the Articles shall be observ’d on both 
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Although the commitment of guarantee could, in principle, be 
pledged to some contracting parties but not others or even to one party 
alone, the commitment was more “commonly promised to all in gen-
eral.”88  But even where the guaranteeing state committed to aid one 
state in preference to others, the guarantee was not “obliged to” imme-
diately “assist him in favour of whom” the guarantee had been given.89  
Rather, the guarantee state’s responsibility was “to weigh the preten-
sions of him who claims his guaranty” and to come to that party’s aid 
only if the claim of violation was found to be credible.90  By contrast, if 
the guarantee state determined that the claims were “ill founded,” it 
could “refuse to support [the party claiming the guarantee], without fail-
ing in [its] engagements.”91  The guaranteeing power thus acted as a 
kind of neutral, third-party monitor of treaty compliance, capable of 
providing both assistance in obtaining redress for violations of treaty 
rights and some measure of protection against fabricated claims of  
violation. 
Importantly, however, by agreeing to serve as the guarantee of a par-
ticular treaty, or particular provisions of a given treaty,92 the guarantee-
ing state acquired no new or additional rights, apart from the obligation 
to come to the aid of a complaining state.93  Because the provision of 
guarantee was given “in favour of the contracting powers,” the guaran-
tee state was not “authorise[d] . . . to interfere in the execution of the 
treaty, or to enforce the observance of it, unasked, and of [its] own ac-
cord.”94  Thus, if the contracting parties chose to alter the terms of their 
agreement, or even to cancel it altogether, the guarantee would have no 
just right to oppose them.95  Nor could the guaranteeing state intervene 
in cases where one party to a treaty chose to “favour the other by a 
relaxation of any claim” arising from a breach of the treaty.96 
This limitation on the power of the guaranteeing state was of great 
importance to the effective operation of the guarantee regime.  Allowing 
guarantee states the power to intermeddle in the internal affairs of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Sides; which Engagement . . . implies a sort of Agreement, by which they oblige themselves to assist 
the Party invaded contrary to Treaty, against the injurious Aggressor”).  
 88 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVI, § 235. 
 89 Id. § 237. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id.  
 92 See MARTENS, supra note 73, at 337 (noting that “[a] guarantee may extend to the treaty in 
general, or be confined to some particular article or articles of it”).  
 93 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVI, § 236. 
 94 Id.  
 95 See id.; see also, e.g., MARTENS, supra note 73, at 338 (“A guarantee has no right to oppose 
the alterations that the contracting parties may afterwards make in the treaty by mutual con-
sent . . . .”).  A guarantee would not, however, be bound to enforce any treaty or provision that was 
revised without obtaining the guarantee’s consent.  Id. 
 96 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVI, § 236. 
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guaranteed state without invitation would both diminish the sovereignty 
of the guaranteed state and deter nations from resorting to the guarantee 
mechanism as a means of treaty enforcement.  For this reason, Vattel 
took particular care to emphasize the limited scope of the guarantee’s 
authority, noting that “[t]his observation is of great importance: for care 
should be taken, lest, under colour of being a guarantee, a powerful 
sovereign should render [itself] the arbiter of the affairs of [its] neigh-
bours, and pretend to give them laws.”97 
Although guarantee provisions often committed the contracting par-
ties to defend either the territorial integrity of a guaranteed state98 or 
compliance with particular treaty terms, such provisions could apply “to 
every species of right and obligation that can exist between nations.”99  
Among other things, guarantee provisions could be and sometimes were 
drafted to ensure adherence to and recognition of certain internal gov-
ernmental arrangements.  One of the most famous examples of treaty 
provisions being used in this way involved the Pragmatic Sanction of 
1713, through which Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI of Austria 
sought to secure the succession to the throne of his daughter, Maria  
Theresa, in contravention of preexisting rules of primogeniture.100  An-
ticipating that Maria Theresa’s right to rule would be challenged by 
other sovereigns, Charles VI sought to secure her inheritance through a 
series of treaties in which other nations pledged to “guaranty” the order 
of succession contemplated by Charles’s decree.101  In the aftermath of 
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 97 Id.  
 98 See, e.g., CHARLES JENKINSON, EARL OF LIVERPOOL, A DISCOURSE ON THE CON-
DUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT-BRITAIN IN RESPECT TO NEUTRAL NATIONS DUR-
ING THE PRESENT WAR 44 (Dublin, Hulton Bradley 1759) (“The proper Object of Guaranties is 
the Preservation of some particular Country in the Possession of some particular Power.”). 
 99 WHEATON, supra note 36, pt. III, ch. II, § 10, at 192. 
 100 C.A. Macartney, The Habsburg Dominions, in 7 THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY: 
THE OLD REGIME, 1713–63, at 391, 397 (J.O. Lindsay ed., 3d ed. 1966).  Charles VI ascended to 
the throne upon the death of his brother, the Emperor Joseph I, bypassing Joseph’s two surviving 
daughters.  Id. at 393.  At the time of his ascension, Charles was the last surviving member of the 
recognized Habsburg line of succession and had not yet fathered any children himself.  Id.  Prior to 
Joseph’s death, Charles had pledged that if he were to die without a male heir, Joseph’s daughters 
would succeed him.  Id.  The elaborate planning and diplomatic effort that Charles placed into 
securing international recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction reflected both an effort to avoid dis-
memberment of the Habsburg dominions as well as an effort to obviate his earlier pledge to recog-
nize his nieces’ claim to the throne.  Id. at 393–98. 
 101 See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Alliance, Between the Emperor Charles VI, and George II, King 
of Great Britain, in Which the States of the United Provinces of the Netherlands Are Included, 
Austria-Gr. Brit., art. II, Mar. 16, 1731, in 2 CHARLES JENKINSON, A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
TREATIES OF PEACE, ALLIANCE, AND COMMERCE, BETWEEN GREAT-BRITAIN AND 
OTHER POWERS, FROM THE TREATY SIGNED AT MUNSER IN 1648, TO THE TREATIES 
SIGNED AT PARIS IN 1783, at 318, 320–21 (London, J. Debrett 1785) [hereinafter JENKINSON] 
(reflecting a pledge on the part of Great Britain and the United Provinces of the Netherlands to 
“guaranty, with all their forces, that order of succession which his Imperial Majesty [Charles VI] 
has declared and established,” id. at 321).  Though Vattel observed that “most of the powers of 
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the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which deposed the Catholic King 
James II, Great Britain extracted similar treaty commitments from other 
states pledging support for the “Protestant succession” to the throne in 
the line of its current possessors.102 
At first glance, such matters of internal state governance might seem 
an unusual subject for treaty making.  But the complex web of diplo-
matic, military, and familial relationships that bound together the states 
of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries meant that con-
flicts over internal governance could easily spill over into international 
conflict.  The treaty commitments secured by Charles VI on behalf of 
his daughter’s succession, for example, proved inadequate to preserve 
the peace following his death in 1740.  Competing claims backed by 
Prussia, France, and other European powers (in contravention of their 
earlier treaty commitments) soon plunged the continent’s major powers 
into the eight-year War of Austrian Succession.103  Against this back-
ground, it is hardly surprising that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
treaty drafters would resort to pledges of guarantee as an additional 
safeguard for the continued security and integrity of their existing forms 
of government. 
II. “GUARANTEE” IN THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE  
AS A TERM OF ART 
Establishing that the term “guarantee” could carry a specialized 
term-of-art meaning in some contexts does not prove that the term, as 
used in Article IV of the 1787 Constitution, would, in fact, have  
been understood to carry such a specialized meaning.104  The word 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Europe” had “guarantied” Charles’s decree, Vattel was of the view that such commitments were 
better characterized as “treaties of alliance” given the reciprocal nature of the pledges at issue and 
the absence of the neutral third-party enforcement mechanism for which he believed the term “guar-
antee” should be reserved.  VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVI, § 238.  
 102 See, e.g., Treaty Between Ulrica Eleonora, Queen of Sweden; and George King of Great  
Britain, for 18 Years, Concluded by the Mediation of the Most Christian King; by Which the Parties 
Agree to Assist One Another Mutually, in Every Case of Necessity, on the Basis of Former Treaties, 
Which Are Hereby Reaffirmed, Gr. Brit.-Swed., art. XVI, Jan. 21, 1720, in 2 JENKINSON, supra 
note 101, at 251, 261 (reflecting pledge by Sweden to “maintain and guarantee the succession to the 
crown of Great Britain . . . in the family of his Britannick Majesty now upon the throne”); The 
Treaty of Guaranty for the Protestant Succession to the Crown of Great Britain, and the Barrier of 
the States General, Concluded at Utrecht, January 29, 1713, Between the Queen of Great Britain, 
and the States General of the United Netherlands, Gr. Brit.-Neth., Jan. 29, 1713, in 1 JENKINSON, 
supra note 101, at 364, 366. 
 103 See generally HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND 
AMERICA: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, 1842, at 166–71 
(New York, Gould, Banks & Co. 1845) (discussing aftermath of Charles VI’s death and the collapse 
of the Pragmatic Sanction). 
 104 Maggs, supra note 67, at 374 (“Just because a word may have a specialized legal meaning does 
not necessarily indicate that the specialized legal meaning was used in the Constitution.”). 
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“guarantee” was also sometimes used in the late eighteenth century to 
convey a meaning much closer to its conventional modern meaning — 
that is, as a promise or assurance of the continued existence of some 
particular state of affairs.105  This section will therefore consider the 
textual and contextual evidence bearing on which of the possible mean-
ings of the term “guarantee” is most plausibly reflected in Article IV’s 
fourth section.  Section II.A begins this analysis with a brief overview 
of the political condition of the several states with respect to one another 
at the time of the Constitution’s framing and the influence of the inter-
national law paradigm in structuring thought regarding interstate rela-
tions.  Section II.B considers what inferences can be drawn from the 
constitutional text, including by virtue of the Guarantee Clause’s loca-
tion in Article IV as well as the Clause’s somewhat unusual syntactical 
structure.  Section II.C considers a variety of contextual evidence that 
may bear on the most plausible understanding of the provision stretch-
ing from the preconstitutional period through the framing and ratifica-
tion debates and into the early post-ratification period. 
A.  The Founding-Era Background: Interstate Relations  
as International Relations 
Understanding the potential significance of international law princi-
ples to the original meaning of the Article IV Guarantee Clause requires 
a basic understanding of the complex and contested relationship be-
tween state and national sovereignty in the post-Revolutionary period.  
In the Declaration of Independence, the Second Continental Congress 
famously declared the “United Colonies” in North America “to be Free 
and Independent States.”106  But in this formulation lurked an ambigu-
ity — was the independence asserted on behalf of these “Free and  
Independent States” declared in their collective capacity as a single sov-
ereign entity?  Or did the Declaration instead assert the independence 
of thirteen separate and distinct sovereign nations?107 
The model of sovereign states uniting together in a loose confederacy 
of the type reflected in the Revolution-era Congress and, later, the  
Articles of Confederation was hardly unknown to eighteenth-century 
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 105 See, e.g., NOAH WEBSTER, An Address to the Dissenting Members of the Late Convention 
in Pennsylvania, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND FUGITIV WRITINGS ON MORAL, HIS-
TORICAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY SUBJECTS 99, 142, 145 (Boston, I. Thomas & E.T.  
Andrews 1790) (“Yes, gentlemen, you know, that under such a general license [of freedom of the 
press], a man who should publish a treatise to prove his Maker a knave, must be screened from legal 
punishment. . . . But the truth must not be concealed.  The constitutions of several States guarantee 
that very license.”). 
 106 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). 
 107 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 19 (2d 
ed. 1996) (“There is disagreement as to whether the Declaration of Independence declared a single 
sovereign entity or thirteen independent nation-states.”). 
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international law.108  Vattel, for instance, acknowledged that “several 
sovereign and independent states may unite themselves together by per-
petual confederacy, without ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect 
state.”109  As examples, Vattel identified the ancient city-states of Greece 
as well as the United Provinces of the Netherlands and the Swiss can-
tons.110  The voluntary agreement of such states to unite together in a 
single “federal republic,” according to Vattel, did not “impair the sover-
eignty of each member,” even though the states themselves might vol-
untarily “put some restraint on the exercise” of their sovereignty by mu-
tual agreement.111 
It is plain that at least some members of the Founding gener- 
ation viewed the relationship between the newly established states and 
the nascent federal government — at least prior to the adoption of the 
federal Constitution in 1787 — in precisely this way.  For example, the 
Pennsylvania High Court of Errors and Appeals declared in a 1784 opin-
ion: “This State has all the powers of Independent Sovereignty by the 
Declaration of Independence . . . except what were resigned by the” Arti-
cles of Confederation, which were ratified in 1781.112  In a pamphlet pub-
lished shortly after the federal Constitution’s ratification, Massachusetts 
Attorney General James Sullivan opined that, through the Declaration of 
Independence, each of the thirteen former British colonies “became free, 
sovereign, and independent states,” and that the subsequently adopted 
Articles of Confederation were “in the nature of any other treaty between 
nations, who were equally independent of each other.”113  The Articles of 
Confederation themselves acknowledged that “[e]ach State retains its 
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, 
and right, which is not by this confederation, expressly delegated to” the 
Confederation government.114 
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 108 See, e.g., LACROIX, supra note 41, at 18–20, 124–26 (discussing influence of continental the-
ories of divided sovereignty in early American discussions of federalism).  
 109 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. I, ch. I, § 10. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Talbot v. Commanders & Owners of Three Brigs, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 95, 99 (Pa. 1784) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 113 JAMES SULLIVAN, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 24 (Boston, Samuel Hall 1791). 
 114 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II; see also, e.g., Letter from Edmund  
Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 30, 1784), in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 513, 
514 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1952) (“Virginia and [South Carolina] are as distinct from each other 
as France and [Great] Britain, except in the instances, provided for by the confederation.”). 
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Not everyone agreed, however, that the states were truly “sovereign” 
in the sense used by writers on the law of nations.115  The sovereign 
status of the states — and the relationship between state sovereignty 
and national sovereignty — involved questions that were contested dur-
ing the Founding period116 and that remain so, to some extent, even 
today.117  The adoption of the federal Constitution of 1787 clarified the 
boundaries between state and federal sovereign responsibilities to some 
extent but did not fully settle the sovereignty question.  The Philadelphia 
debates featured some boldly nationalistic proposals that called for abol-
ishing state sovereignty completely.118  But such proposals did not find 
their way into the Convention’s final product.  The Constitution, as it 
emerged from Philadelphia, contemplated a powerful new national gov-
ernment — but one built upon a superstructure that both presupposed 
and depended on the continued existence of the states as separate sov-
ereign (or at least, quasi-sovereign) entities.119 
Although the newly established federal structure did not fit exactly 
within any established framework recognized by writers on the law of 
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 115 See, e.g., BENJAMIN RUSH, On the Defects of the Confederation (1787), in THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 26, 28 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1947) (contending that “[t]he 
people of America have mistaken the meaning of the word sovereignty” by characterizing states as 
sovereigns and arguing that true sovereignty must include “the power of making war and peace”).  
 116 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, 
at 354 (1972) (“The problem of sovereignty was not solved by the Declaration of Independence.  It 
continued to be the most important theoretical question of politics throughout the following decade, 
the ultimate abstract principle to which nearly all arguments were sooner or later reduced.”).  
 117 Compare Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[T]he sovereign immunity of the States 
neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.  Rather, as the  
Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, 
the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed 
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . .”), with Seminole Tribe 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 149–50 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s position runs afoul of 
the general theory of sovereignty that gave shape to the Framers’ enterprise.  An enquiry into the 
development of that concept demonstrates that American political thought had so revolutionized 
the concept of sovereignty itself that calling for the immunity of a State as against the jurisdiction 
of the national courts would have been sheer illogic.”). 
 118 See, e.g., William Paterson, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 9, 1787), in 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 185, 186 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [here-
inafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (speech of Edmund Randolph) (“The States as States must be cut 
up, and destroyed — This is the way to form us into a Nation . . . .”); Robert Yates, Notes on the 
Constitutional Convention (June 19, 1787), in FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra, at 294, 294 (speech of 
Alexander Hamilton) (“I have well considered the subject, and am convinced that no amendment 
of the confederation can answer the purpose of a good government, so long as state sovereignties 
do, in any shape, exist . . . .”). 
 119 See, e.g., John C. Harrison, In the Beginning Are the States, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
173, 173 (1998) (“[T]he Constitution, the federal government, and federal law are a superstructure 
built on top of something else — the states.”). 
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nations or politics,120 the continued existence of the states and the sig-
nificant role accorded them under the new Constitution left plenty of 
room for viewing the states as fully sovereign and independent with 
respect to those powers not explicitly ceded to the federal government.121 
Whatever the actual metaphysical status of state sovereignty during 
the Founding and Critical Periods,122 it is clear that the international 
law paradigm governing relations between independent sovereigns pro-
vided at least a useful structural analogy for managing relationships be-
tween the states, as well as relations between the states and the nascent 
federal government.123  Thus, for example, courts in the early Republic 
(both state and federal) routinely looked to international law principles 
in addressing such issues as border disputes,124 interstate jurisdiction 
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 120 See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 1559, 1580–81 (2002) (“Unlike the ‘confederate republic’ suggested by the Articles of  
Confederation, the governmental framework contemplated by the Constitution did not fit comfort-
ably into any of the preexisting categories familiar to political scientists.” (footnote omitted)); see 
also, e.g., Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 970, 995 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1990) 
[hereinafter DHRC] (reporting Madison’s statement that the “mixed nature” of the government 
provided for in the Constitution “is in a manner unprecedented: We cannot find one express example 
in the experience of the world: — It stands by itself”). 
 121 See, e.g., Bromley v. Hutchins, 8 Vt. 194, 196 (1836) (“Except in those delegations of power 
invested in the general government and those restrictions provided in the United States constitution, 
each state is a national sovereignty and holds the same relation to the other states which it holds to 
other nations.”); Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92 (1827) (“The jurisdictions of the several 
states as such, are distinct, and in most respects foreign.  The constitution of the United States 
makes the people of the United States subjects of one government quoad every thing within the 
national power and jurisdiction, but leaves them subjects of separate and distinct governments.”); 
Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 358, 374–75 n.* (1810) (opinion of Sedgwick, J.) (“I consider 
the states of the Union as distinct and independent sovereignties, to all intents and purposes, except 
so far as their powers are controuled by the letter or manifest intention of the national compact.”); 
Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424, 429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806) (“Notwithstanding the political compact 
that connects the United States as a federal republic, the several states must be considered as dis-
tinct and independent sovereignties, governed by different laws and customs.”); State v. Knight, 1 
N.C. (Tay.) 44, 45 (1799) (“The States are to be considered, with respect to each other, as independent 
sovereignties, possessing powers completely adequate to their own government, in the exercise of 
which they are limited only by the nature and objects of government, by their respective constitu-
tions, and by that of the United States.”). 
 122 The Critical Period refers to the years between the end of the American Revolution in 1783 
and the inauguration of George Washington in 1789.  For further exposition of the term and an 
account of the importance of this period in early American history, see generally JOHN FISKE, THE 
CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1783–1789 (rev. ed. 1902). 
 123 Cf. Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 49 (2006) 
(noting the Supreme Court’s use of international law rules regulating “the loose association of nation 
states within the global legal system” as a “structural analogy” for interpreting constitutional pro-
visions addressing relations between states in the U.S. federal system). 
 124 See, e.g., Handly’s Lessee v. Anthony, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 374, 379–80 (1820) (relying upon 
Vattel to determine proper resolution of boundary dispute between Indiana and Kentucky). 
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and judgment recognition,125 extradition,126 choice of law,127 and sover-
eign immunity.128 
Of course, not every rule of public international law applicable to 
nation states should necessarily be imputed to the unique governmental 
structure contemplated by the 1787 Constitution.129  But the back-
ground structural principle of state sovereignty provides a reasonable 
basis for believing that at least some international law concepts may 
have influenced understandings regarding the proper structural relation-
ship between the states as well as between the states and the federal 
government.  This background structural principle provides a useful 
prism through which to view the textual and historical evidence bearing 
on the original public meaning of the Guarantee Clause. 
B.  Textual Evidence 
A natural starting point for assessing the original meaning of the 
Guarantee Clause is with the constitutional text itself.  Although the text 
of the Clause is relatively sparse, certain textual features, including its 
placement in the Constitution and its unusual syntactical structure, tend 
to support the view that the Clause may have been influenced by inter-
national law principles. 
1.  Location, Location, Location: The Article IV Guarantee 
Clause.130 — As with real estate, when it comes to the constitutional text, 
location is not quite everything, but it is certainly a very important 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 125 See, e.g., D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174 (1851) (looking to “well-established 
rules of international law, regulating governments foreign to each other” to determine the scope of 
states’ obligations to recognize one another’s judgments under the Full Faith and Credit  Clause). 
 126 See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 327, 348–50 (1833) (looking to principles of 
“international law” governing “nations wholly foreign to each other,” id. at 348, to determine scope 
of states’ powers and responsibilities with respect to fugitive suspects). 
 127 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Livingston, 6 N.J.L. 236, 283 (1822) (invoking Vattel to determine the 
“law of nations” applicable to a question of an asserted conflict between laws of New Jersey and 
New York); Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 474, 477 (1820) (citing Vattel as authority 
for necessity of comity in conflict between Kentucky and Indiana laws concerning slavery);  
Williamson’s Adm’rs v. Smart, 1 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 355, 361 (1801) (opinion of Taylor, J.) (looking 
to “principle[s] of the law of nations” to determine whether Virginia or North Carolina law governed 
in a case involving succession to movable property). 
 128 See, e.g., Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 n.a, 78 n.a (Pa. C.P. 1781) (argument of counsel) 
(citing Vattel as support for the principle that “a sovereign, when in a foreign country, is always 
considered by civilized nations, as exempt from its jurisdiction, privileged from arrests, and not 
subject to its laws”). 
 129 Cf. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (14 How.) 66, 99–100 (1860) (concluding that international 
state practice of refusing to extradite “political offenders,” id. at 100, did not limit scope of state 
obligations under the Extradition Clause).  
 130 This section title is inspired by (that is, stolen from) Professors Gary Lawson and Guy  
Seidman.  See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1, 43 (using a nearly identical heading title to emphasize the importance of the Treaty Clause’s 
location in Article II). 
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thing.131  Each of the seven numbered Articles of the 1787 Constitution 
corresponds in general terms to a particular thematic subject matter.132  
Articles I, II, and III define the composition and the powers of the three 
departments of the federal government — legislative, executive, and ju-
dicial, respectively.133  Article V sets forth the procedures for amending 
the Constitution.134  Article VI addresses the Constitution’s status as 
binding law and clarifies the relationship between the Constitution and 
other sources of legal obligation.135  And Article VII specifies the condi-
tions necessary for the “Establishment” of the Constitution through rati-
fication by state conventions.136 
Article IV, which follows immediately after the three Articles outlin-
ing the structure of the federal government, takes as its central focus the 
“horizontal” relationships between states within the federal Union.137  
Although Article IV is sometimes regarded as something of a hodge-
podge of miscellaneous provisions with little thematic connection to one 
another,138 the arrangement and content of its provisions clearly  
reflect the Article’s overarching concern with mediating and mitigating 
potential sources of tension between state governments.139  Given this 
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 131 See, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419 (1819) (pointing to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause’s placement “among the powers of Congress” — that is, in Article I, § 8, rather 
than “among the limitations on those powers” as in Article I, § 9 — as suggesting the provision was 
intended to enhance, rather than restrict, Congress’s power); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 
148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (inferring from the Suspension Clause’s placement in Article I, 
which is “devoted to the legislative department of the United States, and has not the slightest ref-
erence to the executive department” that Congress, not the President, possesses the sole power to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus).  
 132 See, e.g., Matthew Spalding, Introduction to the Constitution, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE 
TO THE CONSTITUTION 7, 11 (David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014) (“The  
Constitution is divided into seven parts, or articles, each dealing with a general subject.”). 
 133 U.S. CONST. art. I (defining the powers of Congress); id. art. II (defining the powers of the 
President); id. art. III (defining the powers of the federal courts). 
 134 Id. art. V. 
 135 Id. art. VI, cl. 1 (specifying that debts previously contracted and engagements entered into 
“shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation”); 
id. cl. 2 (providing for the supremacy of the Constitution and federal laws and treaties over state 
law); id. cl. 3 (requiring officeholders to pledge an oath to support the Constitution).  
 136 Id. art. VII. 
 137 Jonathan Toren, Note, Protecting Republican Government from Itself: The Guarantee Clause 
of Article IV, Section 4, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 371, 385 (2007) (“Article IV as a whole deals with 
the states’ relationship with the federal government and with each other.”).  
 138 See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITO-
RIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 28 (2004) (referring to Article IV as a “grab 
bag of miscellaneous provisions”); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1477 (2007) (observing that “Article IV is not often considered as a single 
entity”). 
 139 See Metzger, supra note 138, at 1471–72 (noting that Article IV’s “principal provisions limit 
the states’ ability to discriminate against one another — whether by not respecting sister state judg-
ments, laws, and criminal proceedings, or by denying out-of-state residents the right to engage in 
economic and other activity within the state”). 
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emphasis on mediating horizontal relationships between distinct sover-
eign entities, Article IV provides the clearest example “of the Constitu-
tion as an international governance project.”140 
The Article’s first two sections contain a set of requirements imposed 
on the states directly — obligating them to accord “Full Faith and Credit” 
to each other’s “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings,”141 to ex-
tend to citizens of other states the same “Privileges and Immunities” they 
accord their own citizens,142 and to cooperate with one another with 
respect to the extradition of fugitives and the return of escaped slaves.143  
The subjects addressed by each of these provisions had long been famil-
iar subjects of international treaties between sovereign nations.144 
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 140 Lee, supra note 41, at 1051; see also, e.g., In re Romaine, 23 Cal. 585, 589 (1863) (describing 
certain provisions of Article IV as being “to a great extent, a recognition of rights founded upon 
principles of international law”). 
 141 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 142 Id. § 2, cl. 1. 
 143 See id. cl. 2 (obligating states to “deliver[] up” fugitives fleeing from justice in another state 
upon the demand of the “executive Authority” of that state); id. cl. 3 (obligating states to “deliver[] 
up” “Person[s] held to Service or Labour in one State . . . escaping into another”).  
 144 For examples of treaty provisions imposing obligations similar in nature to the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, see Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the Empire of Russia and the Crown 
of Denmark, Concluded at St. Petersburg, the 8/19 of October, 1782, Den.-Russ., art. VII, Oct. 8/19, 
1782, in 3 JENKINSON, supra note 101, at 268, 271–72 (requiring that “full faith and credit” be 
given to the contents of certain “letters and passports,” id. at 272, verifying the cargo of Russian 
ships); The Treaty of Peace Between the Crowns of France and Spain, Concluded and Sign’d by 
His Eminency Cardinal Mazarine, and Don Lewis Mendez de Haro, Plenipotentiarys of Their Most 
Christian and Catholick Majestys, in the Isle Call’d of the Pheasants, in the River of Bidassoa, 
upon the Confines of the Pyrenean Mountains, the Seventh of November, 1659, Fr.-Spain, art. 
XVII, Nov. 7, 1659, in 1 A GENERAL COLLECTION OF TREATYS, DECLARATIONS OF WAR, 
MANIFESTOS, AND OTHER PUBLICK PAPERS, RELATING TO PEACE AND WAR 39, 47 (London, 
J.J. & P. Knapton et al. 2d ed. 1732) [hereinafter A GENERAL COLLECTION OF TREATYS] 
(providing that “full Faith and Credit shall be given” to certain “Passes and Sea-Letters” issued by 
the contracting states).  See also Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1201, 1216–20 (2009) (noting the similarity between language of Full Faith and Credit 
Clause and earlier treaties). 
  For an example of a treaty provisions imposing obligations similar in nature to the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause, see A Treaty of Peace Between Philip IV, King of Spain, and the United 
Provinces of the Low Countries, Made at Munster, the 30th of January 1648, Low Countries-Spain, 
art. XVI, Jan. 30, 1648, in 1 JENKINSON, supra note 101, at 10, 17 (providing that the inhabitants 
of certain towns shall “enjoy all the same rights, franchises, privileges and immunities” which the 
treaty granted to the United Provinces of the Low Countries).  See also, e.g., Stewart Jay, Origins 
of the Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship Under Article IV, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 27–
28 (2013) (noting the similarity between Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause and earlier 
English treaties). 
  For examples of treaty provisions imposing obligations similar in nature to the Extradition 
and Fugitive Clauses, see Convention Between His Most Christian Majesty and the United States 
of America, for the Purpose of Defining and Establishing the Functions and Privileges of Their 
Respective Consuls and Vice Consuls, Fr.-U.S., art. 9, Nov. 14, 1788, in 1 JONATHAN ELLIOT, 
THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC CODE, EMBRACING A COLLECTION OF TREATIES AND CON-
VENTIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN POWERS: FROM 1778 TO 1834, at 
70, 78–79 (Washington, D.C., Jonathan Elliot, Jr. 1834) (providing for cooperation of contracting 
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The Article’s third section contains no direct inhibition on the states 
but does empower Congress to admit new states to the Union and to 
“dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”145  These 
provisions addressed one of the most significant sources of rivalry be-
tween the states at the time of the Constitution’s formation —  
namely, rivalrous claims to sovereignty over western lands.146  By as-
signing Congress the power to control any territories held by the United 
States in their collective sovereign capacity or which would thereafter 
be surrendered up to the federal government by particular states, the 
Territories Clause provided a framework for the eventual resolution of 
the western lands controversy.147  The provision also provided a limited 
protection for the territorial integrity of the existing states by forbidding 
Congress from erecting new states in any portion of an existing state’s 
territory without that state’s consent148 and by making clear that the 
Constitution’s adoption would not “be so construed as to Prejudice” any 
existing land claims of the existing states.149 
The Guarantee Clause appears in Article IV’s fourth (and final) sec-
tion.  If the Clause were intended as a protection of individual citizens’ 
right to democratic self-governance, as some modern interpreters con-
tend,150 this placement at the conclusion of Article IV would be quite 
odd.  Although other provisions in Article IV had the effect of protecting 
individual rights — principally, the Full Faith and Credit, Privileges and 
Immunities, and Fugitive Slave Clauses — these protections existed pri-
marily to limit potential sources of friction between the sovereign states 
and to bind the states into a more cohesive political union.  Notably, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
nations in securing the return of deserting sailors); Treaty of Peace Between Charles II, King of 
England, and Osman Bassa, and the People of Tripoli; Made the 18th of October 1662, Eng.-Tripoli, 
art. XI, Oct. 18, 1662, in 2 THE LAWS, ORDINANCES, AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE ADMIRALTY 
OF GREAT BRITAIN, CIVIL AND MILITARY 35, 37–38 (London, A. Millar 1746) (obligating Eng-
lish consuls in Tripoli to either cooperate in the return of slaves escaping onto English ships or pay 
a ransom). 
 145 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 146 See infra section II.C.1, pp. 635–46 (discussing late eighteenth-century controversies over 
western land claims); see also, e.g., Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: 
The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2001) 
(observing that addressing the problems of the western land claims “and the related questions of 
whether new states could be created and, if so, by what authority . . . became one of the central 
concerns of the government under the Articles of Confederation and the subsequent Constitution”).  
 147 See infra notes 241–245 and accompanying text (discussing eventual resolution of the western 
lands controversy). 
 148 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
 149 Id. cl. 2. 
 150 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 867 (“The Guarantee Clause is best understood as 
protecting basic rights of political participation within state governments.”).  
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each of these provisions dealt only with the rights citizens enjoyed in 
their dealings with states other than their own.151 
No other provision of Article IV confers any rights on citizens when 
dealing with their native states.  Had the Guarantee Clause been in-
tended to protect individuals against their own state governments, it 
would have been far more natural to place the provision in Article I, 
Section 10: the only other place in the Constitution of 1787 that limits 
what states can do to their own citizens.152  The individual rights inter-
pretation also fits uncomfortably with the surrounding language of  
Section 4 itself, which, in addition to “guaranteeing” each State a  
Republican form of Government, also obligates the United States to 
“protect each of them against Invasion” and (under specified conditions) 
“domestic Violence.”153 
By contrast, interpreting the Guarantee Clause as a treaty-like com-
mitment among separate sovereigns fits comfortably with Article IV’s 
overarching thematic concern with balancing horizontal relations 
among the several states.  As discussed above, matters of internal state 
governance were a familiar subject of treaty provisions, reflecting a 
recognition among diplomatic actors that the internal governmental ar-
rangements through which a particular polity chose to govern itself 
could have profound consequences for that country’s international rela-
tions.154  And as discussed in further detail below, such concerns about 
potential spillover consequences from internal governmental arrange-
ments within particular states for the peace and stability of neighboring 
states was a recurring focus of commentary surrounding the Article IV 
Guarantee Clause during the framing and ratification debates.155 
2.  The Syntax of the Guarantee Clause. — In addition to the  
Guarantee Clause’s placement in Article IV, a further textual clue to the 
provision’s original meaning is provided by its syntax, and particularly 
the arrangement of subject and object in the sentence embodying  
the Clause.  Because “[t]he Constitution prohibits” — or, in some cases, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 151 See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
15–17 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868) (identifying the Full Faith and Credit, Privileges and 
Immunities, and Fugitive Clauses as among the class of provisions that “have for their object to 
prevent discrimination by the several States against the citizens and public proceedings of other 
States,” id. at 15). 
 152 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting States from, inter alia, “pass[ing] any Bill of 
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts”). 
 153 Id. art. IV, § 4. 
 154 See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (discussing treaty provisions that guaranteed 
internal governmental arrangements). 
 155 See infra notes 308–315 and accompanying text (discussing concern that imposition of mon-
archy or despotism in one state may threaten security of other states). 
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requires — “certain actions,”156 figuring out what the Constitution re-
quires (or forbids) in any particular instance involves identifying some 
particular constitutional actor who is bound by the relevant require-
ment.157  Both the object of the Guarantee Clause — that is, “every 
State” — and its subject — “the United States”158 — have received in-
sufficient scrutiny in modern scholarship addressing the Clause.  It will 
therefore be useful to consider each of these facets of the Guarantee 
Clause’s syntax in turn. 
(a)  The Object of the Guarantee Clause. — Both the Supreme Court 
and most modern commentators have read the Guarantee Clause as a 
restriction on the states.159  On this reading, the Clause obligates states 
to provide their own citizens with a “republican form of government” 
and empowers the federal government to subject the states to any form 
of compulsion needed should they fail to meet that obligation.160  But 
this understanding is very nearly the opposite of what a literal reading 
of the Clause seems to suggest.  The Clause clearly identifies “every 
State” as the object of the guarantee requirement, rather than its subject.  
This structure strongly suggests that the Clause was intended to benefit, 
rather than to burden, the several states. 
This seeming mismatch between the language of the Guarantee 
Clause and its widespread modern understanding has received little at-
tention in modern scholarship addressing the Clause’s meaning.  To the 
extent the mismatch has been noticed at all, the overwhelming tendency 
has been to either dismiss the textual inconsistency or try to explain it 
away.  For example, Professor Arthur Bonfield has suggested that the 
reference to “every State” in the Guarantee Clause may refer not to states 
in their sovereign or governmental capacity but rather “to the people of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 156 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1212 
(2010).  
 157 Id. at 1212–14. 
 158 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 159 See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911) (concluding the Clause “may imply the duty 
of [each] new State to provide itself with such [republican] state government”); Minor v. Happersett, 
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175 (1875) (declaring that the Clause “necessarily implies a duty on the part 
of the States themselves to provide” a republican form of government); Hans A. Linde, When Ini-
tiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 
OR. L. REV. 19, 20 (1993) (noting that the Clause “obligates each state to govern itself by republican 
institutions”); Merritt, supra note 20, at 25 (“[The Guarantee Clause] promise plainly restricts the 
freedom of the states.”); Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1523, 1533 (2007) (“The U.S. Constitution plainly requires each state to have a republican 
form of government . . . .”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 
N.M. L. REV. 271, 290 n.107 (1998) (“Article IV requires the states to guarantee to their citizens ‘a 
republican form of government’ . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 160 As described by one of the leading modern promoters of this reading, Judge Hans Linde, the 
Guarantee Clause imposes merely “a secondary, derivative duty on the United States” while “the 
primary responsibility for republican institutions is on each state.”  Hans A. Linde, State Courts 
and Republican Government, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 951, 952 (2001).  
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every state, for only they would benefit by such a provision.”161  As 
support for this interpretation, Bonfield leans heavily on the assumption 
that a contrary reading would render the Clause nugatory since a non-
republican state government would never have occasion to demand as-
sistance against its own conduct.162 
But this analysis overlooks the possibility of multiple competing 
claimants to represent the legitimate government within a particular 
state.  Such a possibility is hardly absurd.  After all, the most famous 
case in Supreme Court history addressing the Clause’s meaning —  
Luther v. Borden — involved precisely such a dispute between compet-
ing claimants.163  Moreover, the example of international treaty guaran-
tees addressing rights to succession and other matters of internal gov-
ernance suggests that such competing claims to legitimacy were not 
unknown to the Founding generation.164 
Further, while Bonfield observes that the term “state” could some-
times be understood as synonymous with the people of a state, the  
Constitution itself reflects a different drafting pattern — distinguishing 
a “State” from its “people” or “citizens.”165  For example, Section 2 of 
Article I provides that members of the House of Representatives are to 
be “chosen . . . by the People of the several States”166 while the first sec-
tion of Article II provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint” members of 
the Electoral College “in such Manner” as its legislature may direct.167  
Similarly, both Section 2 of Article III and the Eleventh Amendment dis-
tinguish between suits brought by “States” and suits brought by the states’ 
“Citizens.”168  Indeed, the asserted equivalency between “State” and the 
state’s citizens is not matched by any other constitutional provision. 
(b)  The Subject of the Guarantee Clause. — One of the most unusual 
textual features of the Guarantee Clause — apart from its use of the 
term “guarantee” — is its choice of subject.  In nearly all other provi-
sions of the Constitution where the federal government is empowered 
or compelled to take certain actions, the constitutional text itself singles 
out a particular branch or agent of the government as possessing the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 161 Bonfield, supra note 13, at 524. 
 162 See id. (asserting that the “absurdity of such a construction would have become apparent.  
For what protection would the state government need against its own action?”). 
 163 See infra notes 414–428 and accompanying text (discussing Luther). 
 164 See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (discussing treaty provisions that guaranteed 
internal governmental arrangements). 
 165 Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 791 (1999) (“Although the 
Constitution itself rarely defines a contested word self-consciously the way a dictionary does, the Con-
stitution does illustrate word usage, and thus serves a basic dictionary function.” (footnote omitted)). 
 166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 167 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 168 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XI. 
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relevant power or duty.169  But Section 4 of Article IV marks the one 
and only instance in which the constitutional text explicitly identifies 
the “United States” itself as the subject of a constitutional command.170 
Modern scholarship addressing the Clause’s original meaning sheds 
little light on the Guarantee Clause’s distinctive choice of subject.  The 
modern suggestion that the Clause was intended to command all three 
branches of the federal government does not fully explain the generic 
reference to the “United States” as its subject.  In other instances where 
the Constitution confers powers or imposes duties on different branches 
of the federal government with respect to the same subject matter, the 
text clearly and carefully specifies which branch possesses which powers 
or responsibilities with respect to that subject.  For example, all three 
branches of the federal government share some responsibility for mat-
ters touching on war and international diplomacy.171  And while the text 
certainly does not allow for a clear and unambiguous demarcation of 
the boundary line separating one branch’s powers from those of the oth-
ers,172 the existence of the lines themselves reflects a drafting strategy 
that is markedly different from the Guarantee Clause’s undifferentiated 
conferral of responsibility on the “United States” in its collective, corpo-
rate capacity. 
Once again, the treaty analogy may shed some light on the Guarantee 
Clause’s reference to the “United States.”  Under eighteenth-century in-
ternational law, as today, a valid treaty bound the nation as a whole, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 169 This pattern is so consistent that it is easy to overlook the Guarantee Clause’s distinctive 
exception.  See Gary Lawson, Delegation and the Constitution, 22 REG. 23, 24 (1999) (asserting 
that “[t]he Constitution nowhere grants power to ‘the federal government’ as a unitary entity” with-
out mentioning the Guarantee Clause); cf. John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of 
Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1096 n.105 (2015) 
(mentioning a handful of other collective references to “the United States” that might be read to 
imply additional collective powers). 
 170 Bonfield, supra note 13, at 523 (“The provision’s opening . . . provides the only instance where 
the government by its corporate name is given a duty.”). 
 171 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations”); id. cl. 10 (authorizing Congress to “define and punish Piracies . . . and Offences against 
the Law of Nations”); id. cl. 11 (authorizing Congress to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The 
President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the 
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”); id. cl. 
2 (authorizing the President to make treaties “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate”); 
id. § 3 (providing the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”); id. art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 1 (providing that federal judicial power “shall extend to” particular categories of suits, in-
cluding, among others, cases “arising under” federal treaties, cases “affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls,” cases of “admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction” and controversies 
“between a State, or the Citizens thereof; and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”).   
 172 Cf. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957, at 171 (4th 
ed. 1957) (describing constitutional provisions allocating foreign affairs powers as “an invitation to 
struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy”). 
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irrespective of the internal governmental processes that might be neces-
sary to comply with that treaty.173  Treaty drafters thus typically had no 
need to carefully specify the precise domestic legal actors whose cooper-
ation and compliance would be needed to carry the treaty into effect.  
Rather, once validly ratified, each contracting nation was responsible 
for ensuring compliance with its treaty commitments through whichever 
domestic mechanisms might have been required.174 
As will be discussed in further detail below, negotiations over the 
text that would eventually evolve into the Guarantee Clause began dur-
ing the Confederation Period, long before the Philadelphia Convention 
convened.175  At that time, the relations between the several states and 
between the states and the nascent federal government were far differ-
ent and far less settled than those set in place by the federal Constitution 
of 1787.176  But under eighteenth-century international law, such 
changes in internal governmental structure would not affect the nature 
of the obligation imposed on a nation by virtue of a treaty.  Vattel and 
other late eighteenth-century commentators agreed that a change in the 
form of government would not necessarily affect the binding force of its 
treaty commitments.177 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 173 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 207 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“A state acts through its government, but the state is 
responsible for carrying out its obligations under international law regardless of the manner in 
which its constitution and laws allocate the responsibilities and functions of government, or of any 
constitutional or other internal rules or limitations.”). 
 174 For example, the eighteenth-century British constitutional system divided foreign affairs pow-
ers between the Crown and Parliament — vesting the Crown with virtually plenary formal author-
ity to commit the nation to a treaty but requiring Parliament’s cooperation for the treaty to have 
any domestic legal authority.  See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self- 
Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 697–98 (1995) (describing the British treaty practice).  
But a refusal of Parliament to enact auxiliary legislation needed to carry the treaty into effect did 
not affect the treaty’s validity as a matter of international law.  Once validly ratified, the treaty was 
fully effectual as an international commitment, and a failure by any branch or department to take 
measures needed to carry it into execution would simply amount to a breach.  See, e.g., James 
Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 118, at 384, 393 (remarks of William Johnson) (noting that the British constitution vested 
“[f]ull & compleat power” in the “King of [Great Britain]” with respect to the making of treaties and 
that “[i]f the Parliament should fail to provide the necessary means of execution, the Treaty would 
be violated”). 
 175 See infra section II.C.1.b, pp. 639–43. 
 176 See supra notes 108–116 and accompanying text (discussing contested nature of sovereignty 
in Confederation era). 
 177 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XII, § 185 (“Since . . . a treaty directly relates to the body 
of the state, it subsists, though the form of the republic should happen to be changed, — even 
though it should be transformed into a monarchy.”).  A similar principle is recognized under modern 
international law.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES, supra note 173, at § 208 cmt. a (“Under international law, the capacities, rights, 
and duties” of a state “appertain to the state, not to the government which represents it. . . . They 
are not affected by a mere change in the regime or in the form of government or its ideology.”). 
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Thus, if understood by reference to the treaty analogy, a commitment 
on behalf of the “United States” to guarantee the sovereign rights of 
particular states would impose a roughly equivalent obligation irrespec-
tive of whether the referent of that term was the loose confederation 
government that existed under the Articles or the newly empowered na-
tional government established by the 1787 Constitution.  The Framers 
of the 1787 Constitution may thus have seen little difficulty in carrying 
over language that had been repeatedly suggested and debated during 
the Confederation Period on the understanding that the obligations thus 
imposed on the newly established federal government would be essen-
tially identical. 
Of course, this distinctive choice of subject raises difficult interpre-
tive questions regarding the precise manner in which responsibility for 
fulfilling the duty the Clause imposes should be partitioned out among 
the three branches of the federal government.  Article I’s grant of power 
to Congress to “make all Laws” that may be “necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested . . . in the Government 
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof” suggests 
that Congress was likely expected to play a prominent role in the provi-
sion’s enforcement.178  The President too might stake a plausible claim 
to at least some portion of authority with respect to the provision, by 
virtue of either the Vesting Clause179 or the Take Care Clause.180  A more 
difficult question involves what responsibilities, if any, the Guarantee 
Clause enjoins upon the federal courts.  That question, in turn, raises 
questions regarding the nature of the obligation the Guarantee Clause 
imposed on the federal government and whether that obligation was of 
such a nature as to be comprehended within the textual grant to the 
courts of the “judicial Power of the United States.”181  These questions 
will be considered in more detail in Part III below.182 
C.  Contextual Evidence 
While the text provides a useful starting point for assessing the 
meaning and purpose of the Guarantee Clause, such evidence is clearly 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 178 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 179 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”); see also, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive 
Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 256–57 (2001) (arguing that the Vesting Clause of 
Article II is properly read as a grant of additional substantive powers beyond those explicitly enu-
merated in other provisions of Article II). 
 180 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”). 
 181 Id. art. III, § 1; cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: 
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1176 (1992) (contending that the 
Article III Vesting Clause is the “only explicit constitutional source of the federal judiciary’s au-
thority to act”).  
 182 See infra section III.B, pp. 679–87. 
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incomplete.  Because words have meaning only in context, and context 
includes historical context,183 this section will focus on historical evi-
dence relevant to assessing how the language of the Guarantee Clause 
would have been understood by members of the enacting public at the 
time of the Constitution’s adoption.  Section II.C.1 focuses on the pre-
enactment history of the “guarantee” concept and particularly on the use 
of that concept in debates surrounding resolution of the controversy re-
garding the disposition of the western lands under the Articles of  
Confederation.  Section II.C.2 focuses on the debates surrounding the 
framing and ratification of the Constitution, respectively.  Section II.C.3 
summarizes evidence concerning early interpretations of the Guarantee 
Clause during the post-ratification period.  Section II.C.4 summarizes 
and assesses the evidence presented in the preceding sections. 
1.  The Articles of Confederation and the State Land Claims Contro-
versy. — Many accounts of the Guarantee Clause’s historical background 
begin with the records of the Philadelphia Convention.184  Given the 
dearth of similarly worded provisions in the pre-Founding-era documents 
most widely recognized as possible inspirations for the Constitution’s 
Framers,185 this starting point is understandable. 
A few scholars have suggested that the provision may have been in-
spired, in part, by earlier proposals from Virginia respecting the dispo-
sition of its western territorial claims — particularly Thomas Jefferson’s 
drafts for the constitution of Virginia in 1776 and a 1781 Virginia statute 
proposing a cession of certain western territories to the Confederation 
Congress.186  But neither of these provisions contained the critical “guar-
antee” language that is the focus of the present inquiry.187  Nonetheless, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 183 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original 
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 18 (2015) (“[T]he communicative content of an utterance 
is . . . a function of context, and context is time-bound . . . .”).   
 184 See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 13, at 516–20 (discussing the Guarantee Clause’s drafting his-
tory in the Philadelphia Convention); Merritt, supra note 20, at 29–31 (same); Smith, supra note 20, 
at 1957–59 (same). 
 185 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing absence of “guarantee” language in other 
Founding-era documents). 
 186 See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 13, at 15–16 (pointing to both the 1781 statute and Jefferson’s 
draft constitution as possible inspirations for the Guarantee Clause); Heller, supra note 32, at 1735–
36 (same); Smith, supra note 20, at 1958 (noting the 1781 statute).  
 187 Jefferson’s draft Virginia constitution proposed to cede certain of Virginia’s western land 
claims on the condition that new “colonies” be established in the ceded territories “which . . . shall 
be established on the same fundamental laws contained in this instrument & shall be free & inde-
pendent of this colony and of all the world.”  THOMAS JEFFERSON, Proposed Constitution for 
Virginia, June 1776, art. IV, in 2 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 158, 179 (Paul Leicester 
Ford ed., 1904).  Virginia’s 1781 statute offering to cede its western land claims to the Confederation 
Congress similarly required, as a condition of the cession, that the ceded territory be “laid out and 
formed into states” and that “the states so formed shall be distinct republican states and be admitted 
members of the federal union, having the same rights of sovereignty freedom and independence as 
the other states.”  H.D. Resolutions, for a Cession of the Lands on the North West Side of Ohio to 
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these scholars are on the right track in looking to the controversy over 
the western land claims of various states for guidance on the original 
meaning of the Guarantee Clause. 
The conflict over competing claims to sovereignty over western  
lands that rapidly emerged in the wake of the colonies’ Declaration of 
Independence sparked a corresponding debate over the desirability and 
significance of a national “guarantee” of the territorial integrity of the 
states that composed the Union.188 
(a)  Drafting the Articles of Confederation. — The earliest clear pro-
genitor of the Article IV Guarantee Clause appeared almost contempo-
raneously with the nation’s Founding.  On July 12, 1776, John Dickinson 
of Pennsylvania, the chair of a committee appointed by the Second  
Continental Congress “to prepare and digest the form of a confederation 
to be entered into between these colonies,”189 presented to Congress an 
official draft of the Articles of Confederation.190  Article XV of this ini-
tial draft provided that, “[w]hen the Boundaries of any Colony shall be 
ascertained,” either by agreement or by Congress, “all the other Colonies 
shall guarantee to such Colony the full and peaceable Possession of, and 
the free and entire Jurisdiction in and over the Territory included within 
such Boundaries.”191  This mutual guarantee of territorial integrity par-
alleled the mutual guarantees of borders and boundaries that were rou-
tine in eighteenth-century treaties.192 
Unfortunately, as Noah Webster would later observe, the “bounda-
ries of the several states” had not been “drawn with a view to independ-
ence.”193  Prior to the Revolution, disputes about colonial boundaries 
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could be submitted for arbitration by the British government.194  But 
the removal of superintending British authority and the competing and 
overlapping claims to sovereignty asserted by the newly independent 
states rendered the question of territorial boundaries a major source of 
interstate friction.195 
The vast geographical disparities reflected in the colonial charter 
grants spurred tensions between the seven so-called “landed” states, 
which could assert colorable claims to some portion of the immense ter-
ritories lying west of the Allegheny Mountains, and the six “landless” 
states, which lacked such claims.196  Tensions also arose over conflicting 
or overlapping territorial claims in the West, as well as in the more heav-
ily populated eastern regions.  For example, Connecticut staked a claim 
to jurisdiction over a portion of Pennsylvania, at one point supporting 
its claim through an incursion of armed militia troops.197  Along the 
contested border between New York and New Hampshire, a conflict 
over New York’s refusal to recognize the validity of land grants issued 
by New Hampshire’s governor led to the formation of the breakaway 
Republic of Vermont, which unilaterally declared its independence from 
New York and sought recognition as a sovereign and independent 
state.198 
The conflict over the western land claims quickly emerged as one of 
the central challenges facing the nascent federal government.  The land-
less states, wary of entering into a political union with states whose 
boundaries would dwarf their own, insisted that title and jurisdiction to 
the western lands should be held in collective trust by the Confederation 
government and used as a public fund to repay debts incurred during 
the Revolution.199  The landed states insisted on the validity of their 
extensive territorial claims.200 
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Against this backdrop, the framework contemplated by Dickinson’s 
initial draft of the Articles, which would have conferred broad power 
on Congress to determine, and even “cut off,” state boundaries, proved 
politically toxic to the landed states.201  Both the proposal to confer on 
Congress the power to settle state boundaries and the related provision 
calling for a mutual “guarantee” of the boundaries so ascertained were 
dropped from the final draft of the Articles.202 
Instead of conferring on Congress a power to settle state boundaries, 
as Dickinson’s draft contemplated, the final version of the Articles pro-
vided for a complex adjudicative procedure for the settlement of dis-
puted land claims with a proviso “that no State shall be deprived of 
territory for the benefit of the United States.”203  The pledge to “guar-
antee” existing state boundaries was also omitted from the final version, 
the landless states being reluctant to commit to such a guarantee until 
the controversies over territorial boundaries had been resolved.204 
The final version did, however, include a provision specifying that 
each state would retain “its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and 
every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation, 
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”205  
This reservation of sovereignty and jurisdiction, combined with the 
third Article’s pledge of “a firm league of friendship with each other, for 
their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual 
and general welfare,”206 was viewed by many as the functional equiva-
lent of a guarantee and was often referred to as such throughout the 
Confederation Period.207 
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(b)  Demands for “Guarantees” of Territorial Integrity During the 
Confederation Period. — The omission of the “guarantee” provision 
from the final Articles of Confederation did not end debate over the 
desirability of a federal guarantee of state territorial integrity.  The fail-
ure of the landless states to secure recognition in the Articles for federal 
control over the western territories spurred three such states — New 
Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland — to initially refuse ratification.208  
New Jersey and Delaware soon relented and ratified, but Maryland per-
sisted in its refusal.209  Because the Articles required unanimous ap-
proval by the states, Maryland’s refusal prevented the Articles from tak-
ing legal effect, even among the twelve states that had already 
ratified.210  When Maryland’s legislature finally allowed its delegates in 
Congress to assent to the Articles in January 1781, it did so only with 
the express reservation that “no article in the said Confederation, can or 
ought to bind this or any other State, to guarantee any exclusive claim 
of any particular State, to” ownership of any portion of the disputed 
western territories.211 
As early as 1778, a proposed solution to the jurisdictional impasse 
over the western lands emerged from a congressional committee on fi-
nance, which proposed that the states possessing “large uncultivated 
Territory” in the West might be “called on to cede” such territories vol-
untarily, with the promise that the ceded lands would be “erected into 
separate independent States, to be admitted into the Union.”212  In  
February 1780, New York took the first step toward putting the cession 
idea into practice by authorizing its delegates in Congress to cede its 
claims to western lands to the Confederation without condition.213 
New York’s example, and the difficulties the lack of a formal union 
of states posed for national objectives — including the ongoing war 
against Great Britain — spurred Virginia to act.214  But unlike New 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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York, which had volunteered to cede its western territory without con-
dition, Virginia’s representatives hoped to extract from Congress and 
the other confederating states certain concessions, including a formal 
“guaranty” of the state’s remaining territory.215 
In September 1780, Virginia’s delegates to Congress proposed a res-
olution calling for Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia to “cede to the 
United States” their unappropriated western lands and for the United 
States, in turn, to “guaranty the remaining Territory to the said States 
respectively.”216  In January of the following year, Virginia’s legislature 
enacted a law offering to “yield” to Congress all right and title to lands 
lying north and west of the Ohio river, provided Congress would agree 
to a set of specified conditions.217  One of these conditions was that “all 
the remaining territory of Virginia included between the Atlantic ocean 
and the south east side of the river Ohio, and the Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
and North Carolina boundaries, shall be guaranteed to the common-
wealth of Virginia by the said United States.”218 
Although Virginia’s political leadership anticipated that this offer of 
cession would resolve the controversy, their insistence on receiving a 
“guarantee” of the state’s remaining territory soon emerged as a signifi-
cant sticking point in negotiations.219  New York’s delegates to Congress, 
who had been authorized by the state’s legislature to cede its western 
territorial claims without conditions, concluded that it would be “impru-
dent to bind our State in a special guarantee of the jurisdiction of  
Virginia, when our own was not secured in the same manner.”220  The 
delegates thus chose to make New York’s cession conditional on a sub-
sequent “ratification or disavowal” by the state’s legislature “unless the 
boundaries reserved for the future jurisdiction of the . . . State . . . shall 
be guaranteed by the United States, in the same manner and form as 
the territorial rights of the other states shall be guaranteed.”221 
Virginia’s offer of cession was reported to a committee of Congress, 
which eventually concluded that Congress could not agree to the guar-
antee Virginia insisted on as a condition of its cession “without entering 
into a discussion of the right of the State of Virginia to the said land.”222  
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The committee characterized the guarantee request as “either unneces-
sary or unreasonable” because the land was either “really the property 
of the State,” in which case it would be “sufficiently secured by the con-
federation,” or it was not, in which case there would be “no reason or 
consideration for such guarantee.”223  On the basis of this recommenda-
tion, Congress voted to reject Virginia’s cession offer on the terms  
proposed.224 
As the debate over the western land cessions was working its way 
through Congress, Congress was also grappling with the distinct prob-
lem raised by the Vermonters’ assertion of political independence from 
New York and New Hampshire.225  In August 1781, Congress adopted 
a resolution authorizing a committee to confer with Vermont’s repre-
sentatives regarding Vermont’s request for admission to the Union as a 
sovereign, independent state.226  As part of that resolution, Congress 
declared that “in case Congress shall recognize the independence of the 
said people of Vermont, they will consider all the lands belonging to 
New Hampshire and New York, respectively, without the limits of  
Vermont . . . as coming within the mutual guaranty of territory con-
tained in the Articles of Confederation”227 — an apparent reference to 
the second and third Articles.228  Accordingly, the resolution declared 
that “the United States” would “guarantee such lands, and the jurisdic-
tion over the same, against any claims or encroachments from the in-
habitants of Vermont aforesaid.”229 
New York’s legislature initially objected to even these tentative steps 
toward recognizing Vermont’s independence, insisting that “Congress 
have not any authority by the Articles of Confederation” to “intermeddle 
with” its territorial jurisdiction and that any effort to recognize Vermont 
would violate the rights “guarantied” to New York by the second and 
third Articles of Confederation.230  Vermont, too, initially resisted  
Congress’s proposal, with its delegates reporting that they lacked au-
thority to agree to the proposed boundary lines and suggesting instead 
that the boundary question be submitted to the adjudicatory process 
outlined in Article IX.231  In the interim, Vermont continued to claim 
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jurisdiction over towns and territories lying outside the boundaries con-
templated by Congress.232 
In response to Vermont’s rejection, the committee tasked by Congress 
with considering the Vermont question recommended harsh measures 
for bringing the separatists into submission.  In January 1782, the com-
mittee issued a report recommending that if the Vermonters did not 
within one month “desist from attempting to exercise jurisdiction over 
the lands guaranteed to New Hampshire and New York” by Congress’s 
resolutions of August 1781 and assent to the terms Congress had set for 
Vermont’s admission to the Union, such refusal should be regarded “as 
a manifest indication of designs hostile to these United States.”233  In the 
event the Vermonters persisted in their attempts to exercise jurisdiction 
beyond the boundaries set by Congress, the committee recommended  
that all of the territory claimed by the separatists be partitioned between 
the two neighboring states — New York and New Hampshire234 — and 
that the “Commander in Chief of the armies of these United States” be 
authorized to “carry these resolutions as far as they respect his depart-
ment into full execution” against any resisters.235 
Vermont, for its part, denied that its dispute with New York and 
New Hampshire provided any just grounds for federal interference.  A 
pamphlet published at the direction of the Vermont legislature to gener-
ate popular support for their cause insisted that even if the Articles of 
Confederation could be construed to provide for a guarantee of state 
territorial integrity, such guarantee would not extend to the Vermont 
controversy because Vermont’s assertion of independence from New 
York and New Hampshire long predated the Articles’ effective date of 
March 1, 1781.236  Therefore, the Vermonters argued, the Vermont con-
troversy could not “come within the reach of the guarantee of the con-
federation . . . nor is there any manner of propriety in any supposable 
demand [from either New York or New Hampshire] to interfere with or 
espouse their controversy with Vermont.”237 
Congress ultimately chose not to deliver the committee’s proposed 
ultimatum threatening the use of force, the motion to do so failing by  
a narrow vote of six states in favor, six states against, and one state 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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coalition divided.238  Nonetheless, Vermont soon reconsidered its earlier 
refusal of the terms Congress had offered and disclaimed jurisdiction 
over the territories Congress had recognized as lying within the bound-
aries of New York and New Hampshire.239  By this point, however, sup-
port for the Vermonters’ cause in Congress had weakened, and Congress 
refused to extend the same terms — including recognition of independ-
ence and admission to the Union — it had been willing to offer in August 
1781.240 
Eventually, both the Vermont controversy and the related contro-
versy surrounding control of the western lands were resolved peacefully.  
The conclusion of the Revolutionary War brought increased pressure on 
the national government to make good on its promises of land bounties 
to former soldiers and officers.241  In response to calls from General 
Washington and others, Virginia eventually relented and agreed to cede 
its western claims to Congress without condition; Congress accepted 
that offer in 1784.242  Resolution of the Vermont controversy was de-
layed until after the Constitution’s adoption.  Although the language of 
Article IV, Section 3 governing admission of new states might arguably 
have allowed Vermont’s admission as a state notwithstanding New 
York’s objection,243 New York ultimately agreed to negotiate its bound-
ary with Vermont.  Following an agreement between the two states, 
which provided for New York’s formal consent to Vermont’s admission 
as a state and an agreement by Vermont to pay $30,000 in settlement of 
outstanding land claims,244 Congress formally acknowledged Vermont’s 
statehood and admission to the Union in February 1791.245 
* * * 
Most references to “guarantee” in the various Confederation-era doc-
uments discussing the western lands controversy were not accompanied 
by explanations or context that directly illuminate the term’s intended 
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meaning.  Rather, most invocations of the term appear in contexts  
where its meaning and significance were assumed.  Nonetheless, a few 
features of Confederation-era materials suggest that something like the 
international-law understanding of “guarantee” may have been both un-
derstood and intended by most usages of the term. 
For one thing, the types of documents in which the term typically 
appeared — namely, in proposed agreements between the states or be-
tween Congress and particular states — were often described by con-
temporary observers as being in the nature of “treaties.”  For example, 
in reporting back to the governor regarding the progress of their nego-
tiations concerning the state’s western land claims, New York’s dele-
gates to Congress reported that “[f]rom the manner in which this busi-
ness was conducted it was left to us to make the cession without a formal 
treaty with Congress.”246  Likewise, the instructions given by Vermont 
to the delegates it sent to represent its interests before Congress author-
ized them “to propose . . . and receive . . . terms for an union of this 
[state] with the United States, . . . such terms of union or other treaty 
agreed on by them to be subject to ratification of the Legislature of this 
State previous to their establishment.”247 
It also seems clear that participants in the debates over the western 
land claims took the commitment established by guarantee provisions 
extremely seriously.  The disputed status of the western lands led to the 
omission of the guarantee provision that had been included in the initial 
draft of the Articles of Confederation.248  Even after this revision,  
Maryland refused to assent to the Articles out of concern that the re-
maining provisions could be construed as guarantees of the landed 
states’ territorial claims; it eventually agreed to confederate only on the 
express understanding that no provision of the Articles should be un-
derstood to require a federal “guarantee” of the disputed western 
lands.249  Virginia’s insistence on a “guarantee” of its territorial integrity 
as a condition of its 1781 proposal to cede certain of its western lands to 
Congress proved a major sticking point that delayed resolution of the 
pressing national controversy by more than three years.250  Vermont’s 
efforts to exercise sovereignty over territories that had been “guaran-
teed” by Congress to New York and New Hampshire, respectively, 
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nearly led Congress to authorize military force to suppress the Vermont 
rebellion.251  The repeated references to the concept of a “guarantee” in 
these debates, along with the widely assumed consequences of such a 
commitment, suggest that participants in these debates may have had 
in mind the connotations established by the centuries-long usage of the 
term “guarantee” in the context of international diplomacy.252 
Finally, although specific discussions of the precise character and 
consequences of “guarantee” in the context of the western lands debates 
are relatively sparse, at least a handful of surviving discussions shed 
some light on how participants in those debates may have understood 
the term.  For example, in a January 20, 1786, letter, Massachusetts con-
gressional delegate Nathan Dane responded to reports that portions of 
the state were contemplating secession by insisting that the second and 
third Articles of Confederation had “been determined by Congr. 
1781”253 — an apparent reference to the August 1781 resolution con-
cerning the territorial claims of Vermont254 — to encompass “a positive 
guarantee of the States to each State of her territory and Jurisdiction.”255  
Dane therefore concluded that Congress possessed no power under the 
Articles to “dismember a State” but rather was “bound at the rea-
sona[ble] request of any State to give her aid & assistance in this Case 
for her preservation.”256 
A somewhat more qualified view of the implied “guarantee” sug-
gested by the Articles was reflected in a September 8, 1783, letter from 
Rhode Island’s delegates to the state’s governor.257  Although the Rhode 
Island delegates acknowledged that “the 2nd and 3d articles of 
confœderation” constituted a “general guarantee” of the states’ inde-
pendence and sovereignty, they insisted that this guarantee ought to be 
given “a reasonable construction which is not to be made by the partic-
ular State; but by the United States in Congress assembled.”258  This 
claim to interpretive authority on the part of Congress was consistent 
with Vattel’s characterization of international treaty obligations, which 
allowed the guaranteeing state “to search for the true sense of the treaty” 
and allowed it to reject “ill founded” claims by the guaranteed state.259  
To illustrate their point, the Rhode Island delegates observed that 
“should Georgia extend her” territorial claims into areas controlled by 
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 254 See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 255 Letter from Nathan Dane to Samuel Phillips, supra note 207, at 101. 
 256 Id. (alteration in original). 
 257 Letter from Rhode Island Delegates to William Greene, supra note 207, at 635–36. 
 258 Id. at 635.  
 259 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVI, § 237; see also supra notes 89–91 and accompanying 
text (discussing this limitation of the guaranteeing state’s obligation). 
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Spain or if one state were to “extend its claims to the injury of a neigh-
bour,” Congress, in its capacity as “the dernier resort of justice” would 
“undoubtedly determin[e] how far they will guarantee to such particular 
State.”260  By the same reasoning, the Rhode Islanders contended that 
Congress could judge for itself the legitimacy of the states’ asserted 
western boundaries and assert federal jurisdiction over all lands deter-
mined to lie beyond “the line of guarantee” determined by Congress.261 
A final illustration of the significance of the term “guarantee,” as 
used in the debates over the western lands, is provided by an August 21, 
1785, letter to James Madison from Virginia delegate William Grayson 
discussing the secessionist movement in the state’s western regions that 
would eventually lead to the formation of Kentucky.262  Though Gray-
son was not opposed to Kentucky’s independence, he advised that Vir-
ginia should agree to the “dismemberment” only on the condition that 
Congress simultaneously admit Kentucky to the Confederation as a new 
and independent state.263  As an additional consideration in favor of 
involving Congress in the partition decision, Grayson contended that 
“the conditions for the security of property & other matters” would “be 
more likely to be observed, if the pacta conventa [that is, the conditions 
agreed upon264] are tripartite, & the U.S. as one of the dramatis personæ 
can be induced to guaranty them.”265  Grayson’s description of this “tri-
partite” arrangement, in which the United States would be brought in 
to act as “guaranty” of any terms agreed upon between Virginia and the 
newly independent state of Kentucky in order to better secure ob-
servance of those terms, bears a strong resemblance, in both function 
and form, to the type of “guarantee” mechanism described by Vattel and 
other eighteenth-century commenters on the law of nations.266 
2.  The Framing and Ratification Debates. —  
(a)  The Philadelphia Convention. — On May 29, 1787, shortly after 
the Philadelphia Convention convened, Edmund Randolph introduced 
a set of fifteen resolutions prepared by the Virginia delegation — the 
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 260 Letter from Rhode Island Delegates to William Greene, supra note 207, at 635. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Letter from William Grayson to James Madison (Aug. 21, 1785), in 22 LETTERS OF THE 
DELEGATES, supra note 207, at 576, 577.  
 263 Id.  Grayson expressed concern that, without such a condition, other states that were “jealous” 
of Virginia’s vast territorial extent might be “gratified with a simple dismembrement [of Virginia] 
witht. admitting the new State into the Confœderation.”  Id. 
 264 See D.E. MACDONNEL, A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, IN MOST FREQUENT USE 
(D.E. MacDonnel, ed., London, G. Wilkie & J. Robinson 1811) (defining “pacta conventa” as 
“[c]onditions agreed upon” and describing it as “[a] diplomatic phrase used to describe certain arti-
cles, which are to be observed — until one of the parties finds a convenience in their violation”). 
 265 Letter from William Grayson to James Madison, supra note 262, at 577.  
 266 See supra section I.B, pp. 615–20 (describing the role of third-party “guarantees” in eight-
eenth-century treaty practice).  
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famous Virginia Plan — to address several of the most glaring deficien-
cies in the Articles of Confederation.267  The eleventh resolution in the 
Virginia Plan provided “that a Republican Government & the territory 
of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Govern-
ment & territory, ought to be guaranteed by the United States to each 
State.”268  Though the Virginia Plan was the joint product of the Virginia 
delegation, most historians agree that James Madison was the principal 
intellectual force behind the resolutions.269 
As with the initial Dickinson draft of the Articles of Confederation a 
decade earlier, the Virginia Plan’s proposal for a national “guarantee” of 
state territorial integrity drew immediate objections from representa-
tives of the landless states.270  During the first substantive debate on the 
proposed Resolution XI, Delaware delegate George Read objected that 
such a national guarantee would “confirm the assumed rights of several 
states to lands which do belong to the confederation.”271 
To allay such concerns, Madison moved successfully that the provi-
sion be amended to provide that “[t]he republican constitutions and the 
existing laws of each state” would “be guaranteed by the United 
States.”272  This revision effectively ended any meaningful debate re-
garding inclusion of a national guarantee of states’ territorial boundaries 
in the proposed Constitution.  The document that eventually emerged 
from Philadelphia included a provision expressly disclaiming any legal 
effect on the legitimacy of preexisting territorial claims of either the 
United States or of any state.273 
With the proposed guarantee of state territory removed, the text of 
the revised resolution guaranteed solely the “republican constitutions” 
of the several states and their “existing laws.”  As so revised, the provi-
sion had two principal objectives — (1) to preserve the states’ republican 
governments against threats of monarchy or tyranny, and (2) to protect 
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 267 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 118, at 20, 20–23; see also generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ 
COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 11–72 (2016) (surveying various 
deficiencies of the Confederation government). 
 268 Madison, supra note 267, at 22. 
 269 See, e.g., LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE 
FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 114–15 (1995) (identifying Madison as the principal 
architect of the Virginia Plan); LACROIX, supra note 41, at 147–49 (same); JACK N. RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 60 
(1996) (same). 
 270 See supra notes 189–207 and accompanying text (discussing the guarantee provision in the 
initial Dickinson draft of the Articles). 
 271 Robert Yates, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 11, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S REC-
ORDS, supra note 118, at 204, 206 (statement of George Read). 
 272 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 273 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“[N]othing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to 
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”). 
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the states against domestic insurrections.274  These two concerns were 
closely linked with one another.  In his personal notes prepared in ad-
vance of the Philadelphia Convention, Madison identified the “[w]ant of 
Guaranty to the States of their Constitutions and laws” as being among 
the principal vices of the political system of the United States.275  Such 
a “guaranty” was needed, in Madison’s view, because “fact and experi-
ence” had demonstrated that “a minority may, in an appeal to force, be 
an overmatch for the majority,” particularly if the minority “happen to 
include all such as possess the skill and habits of military life.”276  Madison 
thus viewed an “appeal to force” by a well-armed and organized minor-
ity as the most likely mechanism through which the “Republican  
Theory” of “[r]ight and power, being both vested in the majority,” might 
be thwarted in practice.277  Such concerns were far from hypothetical.  
The insurrection in western Massachusetts that came to be known as 
Shays’s Rebellion had been suppressed only a few months before the 
Philadelphia Convention convened and was still very much present in 
the delegates’ minds.278 
This perceived connection between violence and the threat to repub-
licanism was so central that some delegates expressed doubts that the 
provision could ever be invoked in the absence of an insurrection.   
Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts contended that “[w]ith regard to 
different parties in a State; as long as they confine their disputes to 
words they will be harmless to the Genl. Govt. & to each other” and that 
only in the case of an “appeal to the sword” would it be “necessary for 
the Genl. Govt.” to intervene.279  James Wilson of Pennsylvania likewise 
asserted that “[t]he object” of the provision was “merely to secure the 
States agst. dangerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions.”280 
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 274 See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 18, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 118, at 47 (statement of Edmund Randolph) (“The Resoln. has 2. Objects.  1. 
to secure Republican Government.  2. to suppress domestic commotions.”); id. at 48 (statement of 
Nathaniel Ghorum) (expressing concern that, without such a provision, “an enterprising Citizen 
might erect the standard of Monarchy in a particular State” and “extend his views from State to 
State, and threaten to establish a tyranny over the whole” while “the Genl. Govt.” would “be com-
pelled to remain an inactive witness of its own destruction”). 
 275 James Madison, Notes on the Confederacy (Apr. 1787), in 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 320, 322 (Philadelphia, J.P. Lippincott & Co. 1865) [hereinafter MAD-
ISON WRITINGS]. 
 276 Id.  Madison also noted that a minority of the voting population might ally with “those whose 
poverty excludes them from a right of suffrage, and who, for obvious reasons, [would] be more 
likely to join the standard of sedition than that of the established Government.”  Id.  Slavery pro-
vided a further complication, which rendered the “republican Theory . . . still more fallacious” in 
those states where the institution existed.  Id. 
 277 Id.  
 278 WIECEK, supra note 13, at 27–33. 
 279 Madison, supra note 274, at 48 (statement of Nathaniel Ghorum). 
 280 Id. at 47 (statement of James Wilson). 
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But not everyone was so certain.  The most forceful proponent of 
limiting the states’ ability to revise their forms of government voluntar-
ily was Edmund Randolph, who insisted that “a republican government 
must be the basis of our national union” and that, therefore, “no 
state . . . ought to have it in their power to change its government into 
a monarchy.”281  Later in the debates, Randolph moved unsuccessfully 
to make such a limitation explicit, proposing that language be added to 
the provision making clear “that no State be at liberty to form any other 
than a Republican Govt.”282 
Other delegates who were less enthusiastic about limiting the states’ 
ability to voluntarily change their laws expressed concern that the pro-
vision might be construed to have that effect.  Gouverneur Morris, for 
example, found Madison’s proposed language guaranteeing the states’ 
“republican constitutions” and “existing laws” to be “very objectionable,” 
citing particularly the example of Rhode Island, whose laws Morris was 
“very unwilling” to see guaranteed.283  Likewise, Georgia delegate  
William Houston expressed concern that the provision might “perpet-
uat[e] the existing Constitutions of the States,” including that of his own 
state, which he viewed as “a very bad one” that “he hoped would be 
revised & amended.”284  Houston also noted the “difficult[y]” of “de-
cid[ing] between contending parties each of which claim the sanction of 
the Constitution.”285 
In response to these objections, James Wilson proposed a further re-
vision that he believed provided a “better expression of the idea”286 — 
namely, “that a Republican [form of Governmt. shall] be guarantied to 
each State & that each State shall be protected agst. foreign & domestic 
violence.”287  The provision was referred in this form to the Committee 
of Detail,288 which made further stylistic revisions, including shifting the 
text from a passive voice construction into the active voice and identi-
fying the “United States” as the entity pledged to “guaranty” the 
states.289  Following a handful of further revisions, focusing primarily 
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 281 Yates, supra note 118, at 206 (statement of Edmund Randolph). 
 282 Madison, supra note 274, at 48 (statement of Edmund Randolph). 
 283 Id. at 47 (statement of Gouverneur Morris). 
 284 Id. at 48 (statement of William Houston).  
 285 Id.  
 286 Id. at 48 (statement of James Wilson). 
 287 Id. at 48–49 (alteration in original). 
 288 Report of Committee of Detail, I, in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 118, at 129, 133. 
 289 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 118, at 176, 188 (“The United States shall guaranty to each State a Republican 
form of Government; and shall protect each State against foreign invasions, and, on the application 
of its Legislature, against domestic violence.”).  At one point, the Committee seems to have consid-
ered framing the provision as a mutual pledge of the several states to one another.  Report of  
Committee of Detail, IV, in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 118, at 137, 137 (“The said States 
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on the language securing states against invasion and domestic violence, 
the Committee of Detail placed the language of the Guarantee Clause 
in its near final form.290 
On the whole, the Philadelphia debates shed relatively little light on 
the meaning of the key term “guarantee.”  The recorded substantive 
debate over the resolution that would eventually evolve into the Guar-
antee Clause was limited to two principal days — June 11, when objec-
tions from the landless state delegates prompted the removal of the guar-
antee for state territory,291 and July 18, when concern over Madison’s 
“existing laws” formulation prompted the substitution of Wilson’s pro-
posal to guarantee states their “republican form” of government.292  And 
only a handful of delegates commented on the provision on either of 
those days.293 
The key point of debate regarding the meaning of the provision cen-
tered on whether it would inhibit states from making voluntary changes 
to their existing governments or rather was merely a protection against 
violent usurpations of political authority.294  The latter understanding 
fits much more comfortably with the eighteenth-century international 
law framework, which recognized that a guaranteeing power acquired 
no new rights over the sovereign parties guaranteed.295 
Some in the Philadelphia Convention seem to have adhered to this 
view regarding the significance of the proposed constitutional guaran-
tee.296  But others expressed concern that such a provision might limit 
states’ ability to alter their respective governmental forms voluntarily.297  
Such concerns would not have been wholly misplaced even if the inter-
national law understanding had been intended.  Though leading author-
ities on the law of nations denied that a guaranteed party forfeited any 
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of N.H. &c guarantee mutually each other and their Rights against all other Powers and against all 
Rebellions &c.”). 
 290 Report of Committee of Detail, in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 118, at 590, 602. 
 291 See supra notes 270–273 and accompanying text (discussing June 11 debate). 
 292 See supra notes 279–290 and accompanying text (discussing July 18 debate). 
 293 It is also important to keep in mind that significant questions have been raised about the 
reliability of the surviving records of the Philadelphia Convention, particularly James Madison’s 
notes on the Convention.  See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND:  REVISING THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION 141–223 (2015) (contending that Madison likely made substantial 
revisions to his notes long after the Constitutional Convention concluded and questioning their 
reliability as an accurate record of what was said).  
 294 See supra notes 279–285 and accompanying text (discussing competing positions regarding 
the provision’s effect on voluntary changes to state government). 
 295 See supra section I.B, pp. 615–20 (discussing the international law understanding of  
“guarantee”). 
 296 See supra notes 279–280 and accompanying text (discussing statements of Nathaniel Gorham 
and James Wilson). 
 297 See supra notes 283–285 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of Gouverneur Morris 
and William Houston). 
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of its preexisting sovereign rights by agreeing to a treaty guarantee,298 
the pretextual invocation of such provisions as an excuse for intermed-
dling was not unheard of.299  The most outspoken proponent of limiting 
states’ sovereign rights to deviate from republican principles —  
Edmund Randolph — arguably recognized the inadequacy of the chosen 
language to limit states’ freedom and proposed alternative language that 
would have expressed the idea more explicitly.300  But that alternative 
language was never taken up or seriously debated by the Convention 
delegates. 
(b)  The Ratification Debates. — When debate regarding the pro-
posed Constitution moved from behind the Philadelphia Convention’s 
closed doors into the public arena of ratification, opinions regarding the 
meaning and significance of the proposed Guarantee Clause multiplied 
rapidly.  Some who spoke publicly on the provision embraced the view 
that it would function as a restriction on the voluntary actions of the 
states.  For instance, Tench Coxe — a Pennsylvania delegate to the  
Confederation Congress — published a series of pseudonymous essays 
in which he contended that the provision would “restrain[] [the states] 
from [making] any alterations” to their respective forms of government 
that were “not really republican”301 and that any citizen attempting to 
erect such a non-republican government in a state would stand “guilty 
of treason.”302  James Iredell, in the North Carolina ratifying convention, 
similarly asserted that the provision would deprive each state of its 
“right to establish an aristocracy or monarchy.”303 
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 298 See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text (discussing statements to this effect by Vattel 
and others). 
 299 See, e.g., WHEATON, supra note 103, at 273–74 (discussing pretextual invocations of a treaty 
guarantee provision by Russia, Austria, and Prussia to justify “their perpetual interference in the 
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 301 A Freeman II, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 1788, reprinted in 15 DHRC, supra note 120, at 508, 
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 303 James Iredell, Address to the North Carolina Convention (July 30, 1788), in 4 THE DEBATES 
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security of neighboring states than would a republic.  See Iredell, supra, at 195 (statement of James 
Iredell) (“Every one must be convinced of the mischief that would ensue, if any state had a right to 
change its government to a monarchy.  If a monarchy was established in any one state, it would 
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 77, at 271 (alluding to Montesquieu’s warning that ancient 
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Other commentators, echoing sentiments that had been expressed by 
members of the Philadelphia Convention, denied that the Clause would 
place any meaningful restrictions on voluntary changes a state might 
make to its own government.  Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Fed-
eralist No. 21, acknowledged the existence of concerns that “a guaranty 
in the federal government”304 might involve “an officious interference in 
the domestic concerns of the [states].”305  But Hamilton contended that 
such concerns could “only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of 
the provision itself.”306  “The guaranty,” Hamilton asserted, “could only 
operate against changes to be effected by violence” or “usurpations of 
rulers” and “could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitu-
tions by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode.”307 
At least some of the seeming disagreement regarding the effect of the 
Guarantee Clause on voluntary changes in a state’s government may 
have been more apparent than real.  Virtually all supporters of the  
Constitution who spoke publicly about the provision’s scope insisted 
that it would provide a ground for federal intervention only in situations 
involving the most extreme forms of deviation from republican princi-
ples — meaning the erection of a hereditary monarchy, despotism, or 
(perhaps) aristocracy within a state.308  Both Iredell and Madison con-
nected the provision to the putative warlike tendencies of monarchical 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Greece was “undone” by its confederation with Macedon and suggesting that “the disproportionate 
force, as well as the monarchical form of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the 
events”). 
  At least some who viewed the Guarantee Clause as a potential constraint on state experimen-
tation with monarchical or aristocratic forms of government were opposed to such constraints on 
policy grounds.  For example, William Symmes, an Antifederalist delegate to the Massachusetts 
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 304 THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 77, at 135–36 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 305 Id. at 136. 
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croachments.  Congress can go no further, for the states would justly think themselves insulted, if 
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governments in particular, contending that the erection of a monarchy 
in one state would threaten the freedom and independence of the oth-
ers.309  But given the deep public antipathy to monarchical government 
among the populace at the time,310 the most plausible mechanism 
through which such an extreme revision in a state’s government could 
be achieved was through violent overthrow of legitimate state authori-
ties or, perhaps, through usurpation by the state’s rulers.311 
Many articulated defenses of the provision relied on the sheer im-
plausibility of any state voluntarily surrendering itself to monarchy or 
aristocracy, combined with reassurance that any other changes a state 
might make to its existing government would not be a proper subject 
for federal interference.  In The Federalist No. 43, for example, Madison 
assured his readers that the Clause would be, at worst, “a harmless  
superfluity” that might nonetheless be of some value in guarding against 
“experiments” that “may be produced by the caprice of particular States, 
by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence 
of foreign powers.”312  In response to concerns that the Clause might be 
invoked as a “pretext for alterations in the State governments, without 
the concurrence of the States themselves,”313 Madison responded that: 
[The guarantee] supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to 
be guaranteed.  As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are con-
tinued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution.  
Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they 
have a right to do so and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter.  The 
only restriction imposed on them is that they shall not exchange republican 
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they should presume to interfere in other alterations which may be individually thought more con-
sistent with the good of the people.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4)).  
 309 See supra note 303 (quoting statements by Iredell and Madison). 
 310 The anxieties surrounding Shays’s Rebellion, combined with dissatisfaction with the deficien-
cies of the state and Confederate governments, led a few prominent New England citizens to openly 
advocate a return to monarchy.  See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 267, at 99–101 (collecting sources). 
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Washington to James Madison (Mar. 31, 1787), in 5 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: 
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the change without shaking the Peace of this Country to its foundation.”).  
 311 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 77, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton) (contending that 
the “guaranty by the national authority” would only “operate against changes to be effected by 
violence” or “against the usurpations of rulers”).  
 312 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 77, at 271 (James Madison). 
 313 Id. 
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for anti-republican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will 
hardly be considered as a grievance.314 
In his speech to the North Carolina ratifying convention, Iredell simi-
larly asserted that the Clause would only limit the right of a state “to 
establish an aristocracy or monarchy,” but that, “consistently with this 
restriction, the states may make what change in their own governments 
they think proper.”315 
Far from viewing the Guarantee Clause as a limitation of the powers 
and prerogatives of the states, many of the Constitution’s supporters 
who spoke publicly regarding the provision’s meaning identified it as a 
source of protection for such powers and prerogatives.316  For example, 
an anonymous Federalist commentator writing under the name Uncus 
declared that the Framers of the proposed Constitution had been:  
So decided . . . in not infringing upon the internal police of the states,  
that they ordain in art. 4, sect. 4, that Congress shall not only allow, but 
“shall guarantee to every state in the Union, a republican form of govern-
ment,” and shall support them in the same, against either external or inter-
nal opposition.317   
Jasper Yeates, speaking in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, in-
sisted that the Guarantee Clause should be sufficient “to assure us of the 
intention of the framers of this constitution to preserve the individual 
sovereignty and independence of the States inviolate.”318  Many other 
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Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 546–47 (1983) (observing that many enactments are 
imprecise and are underinclusive or overinclusive relative to their background objectives). 
 316 See Merritt, supra note 20, at 31–34 (summarizing arguments).  
 317 Uncus, MD. J., Nov. 9, 1787, reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 120, at 76, 79 (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 4).  
 318 Jasper Yeates, Address at the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 30, 1787), in PENNSYLVANIA 
AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787–1788, at 295, 297 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick 
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supporters of the Constitution invoked the Guarantee Clause to respond 
to concerns that the state governments would be “annihilated” or “swal-
low[ed] up” by the federal government319 as well as to concerns stem-
ming from the omission of a federal bill of rights.320 
Antifederalist critics of the proposed Constitution, for the most part, 
accepted this framing of the Guarantee Clause’s significance, viewing 
the provision primarily as a shield of state sovereignty rather than as a 
source of federal interference.321  To the extent critics addressed the 
Guarantee Clause at all, their arguments tended to focus on the asserted 
insufficiency of the provision to secure state autonomy against federal 
encroachment.322 
Modern scholars have recognized the prevalence of this “state auton-
omy” interpretation of the Guarantee Clause during the ratification de-
bates.323  But they lack a convincing account of how participants in 
those debates derived such a limitation on national power from the pro-
vision’s text.  Professor Deborah Merritt — the leading modern exposi-
tor of the state autonomy interpretation — argues that the limit on fed-
eral interference inheres in the pledge of a “Republican Form of 
Government” because undue federal interference would inhibit citizens’ 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
D. Stone eds., Lancaster, Pa., Inquirer Printing & Publishing Co. 1888) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA 
AND THE CONSTITUTION]. 
 319 Stillman, supra note 315, at 173 (pointing to the Guarantee Clause as “an admirable security 
of the people at large, as well as of the several governments of the states” and as demonstrating that 
“the general government cannot swallow up the local governments, as some gentlemen have sug-
gested”); see also, e.g., General Eleazer Brooks, Statement in the Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 
23, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT, supra note 303, at 115, 115–16 (responding to concerns that the Constitution 
would “produce a dissolution of the state governments, or a consolidation of the whole,” id. at 115, 
by observing, inter alia, that “as the United States guarantee to each state a republican form of 
government, the state governments were as effectually secured, as though this [C]onstitution should 
never be in force,” id. at 116); A Jerseyman, To the Citizens of New Jersey, TRENTON MERCURY, 
Nov. 6, 1787, reprinted in 3 DHRC, supra note 120, at 146, 149 (pointing to the Guarantee Clause 
as a response to asserted concerns regarding “the danger of our state governments being annihilated”).  
 320 See, e.g., Yeates, supra note 318, at 297 (asserting that the “constitutional security” afforded 
by the Guarantee Clause would be “far superior to the fancied advantages of a bill of rights”); The 
State Soldier I, supra note 315, at 306 (asserting that the Guarantee Clause “diminished” the objec-
tion “respecting a bill of rights, and the liberty of the press” by providing additional security to state 
constitutions). 
 321 See Merritt, supra note 20, at 34 (“Even opponents to the Constitution beheld the guarantee 
clause as an attempt to shield state sovereignty.”). 
 322 See, e.g., Address by Sydney, N.Y. J., June 13–14, 1788, reprinted in 6 STORING, supra note 
303, at 107, 116 (“[W]e may be allowed the form and not the substance [of republican government], 
and that it was so intended will appear from the changing the word constitution to the word form 
and the omission of the words, and its existing laws.”); George Clinton, Speech at New York State 
Convention (July 11, 1788), reprinted in 6 STORING, supra note 303, at 181, 185 (contending that 
the constitutional guarantee was “too feeble a security to be relied on,” because “[t]he form [of re-
publican government] may exist without the substance”).  
 323 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 9, at 754; Merritt, supra note 20, at 24–25; Smith, supra note 20, at 
1951. 
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popular control over their state governments.324  But such an under-
standing is hardly an obvious reading of the text, particularly if one 
views the provision as principally concerned with limiting the states’ 
prerogative to alter their respective forms of government.325 
Even Merritt concedes that this understanding may not have been 
immediately obvious, but rather emerged gradually over the course of the 
ratification debates as “political leaders and commentators began to per-
ceive a broader meaning in the” Clause.326  But this explanation does not 
fully account for the evidence of understandings reflected in the ratifica-
tion debates.  The Antifederalists’ acquiescence in the state autonomy 
interpretation of the Guarantee Clause is particularly difficult to fathom 
absent some strong background principle connecting the language of the 
provision to notions of state autonomy.  As a group, the Antifederalists 
shared a skepticism of centralized federal authority that verged on the 
paranoid.327  Given their well-known tendency to perceive the specter of 
tyranny in seemingly anodyne provisions of the proposed Constitution,328 
it seems passing strange that they would have overlooked a provision 
that — according to modern interpreters — would have empowered fed-
eral officials to sit in judgment on whether each state’s government was 
sufficiently “Republican” in form and to coercively impose whatever cor-
rective measures they saw fit.329  The fact that so many did so suggests 
that the state autonomy interpretation of the Guarantee Clause may have 
been supported by something more than an imaginative new gloss on the 
phrase “Republican Form of Government.”330 
The parallel between the Guarantee Clause’s language and the lan-
guage of similarly worded guarantee provisions in international treaties 
may go some way toward explaining the ease with which the state au-
tonomy interpretation was so readily embraced by participants on both 
sides of the ratification debate.  Americans of the late eighteenth century 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 324 Merritt, supra note 20, at 24–25. 
 325 See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Terminator 2, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 843, 844 (1994) (asserting that 
Merritt’s interpretation of the Guarantee Clause requires “attribut[ing] to words rather special and 
somewhat strained meanings”); Rappaport, supra note 41, at 830 n.41 (contending that the Guaran-
tee Clause cannot provide a basis for state immunities from federal interference because “the lan-
guage and structure of the clause indicate that it was addressed primarily to anti-republican actions 
taken on the state level rather than by the federal government”). 
 326 Merritt, supra note 20, at 31. 
 327 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
333 (50th Anniversary ed. 2017) (“The fear of a conspiracy against the fragile structure of free-
dom . . . pervaded the thought of the antifederalists.”).  
 328 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 43, at 132–33 (noting “[t]he ease with which Anti-Federalists 
uncovered seeds of tyranny nestled in obscure provisions”). 
 329 See sources cited supra notes 19–24 (collecting modern sources proposing various applications 
of the Guarantee Clause to state governments). 
 330 Cf. Nagel, supra note 325, at 844 (noting that in Merritt’s account, “the word ‘republican’ is 
by degrees replaced by the phrase ‘state sovereignty,’ which connotes not only popular accounta-
bility but also governmental dignity and status”).  
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were familiar with the significance of “guarantee” language in interna-
tional treaty documents.331  The guarantee of U.S. sovereignty France 
had pledged in its 1778 Treaty with the United States provided a par-
ticularly well-known example of such a commitment.332  And similar 
language had been proposed or included in treaties negotiated with  
Native American tribes.333  As discussed above, comparable wording 
had been mooted throughout the Confederation Period as a pledge of 
national protection for state territorial integrity.334  As such, it would 
hardly be surprising if many participants in the ratification debates as-
sumed that the national “guarantee” of republican government pledged 
by Article IV would be interpreted in accordance with background prin-
ciples of international law applicable to the well-known treaty conven-
tion of guarantee — including, most significantly, the principle that a 
pledge of guarantee existed solely for the benefit of the party to whom 
the guarantee was pledged.335 
At least a few statements during the ratification debates suggest that 
this international law understanding may have informed public under-
standings of the Guarantee Clause.  For example, during the Virginia 
ratifying convention, delegate George Nicholas responded to assertions 
that the Constitution might inhibit states from suppressing insurrections 
or slave uprisings occurring within their own borders by insisting that 
the “fourth article” of Article IV had been “introduced wholly for the 
particular aid of the states,” and would “exclude the unnecessary  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 331 See, e.g., CATO, OBSERVATIONS ON MR. JAY’S TREATY NO. 1, reprinted in 2 THE  
AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER; OR, AN IMPARTIAL COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, RESOLVES, 
SPEECHES, &C. RELATIVE, OR HAVING AFFINITY, TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN 
114, 117 (Mathew Carey ed., Philadelphia, Henry Tuckniss 1795) [hereinafter AMERICAN REMEM-
BRANCER] (“[I]t is the practice of negociators [sic], where the character of the nation, or other 
circumstances, give reason to suspect a violation of their engagements, not to rely upon a naked 
promise, but to expect some guarantee or surety for the performance . . . .”); SAMUEL WHARTON, 
PLAIN FACTS 126 n.* (Philadelphia, R. Aitken 1781) (“The King of England never esteemed himself 
in any other light than as an ally, bound to protect the soil, for the Six Nations; and that when they 
submitted their country to his protection, — it gave him no title to it; as he well knew, that no 
engagement by one state, to guaranty another state in its possessions, could, by any mode of con-
struction, be made to imply a right over such possessions.” (final emphasis added)).  
 332 See Treaty of Alliance Between the United States of America and His Most Christian Majesty, 
supra note 72, art. XI. 
 333 See, e.g., Articles of Agreement and Confederation, U.S.-Delaware Nation, art. VI, Sept. 17, 
1778, 7 Stat. 13 (“[T]he United States do engage to guarantee to the aforesaid nation of Delawares, 
and their heirs, all their teritoreal [sic] rights in the fullest and most ample manner, as it hath been 
bounded by former treaties, as long as they the said Delaware nation shall abide by, and hold fast 
the chain of friendship now entered into.” (emphasis added)). 
 334 See supra section II.C.1.b, pp. 639–43 (discussing use of “guarantee” language in Confederation 
Period). 
 335 See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text (discussing statements by Vattel and others to 
this effect). 
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interference of [C]ongress, in business of this sort.”336  In the Massachusetts 
ratifying convention, General Eleazer Brooks referenced the guarantee of 
republican government in response to an assertion that the Constitution 
would lead to a consolidation of the States, insisting that a “guaranty 
does not imply a gift or grant” of something new but rather “a warrant 
and defence” of something that already exists.337 
A more explicit connection between Article IV’s fourth section and 
the international treaty context was drawn by James Madison in The 
Federalist No. 43, in which Madison analogized the provision to a sim-
ilar commitment found in the complex set of treaties that bound together 
the Swiss cantons.338  Though deeply critical of the governmental struc-
ture of the Swiss Confederacy,339 Madison praised the cantons’ stipula-
tion for one another’s mutual defense, observing that such “mutual aid” 
had been “frequently claimed and afforded . . . as well by the most dem-
ocratic, as the other cantons.”340  Madison had earlier noted this partic-
ular aspect of the Swiss Confederacy in his famous “Notes on Ancient 
and Modern Confederacies,”341 a private memorandum prepared some-
time in the summer of 1786 in which Madison “painstakingly recorded 
the primary attributes and ‘vices’ of other” federated governments.342  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 336 George Nicholas, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT, supra 
note 303, at 395, 396; cf. VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVI, § 236 (observing that the guaran-
teeing power acquires no new rights under a treaty because “[t]he treaty was not made for him”). 
 337 Theophilus Parsons, Notes of Convention Debates, 24 January, P.M. (Jan. 24, 1788), in 6 
DHRC, supra note 120, at 1341, 1343 (statement of General Eleazar Brooks) (emphasis omitted); 
see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 77, at 271–72 (James Madison) (observing that 
the commitment “extends no further than to a guaranty of a republican form of government, which 
supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed”); cf. WHEATON, supra 
note 36, pt. III, ch. II, § 10, at 193 (observing that international treaty guarantees “apply only to 
rights and possessions existing at the time they are stipulated”). 
 338 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 77, at 271–72 (James Madison).  The Swiss Confederacy 
grew out of a series of overlapping and mutually reinforcing treaties between its component cantons 
that stretched back to the fourteenth century.  See WILLIAM COXE, Letter 12 from William Coxe 
to William Melmoth, in 1 TRAVELS IN SWITZERLAND IN A SERIES OF LETTERS TO WILLIAM 
MELMOTH, ESQ. FROM WILLIAM COXE, M.A. F.R.S. F.A.S., at 123, 123–25 (London, T. Cadell 
1789) (tracing origins to a 1308 treaty and describing subsequent treaties that enlarged the confed-
eracy and modified its terms). 
 339 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 77, at 272 (James Madison) (asserting that the cantons 
“properly speaking, [we]re not under one government”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 19, supra 
note 77, at 128 (James Madison with Alexander Hamilton) (“The connection among the Swiss can-
tons scarcely amounts to a confederacy . . . .  They have no common treasury; no common troops 
even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of sovereignty.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 340 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 77, at 272 (James Madison).  Madison closed this pas-
sage by referring to a “recent and well-known event among ourselves [that] has warned us to be 
prepared for emergencies of a like nature,” id. — a thinly veiled reference to Shays’s Rebellion, 
WIECEK, supra note 13, at 27–33. 
 341 James Madison, Of Ancient & Modern Confederacies, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES  
MADISON 369, 369 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901) [hereinafter Madison, Notes on Confederacies]. 
 342 Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 626 (1999). 
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After noting the absence of traditional features characteristic of a true 
national government, such as a common army, treasury, currency, or ju-
diciary, Madison characterized the confederacy as consisting of “a per-
petual defensive engagement agst. external attacks and internal troubles” 
and noted that an “axiom” of the confederacy’s public law was that 
“there are no particular or common possessions of the Cantons for the 
defence of which the others are not bound as Guarantees or auxillaries 
of Guarantees.”343  Madison further observed that it was “an essential 
Object of the league to preserve interior tranquillity by the reciprocal 
protection of the form of Governmt established in each Canton”344 and 
that history had afforded “frequent instances of mutual succors for this 
purpose.”345 
The parallel between the Swiss cantons’ mutual pledge to protect 
the “form of Government” each had chosen and the national commit-
ment to “guarantee” to each State its chosen “Republican Form of  
Government” in Article IV suggests that Madison may have had the 
Swiss model in mind in proposing an early version of the Guarantee 
Clause’s language at the federal Convention in Philadelphia.346  At the 
same time, the stipulation that the governments so guaranteed be  
“Republican” in form went some way toward addressing what Madison 
perceived to be one of the principal “vices” of the Swiss confederacy — 
namely, the existence of “different principles of Governm[ent] in 
diff[erent] Cantons.”347 
Critics of the Constitution offered their own international analogue, 
which they contended demonstrated the inefficacy of the proposed na-
tional guarantee — the 1772 partition of Poland by Prussia, Austria, and 
Russia.348  Though Poland was the beneficiary of a “long series of trea-
ties, by which the integrity of [its] territory . . . had been guarantied by 
the very powers who now sought to despoil her,” these treaties had done 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 343 Madison, Notes on Confederacies, supra note 341, at 377.  
 344 Id.  
 345 Id. at 378.   
 346 See supra notes 268–269 and accompanying text (noting Madison’s role in proposing the lan-
guage that would eventually evolve into the Guarantee Clause).  The pledge of mutual support for 
the respective cantons’ forms of government was set forth in the 1501 Convention of Stantz, which 
provided, among other things, that “all the Cantons oblige themselves to succour one another, in 
the support of the form of government then established in each of them.”  ABRAHAM STANYAN, 
AN ACCOUNT OF SWITZERLAND 116 (Edinburgh, Hamilton, Balfour & Neill 1716) (quoting the 
Convention of Stantz). 
 347 Madison, Notes on Confederacies, supra note 341, at 378.  Writing a few years after the  
Constitution’s ratification, Chancellor James Kent echoed Madison by describing the “reciprocal 
guarantee of their respective forms of government, and of assistance in cases of domestic violence,” 
as being “the only things desirable in the Swiss confederacy.”  JAMES KENT, DISSERTATIONS: 
BEING THE PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LAW LECTURES 43 (New York, George 
Forman 1795).   
 348 For background on the 1772 partition, see JERZY LUKOWSKI, THE PARTITIONS OF  
POLAND 1772, 1793, 1795, at 52–77 (1999).   
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nothing to prevent Poland’s dismemberment.349  The partitioning pow-
ers also imposed upon Poland a set of constitutional reforms designed to 
ensure its “pacification.”350  One of these imposed reforms com-
manded — in language that closely paralleled the language of the  
Article IV Guarantee Clause — that the Polish government should “be 
for ever free, independent, and of a republican form.”351 
Antifederalists pointed to the inefficacy of the treaty guarantees to 
preserve Polish independence as evidence that the promised “Guarantee” 
in the federal Constitution would be similarly valueless.  For example, 
an anonymous pamphleteer writing in the Philadelphia Freeman’s  
Journal under the pseudonym “A Farmer” observed that, though Poland 
had been “guaranteed,” by “a league with the neighboring powers” — 
“in much the same words that are expressed in the new system [that is, 
the proposed Constitution]” — to be “forever independent and of a re-
publican form,” the people of that kingdom had been “reduced . . . by 
misery to a state of brutes.”352 Another author writing as “A Federal 
Republican” cited the example of Poland as evidence that the proposed 
Constitution would “tend to reduce the dignity and importance of the 
states” and that “the republican form . . . decreed to each state” by  
Article IV would “indeed be only form” rather than substance.353 
On the whole, the ratification debates furnish significant evidence 
that is consistent with the international law interpretation of the  
Guarantee Clause.  Both supporters of the proposed Constitution and 
its opponents tended to view the provision as serving two principal func-
tions — securing the states against having antirepublican changes to 
their governments thrust upon them and serving as a safeguard of state 
autonomy and independence.354  Treaty guarantees performed a similar 
function, empowering a guaranteed state to call upon the assistance of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 349 WHEATON, supra note 103, at 273–74; see also STEPHEN JONES, THE HISTORY OF  
POLAND, FROM ITS ORIGIN AS A NATION TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 1795, at 
328 (London, Vernon & Hood 1795) (“Treaties upon treaties, and negociations upon negociations 
[sic], had guarantied to Poland the possession of her territory . . . .”).   
 350 JONES, supra note 349, at 345. 
 351 Id. at 344. 
 352 The Fallacies of the Freeman Detected by a Farmer, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Apr. 1788, re-
printed in 3 STORING, supra note 303, at 181, 185.    
 353 A REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION, BY A 
FEDERAL REPUBLICAN (1787), reprinted in 3 STORING, supra note 303, at 65, 78; see also Essays 
by a Farmer, VII, MD. GAZETTE, Apr. 4, 1788, reprinted in 3 STORING, supra note 303, at 55, 58 
(“It is true that each state is guaranteed a republican form of government [but in] . . . the treaty 
whereby the three arch despots of Russia, Germany, and Prussia, divided that poor distracted coun-
try, Poland — they solemnly guarantee (in express words) to the said Poland — a republican gov-
ernment forever.”).  
 354 See supra notes 301–322 and accompanying text (outlining arguments of Federalists and  
Antifederalists); see also Merritt, supra note 20, at 30–31 (noting that participants in the ratification 
debates argued that the provision would “protect[] the states not only from domestic rebellion or 
monarchy, but from unwanted federal intrusions into state sovereignty,” id. at 31). 
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a foreign power while preserving its own sovereignty and autonomy.355  
And at least a few commentators drew an explicit parallel between the 
provision’s language and similar commitments pledged in international 
treaty documents.356  By contrast, there is very little evidence from the 
ratification debates suggesting that the Clause was intended to protect 
individual rights, as some modern commentators suggest.357 
3.  Post-Ratification Evidence. — 
(a)  Early Commentaries on the Guarantee Clause. — The Guarantee 
Clause was not a particularly prominent topic of discussion during the 
early years following ratification.  Neither Justice James Wilson’s 1791 
Lectures on Law nor Chancellor James Kent’s 1826 Commentaries on 
American Law contains any substantive discussion of the provision.358  
Justice Joseph Story’s highly influential Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States, published in 1833, offered little original dis-
cussion of the provision but did set forth a lengthy recapitulation of 
what Hamilton and Madison had written about it in The Federalist.359  
St. George Tucker’s annotated 1803 version of Blackstone’s Commen-
taries on the Laws of England likewise drew upon Madison’s explana-
tion of the provision in The Federalist, concluding that each State had 
an interest in preserving republican government in the others because 
“[t]he spirit of monarchy is war, and the enlargement of dominion.”360 
A more intriguing invocation of the Guarantee Clause appears in a 
separate portion of Tucker’s treatise addressing the scope of federal au-
thority under the Treaty Clause of Article II.361  Though a strong pro-
ponent of states’ rights and a skeptic of broad claims to federal authority 
in other contexts,362 Tucker took a capacious view of the federal gov-
ernment’s power to enter into treaties with other nations.  Indeed, 
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 355 See supra section I.B, pp. 615–20 (discussing eighteenth-century international law concerning 
treaty guarantees). 
 356 See supra notes 338–353 and accompanying text (discussing commentary connecting the  
Guarantee Clause to Swiss and Polish analogues). 
 357 See sources cited supra note 46. 
 358 See generally JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (New York, O. Halsted 
1826); JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, reprinted in 1 & 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 
(Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).  On the respective influences of Wilson’s and Kent’s treatises, 
see Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 34, at 1176–77 n.285, 1177 n.288.  
 359 See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 677–78, 679, (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (paraphrasing Hamilton’s argument in 
The Federalist No. 21).  
 360 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 367 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young 
Birch & Abraham Small 1803) [hereinafter TUCKER]. 
 361 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 362 See Kurt T. Lash, “Tucker’s Rule”: St. George Tucker and the Limited Construction of Federal 
Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1349–52 (2006) (discussing Tucker’s preference for a narrow 
construction of federal power and preservation of state rights). 
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Tucker acknowledged only one possible limitation on the scope of that 
power — namely, Article IV’s guarantee of a republican form of gov-
ernment and the accompanying pledge of protection against invasion 
and domestic violence.363  Tucker noted that these provisions could “be 
construed to impose such a restriction, in behalf of the several states, 
against the dismemberment of the federal republic,” thereby prohibiting 
the national government from ceding any portion of a state’s territory.364 
At first glance, Tucker’s invocation of the Guarantee Clause as the 
principal textual limit on the scope of the constitutional treaty power 
seems somewhat curious.  Why, for example, would the treaty power be 
limited by the Guarantee Clause but not by the constitutional prohibi-
tions on ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, or any of the other specific 
limitations set forth in Article I, Section 9?365  But Tucker was not alone 
in viewing the Guarantee Clause as the principal restriction on the treaty 
power’s scope.366 
Once again, the international law significance of the term “guaran-
tee” may shed some light on Tucker’s assumption that the provision may 
have had particular significance in regard to the federal treaty power.  
The eighteenth-century law of nations placed very few substantive lim-
its on the subject matter of treaties.367  But one important limit endorsed 
by Vattel and other commentators was that “[a] sovereign already bound 
by a treaty” could not “enter into others contrary to the first.”368  Ac-
cording to Vattel, “[i]f it happens that a posterior treaty be found, in any 
particular point, to clash with one of more ancient date, the new treaty 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 363 1 TUCKER, supra note 360, at 333 (“In our constitution, there is no restriction as to the sub-
jects of treaties, [except] perhaps the guarantee of a republican form of government, and of protec-
tion from invasion, contained in the fourth article . . . .”).  
 364 Id.  
 365 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 2–3. 
 366 See, e.g., 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 70 (1803) (statement of Sen. Nicholas) (“I do not believe 
therefore that the President and Senate would cede a State or any part of a State, because our 
common defence was one of the great purposes for which the Government was formed, and because 
the Constitution guaranties to every State in the Union a Republican form . . . .”); Robert Livingston, 
Cato No. XIII, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN REMEMBRANCER, supra note 331, at 244, 250 (“[W]here 
[a] treaty is made relative to objects not surrendered by them, the treaty that is binding upon them, 
must be constitutionally made, and consist with the powers yielded to the federal government; oth-
erwise the president might barter away the independence of individual states, which makes a nec-
essary part of the constitution of the United States, and which is expressly guaranteed.”).  Unlike 
Tucker, some of these other commentators argued that the treaty power was also constrained by 
other provisions of the Constitution in addition to the Guarantee Clause.  See, e.g., Livingston, 
supra, at 247–50 (contending that the treaty power could not be used to interfere with the enumer-
ated powers of Congress or the judicial branch).  
 367 See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 39, at lviii–lix (“[I]t rests at the option of nations to make in 
their treaties whatever agreements they please, or to introduce whatever custom or practice they 
think proper.”  Id. at lix.).  Vattel argued that the power of entering into treaties should be limited 
by the law of nature, rendering treaties made for unjust or dishonest purposes or that would be 
pernicious to the nation void and of no obligation.  Id. bk. II, ch. XII, §§ 160–161.   
 368 Id. bk. II, ch. XII, § 165. 
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is null and void with respect to that point, inasmuch as it tends to dis-
pose of a thing that is no longer in the power of him who appears to 
dispose of it.”369  If the Guarantee Clause were, in fact, viewed as a 
treaty-like commitment from the national government to the states in 
their sovereign capacities, the national government would thus lack the 
power to relieve itself of that commitment by entering into a treaty with 
a foreign state.  And any subsequent treaty commitment purporting to 
do so would thus be without legal effect, just as Tucker suggested. 
One of the most extensive early commentaries on the Guarantee 
Clause appeared in Philadelphia attorney William Rawle’s 1825 treatise, 
A View of the Constitution of the United States of America.370  Rawle 
pointed to the Guarantee Clause as an “emphatical” declaration of the 
nature of the Union that the Constitution had erected among the 
states.371  According to Rawle: 
The Union is an association of the people of republics; its preservation is 
calculated to depend on the preservation of those republics.  The people of 
each pledge themselves to preserve that form of government in all.  Thus 
each becomes responsible to the rest, that no other form of government shall 
prevail in it, and all are bound to preserve it in every one.  But the mere 
compact, without the power to enforce it, would be of little value.  Now this 
power can be no where so properly lodged, as in the Union itself.  Hence, 
the term guarantee, indicates that the United States are authorized to op-
pose, and if possible, prevent every state in the Union from relinquishing 
the republican form of government, and as auxiliary means, they are ex-
pressly authorized and required to employ their force on the application of 
the constituted authorities of each state, “to repress domestic violence.”372   
Rawle acknowledged that “[i]n what manner this guarantee shall be 
effectuated is not explained, and it presents a question of considerable 
nicety and importance.”373  But he was emphatic that the provision did 
not inhibit a state from “expung[ing] the representative system” of gov-
ernment within its borders through peaceful means, even if doing so 
meant “incapacitat[ing] [itself] from concurring . . . in the choice of cer-
tain public officers of the United States.”374  Should “the majority of the 
people of a state deliberately and peaceably resolve to relinquish the 
republican form of government,” Rawle believed that the consequence 
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should be that the national government would be relieved of its obliga-
tion of protection while the state would “cease to be [a] member[] of the 
Union.”375 
Though Rawle’s views regarding the permissibility of state secession 
were later repudiated,376 his view that the Guarantee Clause would not 
inhibit the people of a state from “deliberately and peaceably” changing 
their form of government was in keeping with the views expressed by 
Hamilton and others at the time of enactment.377  And his view that the 
voluntary adoption of a nonrepublican government by a state would 
relieve the national government of its obligation to extend protection 
was consistent with the background legal rules for interpreting guaran-
tee provisions in international treaties.  As Vattel explained, making any 
changes to the terms of an underlying treaty “without the consent and 
concurrence of the” guaranteeing state would relieve the latter state of 
its obligation because “the treaty thus changed is no longer that which 
he guarantied.”378 
Although the statements of Rawle and Tucker regarding the  
Guarantee Clause are broadly consistent with interpreting that provi-
sion in accord with background principles of international law, neither 
author explicitly drew a connection between the provision and interna-
tional treaty guarantees.  But there was another group of commentators 
who did explicitly recognize such a connection — namely, mid- 
nineteenth-century commenters on the law of nations. 
For example, Henry Wheaton’s treatise, published in 1836, observed 
that the right of every state to “freely exercise all its sovereign rights in 
any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of other states,”379 
could be qualified by “positive compact[s] . . ., such as treaties of medi-
ation and guarantee,” which could grant another state a limited right to 
intervene in that state’s internal affairs.380  To illustrate this principle, 
Wheaton referred to several examples of guarantee provisions in inter-
national treaties, including the treaties establishing the Peace of  
Westphalia in 1648 and the pledge of mutual defense in the treaties that 
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established the Swiss Confederacy.381  The final example Wheaton men-
tioned in this regard was the Guarantee Clause in Article IV of the 
United States Constitution — an example Wheaton cited without any 
suggestion that the obligations growing out of this provision were dif-
ferent in nature or kind than the international commitments he had cited 
in his earlier pages.382 
English jurist Robert Phillimore similarly identified the Article IV 
Guarantee Clause as an example of a provision that constituted an ex-
ception to the general rule that a foreign state had no right to intervene 
in the internal affairs of another state.383  But unlike Wheaton, 
Phillimore — who took a deeply skeptical view of foreign interventions 
in general384 — was somewhat more circumspect in describing the les-
sons that could be drawn from the American example, observing that 
because Article IV provided for “a guarantee from within” rather than 
“a guarantee from without,” the significance of the promised guarantee 
raised “a question rather of Public than International Law.”385 
American lawyer Henry Halleck likewise analogized the Guarantee 
Clause to international treaty guarantees but, like Phillimore, was care-
ful to distinguish such agreements between “a sovereign state” and “its 
component parts” from international commitments between two sover-
eign states of equal status.386  This caveat was particularly significant 
for Halleck because he, unlike Phillimore, denied that a state could, by 
treaty, authorize another state to interfere with its purely internal affairs 
where such interference would not otherwise be authorized by interna-
tional law.387  But Halleck was clear that “[t]here can be no doubt that 
a sovereign state may guarantee a particular form of government to one 
of its component parts, as . . . the United States of America guarantees 
a Republican form to each state of the federal union.”388 
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(b)  Early Jurisprudence Under the Guarantee Clause. — The first 
clear reference to the Guarantee Clause in a Supreme Court opinion 
appeared in Justice William Johnson’s 1816 concurring opinion in Martin 
v. Hunter’s Lessee.389  Martin arose out of a decision by Virginia’s high-
est state court holding that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
did not extend to state court judgments.390  By rejecting the Virginia 
court’s claim, Justice Joseph Story’s opinion for the Court established 
one of the most significant early precedents defining the relationship 
between state and federal authority.391  In defending the primacy of fed-
eral authority, Justice Story insisted that “[t]he constitution of the United 
States was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign 
capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution de-
clares, by ‘the people of the United States,’”392 and that “it was compe-
tent to the people to invest the general government with all the powers 
which they might deem proper and necessary.”393 
Although Justice Johnson agreed with Justice Story that the Court 
possessed jurisdiction over state court appeals, he took issue with the 
attempt to minimize the states’ role in the federal compact.394  He 
pointed to the Guarantee Clause specifically as the principal illustration 
that the sovereign states, as well as the “people,” were parties to the 
compact: 
To me the constitution appears, in every line of it, to be a contract, which, 
in legal language, may be denominated tripartite.  The parties are the peo-
ple, the states, and the United States. . . . That the states are recognised as 
parties to it is evident from various passages, and particularly that in which 
the United States guaranty to each state a republican form of government.395 
Justice Johnson’s invocation of the Guarantee Clause as an illustra-
tion of the states’ role in the “contract” formed by the Constitution is in 
keeping with the international law understanding of the provision.   
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After all, treaties themselves were essentially contracts between differ-
ent sovereigns.396  His identification of the Clause as a protection of state 
autonomy also echoed the numerous similar invocations of the provision 
during the ratification debates.397 
A similar interpretation of the Guarantee Clause as a protection of 
state sovereignty is reflected in an 1835 opinion of Tennessee’s highest 
court rejecting federal authority to exclude state sovereignty over Indian 
tribes situated within state boundaries.398  The opinion’s author — fu-
ture Supreme Court Justice John Catron — declared that if federal trea-
ties with Indian tribes were construed to “authorize[] congress to legis-
late, excluding the jurisdiction of the States from the Indian territory, 
then the treaty is a constitution as between the Cherokee nation and the 
federal government, to which, the States of the Union are no parties.”399  
Under this interpretation, “the treaty[,] and acts of congress grounded 
on its authority,” would be “superior to[,] and destructive of[,] the con-
stitution, so far as this guaranties to every State a republican form of 
government, and sovereignty to the whole extent of its limits.”400  This 
view of the Guarantee Clause as a protection of state sovereignty and a 
limit on the federal treaty power echoed the view expressed by St. 
George Tucker more than three decades earlier.401 
In 1834, South Carolina’s highest court addressed a constitutional 
challenge to a state law requiring all officers in the state militia to swear 
an oath of allegiance to South Carolina without any corresponding 
pledge of loyalty to the United States.402  The plaintiff challenged the 
law as a violation of both the South Carolina Constitution and various 
provisions in the federal Constitution, including the Guarantee 
Clause.403  Arguing on behalf of the State, Attorney General Robert 
Smith404 rejected the plaintiff’s characterization of the Guarantee 
Clause’s significance, insisting that the provision was “intended to con-
fer a privilege, and not to put a restriction upon the separate States.”405  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 396 See VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XII, § 152 (“A treaty, in Latin foedus, is a compact 
made with a view to the public welfare by the superior power . . . .”); id. § 154 (“Public treaties can 
only be made . . . by sovereigns who contract in the name of the state.”).   
 397 See supra notes 315–320 and accompanying text (discussing statements in ratification debates 
linking Guarantee Clause to state autonomy).   
 398 State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 256 (1835). 
 399 Id. at 337. 
 400 Id.  
 401 See supra notes 361–366 and accompanying text (discussing Tucker’s treatise). 
 402 State ex rel. M’Cready v. Hunt, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 1, 3–4 (S.C. 1834). 
 403 See id. at 179 (argument of counsel) (contending that the states cannot be considered fully 
sovereign because, among other things, Article IV deprives them of their right to “establish any 
other than a republican form of government”).  
 404 See id. at 60 (argument of counsel).  
 405 Id. at 104. 
  
668 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 132:602 
Smith placed particular emphasis on the significance of the term “guar-
antee.”  “A guaranty,” according to Smith, “is an obligation upon the 
party guaranteeing, by which a right or privilege is conferred upon the 
party to whom the guaranty is made.”406  By virtue of the Guarantee 
Clause, each of the states “obligated themselves to secure” a republican 
form of government “to every State which may require it.”407  But Smith 
argued that the provision did not give other states or the national gov-
ernment “a right to enforce such a form of government upon [a state]” 
because to do so would be to “convert[] a privilege into an obligation, 
plainly against the import of the clause.”408 
Two of the three justices concluded that the statute was unconstitu-
tional on state law grounds;409 the third — Justice Harper — considered 
and rejected each of the plaintiff’s constitutional arguments, including 
the argument grounded in the Guarantee Clause.410  Justice Harper re-
jected the view that the Guarantee Clause “restrict[ed] . . . the power of 
the people of a State to model and control their government at their own 
pleasure.”411  Rather, Justice Harper believed that the provision would 
apply only if a nonrepublican government were “imposed on” a state by 
“external force,” in which case “the arms of the Union” would “be em-
ployed to repel that force.”412  In support of this interpretation, Justice 
Harper drew a direct parallel between the Guarantee Clause of Article 
IV and similarly worded guarantee provisions in international treaties: 
“Nearly all the powers of Europe, by the compact called the Pragmatic 
Sanction, guaranteed the succession of Maria Theresa.  So England and 
France guaranteed the Spanish succession.  Yet Spain and the German 
States were not less sovereign on this account.  The guarantee was to be 
made effectual by arms.”413  Justice Harper thus clearly viewed the 
“guarantee” promised by Article IV as equivalent in substance to the 
similarly worded pledges in international treaties and used the latter as 
a guide to understanding the former. 
By far the most significant antebellum judicial decision addressing 
the meaning of the Guarantee Clause was Chief Justice Taney’s 1849 
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decision for the Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden.414  Luther involved 
a civil trespass action brought against an officer in Rhode Island’s mili-
tia who had participated in the suppression of the “Dorr Rebellion.”  In 
1841, after having been thwarted in repeated efforts to secure legislative 
reform of the state’s restrictive suffrage laws, the Rhode Island Suffrage 
Party, led by Thomas Dorr, called its own constitutional convention de-
signed to replace the 1663 colonial charter, which had served as the 
state’s framework of government.415  The resulting constitution was 
submitted to a popular referendum and overwhelmingly approved by 
the state’s residents.416  But the state’s political leadership refused to 
acknowledge the constitution’s legitimacy.417  Elections held in early 
1842 under the claimed authority of the 1841 constitution resulted in 
Dorr’s election as governor; but the state’s incumbent governor, Samuel 
King, refused to acknowledge the Dorr government’s legitimacy.418 
Following a poorly executed attempt by the Dorr faction to seize 
control of state institutions by force, the charter government moved to 
suppress the insurrection by declaring martial law and authorizing 
preemptory searches and mass arrests of individuals suspected of sup-
porting the rebellion.419  The victim of one such search and arrest, Martin 
Luther, sued militiaman Luther Borden, alleging that Borden had acted 
without legal authority notwithstanding the charter government’s dec-
laration of martial law.420  Luther further contended that Borden’s ac-
tions were unlawful because the charter government, under whose au-
thority Borden had acted, had been supplanted as the state’s legitimate 
government by the government elected under the 1841 constitution.421 
Resolving the case on the terms proposed by the plaintiff would thus 
have required the federal courts to decide which of the competing fac-
tions represented the legitimate government of Rhode Island.  But Chief 
Justice Taney’s majority opinion declined the invitation, insisting that 
the question of which faction represented the state’s legitimate govern-
ment “belonged to the political power and not to the judicial.”422   
Although the plaintiff’s claim did not turn directly on the meaning of 
the Guarantee Clause, Chief Justice Taney invoked that provision as 
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reflecting the Framers’ decision to treat the question of when “the gen-
eral government” is authorized “to interfere in the domestic concerns of 
a State . . . as political in . . . nature” and thus inappropriate for judicial 
resolution.423  “Under this article of the Constitution,” Chief Justice 
Taney wrote, “it rests with Congress to decide what government is the 
established one in a State.”424  Admission of senators or representatives 
“into the councils of the Union” would constitute a conclusive recogni-
tion of not only “the authority of the government under which they are 
appointed” but also “its republican character.”425  And that conclusion 
would be “binding on every other department of the government,” in-
cluding the judiciary.426 
Because no elections for senators or representatives were held under 
the Dorr government, Chief Justice Taney looked instead to the actions 
of the Executive.  He concluded that a message from President John 
Tyler to Governor King expressing a willingness to call forth the militia 
“to support [Governor King’s] authority if it should be found necessary 
for the general government to interfere” constituted a recognition of the 
King government’s authority and was “as effectual as if the militia had 
been assembled under his orders.”427  “[N]o court of the United States,” 
Chief Justice Taney wrote, “with a knowledge of this decision, would 
have been justified in recognizing the opposing party as the lawful gov-
ernment; or in treating as wrongdoers or insurgents the officers of the 
government which the President had recognized, and was prepared to 
support by an armed force.”428 
Although Luther had virtually nothing substantive to say about what 
the Article IV guarantee of republican government required, it estab-
lished an enduring precedent regarding who possessed constitutional au-
thority to determine whether the provision applied.  As discussed above, 
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Chief Justice Taney’s discussion of the Guarantee Clause — though ar-
guably dicta429 — has come to stand for the proposition that all consti-
tutional challenges based on the Clause be treated as involving a non-
justiciable political question.430  Some modern critics of the political 
question doctrine have criticized Chief Justice Taney’s conclusion that 
the Guarantee Clause was nonjusticiable.431  Others have suggested that 
the rationale of Chief Justice Taney’s decision, while perhaps defensible 
given the particular facts presented in that case, should not have been 
extended by later cases into a more general prohibition on adjudicating 
Guarantee Clause claims in all circumstances.432 
The implications of the international law interpretation of the  
Guarantee Clause for modern debates about the provision’s justiciabil-
ity will be considered in further detail below.433  For present purposes, 
it is sufficient to observe that nothing in Luther tends to contradict the 
international law interpretation of the Guarantee Clause.  And at least 
some statements in earlier decisions (particularly Justice Harper’s dis-
senting opinion in the South Carolina case434) tend to support such a 
reading. 
4.  Summary. — The Framers, ratifiers, and early interpreters of the 
Constitution failed to speak with a single, unequivocal voice on many 
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of the Constitution’s most significant provisions.435  The Guarantee 
Clause marks no exception to this more general pattern.  At least some 
participants in the framing and ratification debates — including  
Edmund Randoph and Tench Coxe — expressed a view of the Guarantee 
Clause that would directly limit state officials and confer broad author-
ity on the national government to police states’ perceived deviations 
from “republican” principles.436  For reasons discussed above, this un-
derstanding of the provision is difficult to reconcile with the interna-
tional law understanding of the term “guarantee,” which signified a 
pledge for the benefit of the guaranteed party that conferred no new 
rights or powers on the sovereign pledging the guarantee.437 
But statements such as these were hardly the sole, or even predomi-
nant, account of the Guarantee Clause’s significance.  As discussed 
above, numerous statements during the framing and ratification debates 
suggested that the provision would serve as a bulwark of state sover-
eignty against federal interference.438  As modern commenters have ob-
served, this “state sovereignty” interpretation of the provision fits some-
what uncomfortably with the provision’s actual text, at least if the term 
“guarantee” is understood in its modern-day sense.439  But if the term 
“guarantee” is understood to carry the meaning it would have held under 
the eighteenth-century law of nations, such “sovereigntist” connotations 
are easily explained.440  Moreover, at least some participants in the rat-
ification debates drew a direct analogy between the language of the 
Guarantee Clause and similarly worded provisions in international trea-
ties, suggesting an assumption that the latter category of documents 
could provide a suitable reference point for interpreting the former.441  
At least one early-nineteenth-century court drew this connection explic-
itly, looking to international treaties for guidance in understanding the 
significance of the constitutionally specified guarantee.442 
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At a minimum, the international law interpretation of the Guarantee 
Clause seems to fall within the range of plausible interpretations to 
which the provision would likely have been amenable at the time of 
enactment.443  Indeed, the international law interpretation arguably con-
stitutes the most plausible account of the available historical evidence 
regarding the provision’s original meaning.444  Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, only the international law interpretation plausibly connects the 
constitutional usage of the term “guarantee” to a preexisting legal usage 
with which many members of the Founding generation would likely 
have been familiar.  As noted above, the term “guarantee” appears in 
virtually none of the municipal law documents that are conventionally 
recognized as having informed the drafting decisions reflected in the 
Constitution of 1787.445  And while the Framers may well have included 
language in some provisions that lacked a clear preexisting legal mean-
ing,446 it is also beyond dispute that they sometimes chose specialized 
terms of art to convey their meanings.447 
For purposes of this Article, I am content to allow readers to draw 
their own conclusions from the historical evidence surveyed here.  Un-
doubtedly, such assessments will depend in part on the extent to which 
individual readers believe contemporary constitutional interpretation 
should be informed by historical evidence regarding the original mean-
ing of the constitutional text.448  Although virtually all interpretive the-
ories acknowledge at least some role for text and original understanding 
as part of the interpretive endeavor,449 many theories acknowledge at 
least some role for other considerations — such as judicial precedent, 
postenactment historical practice, or practical consequences — as 
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 443 Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 690 (1987) (observing that 
history sometimes reveals “not a focused, specific answer, but a range of original understandings” 
of a particular provision).  
 444 Cf. GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS 75–76 (2017) (con-
tending that the “best-available-alternative” is usually viewed as the default standard for assessing 
the validity of legal claims). 
 445 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 446 See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176–77 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.) 
(noting uncertainty regarding meaning of Constitution’s references to “[d]irect taxes,” id. at 176, in 
Article I). 
 447 See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (concluding that 
the phrase “ex post facto laws” in Article I, § 10 was a legal term of art). 
 448 Cf. William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355 (2015) 
(surveying various approaches one could take to the relationship between original meaning and 
contemporary constitutional law). 
 449 See, e.g., J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses 
Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 858 (2007) (“Most interpretive methods start with 
the text and original meanings and purposes of the constitutional provision at issue, even if they 
ultimately move beyond those moorings and make additional interpretive moves.”). 
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well.450  For proponents of interpretive theories of this sort, the decision 
of whether to accept the international law interpretation of the Guarantee 
Clause may turn, to at least some degree, on the extent to which that 
interpretation fits with existing judicial approaches to interpreting the 
provision as well as the contemporary practical consequences of adopt-
ing such an interpretation.  These considerations will be taken up and 
explored in the next Part. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
The first set of issues regarding the implications of the international 
law interpretation of the Guarantee Clause for modern constitutional 
interpretation involves the questions of what particular set of protec-
tions the provision confers and who can claim the benefit of the Clause’s 
protection.  The second cluster of issues involves the implications of the 
international law interpretation for the justiciability of Guarantee 
Clause claims and the role of the federal courts in enforcing the provi-
sion’s protection.  As the following sections will show, adopting the in-
ternational law interpretation may require a significant rethinking of the 
way many people have come to conceive the role of the Guarantee 
Clause in the constitutional framework and the nature of the obligation 
it imposes on the national government.  At the same time, however, ac-
cepting that interpretation may require little change in — and may sub-
stantially strengthen and reinforce — the Supreme Court’s longstanding 
practice of viewing litigation premised on the Guarantee Clause as be-
yond the bounds of judicial cognizance. 
A.  Substantive Interpretation of the Guarantee Clause 
In its 1875 decision in Minor v. Happersett,451 the Supreme Court 
assumed, in dicta, that “[t]he guaranty” of republican government ex-
tended in Article IV’s fourth section “necessarily implies a duty on the 
part of the States themselves to provide [a republican form of] govern-
ment.”452  This understanding of the provision’s significance has been 
echoed by myriad subsequent interpreters.453  Under this interpretation, 
the Guarantee Clause exists in substantial part to protect the interests 
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 450 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194–209 (1987) (setting forth a “typology of constitutional ar-
gument,” id. at 1194, including arguments from text and enactment-era history, as well as arguments 
from constitutional theory, precedent, and values); cf. Baude, supra note 448, at 2356–63 (observing 
that even “originalist” theories may sometimes allow decisionmakers to look to considerations other 
than text and original understanding). 
 451 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).  
 452 Id. at 175. 
 453 See sources cited supra note 46. 
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of state citizens against antirepublican conduct by their elected officials 
in state government.454 
But for reasons already outlined above, this understanding of the pro-
vision’s significance fits poorly with the international law interpretation 
of the Guarantee Clause.  As noted above, the text of the Guarantee 
Clause clearly identifies each “State” as the beneficiary, rather than the 
obligee, of the “guarantee” the provision promises.455  This textual fram-
ing fits comfortably with the paradigm of international treaty obliga-
tions, which consisted exclusively of commitments between sovereign 
states.  Indeed, the eighteenth-century conception of the law of nations 
conceived of sovereign states as the only entities capable of possessing 
international rights and duties.456  This interpretation is also consistent 
with the more specific usage of the term “guarantee” as it appeared in 
eighteenth-century treaties.  As discussed above, eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century commentators universally agreed that a guarantee 
provision in an international treaty existed exclusively for the benefit of 
the guaranteed party and could be waived by that party at any time.457 
The international law interpretation also has implications for the 
scope of federal power under the Guarantee Clause.  Although the  
Guarantee Clause itself is framed as a duty on the part of the federal 
government rather than as a source of power, “a well-known — and 
commonsensical — canon of textual interpretation instructs that the im-
position of a duty necessarily implies a grant of power sufficient to see 
the duty fulfilled.”458  Nevertheless, assessing the scope of the power 
conferred by virtue of the provision requires careful attention to the 
precise nature of the duty it establishes.  As noted above, the introduc-
tion of a treaty guarantee established no new rights or powers on the 
part of the guaranteeing party except those that were necessary to come 
to the aid of the guaranteed state.459  And the guaranteed state always 
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 454 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 868 (“[T]he Guarantee Clause is not primarily about 
guaranteeing a particular structure of government in states” but rather was “meant to protect the 
basic individual right of political participation”). 
 455 See supra section II.C.2.a, pp. 646-51. 
 456 See, e.g., WHEATON, supra note 36, pt. I, ch. II, § 1, at 62 (“The subjects of international law 
are separate political societies of men living independently of each other, and especially those called 
Sovereign States.”); Kent, supra note 449, at 849 (observing that “[i]ndividual persons were simply 
not subjects with international legal personality” until the twentieth century); Lee, supra note 41, 
at 1032 (“The classical law of nations imposed duties and conferred rights only upon sovereign 
states.”).  
 457 See VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVI, § 236. 
 458 Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1834, 
1854 (2016); see also, e.g., 6 REG. DEB. 261 (1830) (speech of Sen. Livingston) (“No principle is 
clearer than that the grant of power or the requisition of a duty, implies a grant of all those [powers] 
necessary for its execution . . . .”). 
 459 See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text. 
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maintained the option of releasing the guaranteeing state from its obli-
gation and foregoing whatever assistance it may have obtained by virtue 
of the guarantee.460  An invocation of federal power under the Guarantee 
Clause will thus almost always depend, to some extent, on the existence 
of a request for assistance from a guaranteed state whose “republican 
form of government” is threatened by some outside force. 
This is not to say that the federal government is necessarily bound 
by the decisions of those claiming to exercise authority on behalf of the 
state.  Unlike Article IV’s Insurrection Clause, which also appears in 
that Article’s fourth section,461 the Guarantee Clause contains no ex-
plicit requirement that a request for federal assistance be made by the 
“Legislature” or “Executive” of the requesting state.  This textual dis-
tinction is sensible given the Framers’ recognition that threats to repub-
lican government can arise from “usurpation” as well as from violent 
overthrow.462  If the holders of political power within a state sought to 
entrench themselves in office, contrary to the will of the people, and 
were met by organized resistance of the citizenry, questions could arise 
regarding which faction reflected the legitimate “republican” govern-
ment of the state.463 
This was essentially the nature of the conflict with which the  
Supreme Court was confronted in Luther.464  There, the Court correctly 
recognized that questions regarding the scope of the Guarantee Clause’s 
protection were intimately bound up with the national government’s 
power to recognize state governments — questions akin to those pre-
sented in cases in which the courts have acknowledged the primacy of 
the political branches’ decisionmaking authority.465  But contrary to the 
assumption of many modern commentators, the recognitional questions 
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 460 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XVI, § 236. 
 461 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Appli-
cation of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against 
domestic Violence.” (emphasis added)).  
 462 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 77, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton) (“A guaranty by 
the national authority would be as much leveled against the usurpations of rulers as against the 
ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community.”). 
 463 Cf. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 243, at 297–325 (discussing a similar controversy regarding 
the locus of legitimate governmental power for the State of Virginia during the Civil War, which 
eventually led to the formation and recognition of the breakaway state of West Virginia). 
 464 See supra notes 414–428 and accompanying text (discussing Luther). 
 465 See, e.g., Guar. Tr. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938) (“What government is to be 
regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political rather than a judicial ques-
tion, and is to be determined by the political department of the government.”); United States v. 
Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1865) (“In reference to all matters [involving recognition of 
Indian tribes], it is the rule of this court to follow the action of the executive and other political 
departments of the government, whose more special duty it is to determine such affairs.  If by them 
those Indians are recognized as a tribe, this court must do the same.”). 
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implicated by the Luther decision were neither aberrational nor orthog-
onal to the central question regarding the scope of the federal govern-
ment’s power and duty under the Guarantee Clause.466  Under the in-
ternational law interpretation, the recognitional question is inescapable 
because only the states — not individual citizens or groups of citizens — 
possess the authority to invoke the Clause’s protection.467 
Thankfully, the type of violent contestation of state political author-
ity that led to the Luther decision is not particularly common in our 
modern constitutional history.468  But even in the absence of an express 
invocation of the Guarantee Clause by a particular state, the require-
ments of the provision may sometimes constrain federal decisionmaking 
in situations where the national government acts on the basis of some 
other enumerated power.  For example, the Luther Court assumed that 
each House of Congress would be guided by the Guarantee Clause in 
assessing the qualifications of new members pursuant to their respective 
powers under Article I, Section 5 to judge the elections and qualifica-
tions of their own members.469  The Guarantee Clause has also long 
been viewed as requiring Congress, in exercising its power to admit new 
states into the Union, to assess the republican nature of a state’s pro-
posed form of government before granting admission.470 
A similar set of considerations may apply to constrain federal  
decisionmaking in areas where the ordinary operations of state govern-
ment have been interrupted or supplanted as a result of war or insur-
rection, as was the case in the immediate aftermath of the American 
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 466 Cf. supra note 431 (collecting modern sources expressing the opposite view of Luther). 
 467 Nor was the Dorr Rebellion unique in confronting national decisionmakers with a conflict 
between competing claimants seeking recognition as the legitimate government of a state.  See, e.g., 
EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 79–84 (2016) (discussing the “Buckshot War” that resulted from disputed election 
results in 1838 Pennsylvania election); CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE 
COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 
13–14 (2008) (discussing dispute over 1872 Louisiana election requiring intervention of federal 
troops to support the faction recognized by President Grant as the legitimate government); Kesavan 
& Paulsen, supra note 243, at 297–325 (detailing the conflict between competing claimants of state 
government power in Virginia during the Civil War).  
 468 See, e.g., FOLEY, supra note 467, at 346–48 (noting an overall trend toward more peaceful 
resolution of election disputes in recent history).  But cf. Lucian Emery Dervan, Georgia’s Noble 
Revolution: Three Governors, Two Armies, the Georgia Supreme Court, and the Gubernatorial Elec-
tion of 1946, 15 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 167, 167–74 (2007) (discussing background of contested 1946 
Georgia gubernatorial election, which resulted in competing claimants to the office backed by com-
peting factions of the state’s National Guard). 
 469 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (“[W]hen the senators and representatives 
of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which 
they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional 
authority.”). 
 470 See, e.g., Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government and the 
Admission of New States, 11 J. POL. 578, 578 (1949) (“In no area has the guarantee been so widely 
invoked as in the admission of new states into the Union.”).   
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Civil War.471  In such circumstances, the Guarantee Clause may require 
the federal government to ensure that any replacement government 
formed under the auspices of its authority conforms to the principles of 
republican government.472 
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 471 See generally WIECEK, supra note 13, at 166–209 (discussing the role of the Guarantee Clause 
in public debates regarding reconstruction and readmission of the former Confederate states). 
 472 See David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 413 (2008) (“When 
state and local government collapsed with the approach of the Union armies, the Guarantee 
Clause . . . demanded that the United States take action to restore republican government.  The 
military governments . . . and the civilian governments established under military rule, may be 
viewed as successive steps in fulfillment of the constitutional guarantee.”); John Harrison, The Law-
fulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375, 391–92 (2001) (describing the 
theory of Reconstruction-era congressional Republicans that the Confederate states had destroyed 
their state governments by seceding, requiring federal intervention to restore republican govern-
ment in those states). 
  The prominence of the Guarantee Clause in constitutional debates surrounding the scope of 
Congress’s power over the former Confederate states raises interesting interpretive questions regard-
ing that provision’s relationship to the three Reconstruction-era amendments to the Constitution — 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.  One possibility might be that the original 
meanings of the Reconstruction Amendments are informed, to some extent, by prevailing under-
standings of the Guarantee Clause.  See, e.g., Fred O. Smith, Jr., Due Process, Republicanism, and 
Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 640–51 (2014) (arguing that understandings of the guar-
antee of republican government should inform understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause).  To the extent understandings of the Guarantee Clause embraced by members of 
the Reconstruction generation diverged from the prevailing understanding of that provision in 
1789 — a topic that is beyond the scope of this Article — the understandings of the enacting gen-
eration would likely be most relevant to assessing the original meanings of the relevant Reconstruction 
Amendment provisions.  Cf. Gary Lawson, Response, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 
85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1826 (1997) (“[B]ecause every document is created at a particular moment in 
space and time, documents ordinarily, though not invariably, speak to an audience at the time of 
their creation and draw their meaning from that point.”). 
  Professor Akhil Amar has endorsed a more ambitious interpretive claim, urging interpreters 
to read the Guarantee Clause itself through the lens of the Reconstruction generation’s understand-
ings of that provision.  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 82–86 
(2012).  According to Amar, the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment “pivoted on a fresh interpre-
tation of the republican-government clause” reflecting a “principle of broad national control over 
undemocratic state franchise law.”  Id. at 82.  Therefore, Amar argues, this new, broadened under-
standing of the Guarantee Clause should be understood to have been incorporated into constitu-
tional law by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s successful ratification, even if that broadened 
interpretation would not necessarily have been recognized by the generation that enacted the  
Guarantee Clause in 1789.  Id.  Amar’s theory that extratextual principles underlying later-enacted 
texts can legitimately be read back into earlier-adopted constitutional provisions is not universally 
shared.  See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Commentary, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: 
The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 732 (2000) (contending that “Amar’s 
strong assumption of coherence stands at odds both with the patchwork character of the Constitution 
and with the settled practice of constitutional interpreters”); cf. Ryan C. Williams, The One and 
Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 503–05 (2010) (questioning Amar’s similar 
claim that the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification should be understood to have altered the mean-
ing of the earlier-adopted Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).  For those inclined to accept the 
interpretive premises underlying Amar’s position, assessing the significance of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption for modern understandings of the Guarantee Clause would require a careful 
examination of the public understanding of the Guarantee Clause during Reconstruction — a topic 
that, again, is beyond the scope of this Article.  Compare, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 
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Finally, some scholars have suggested that the Guarantee Clause 
may limit the ability of the federal government, acting within the scope 
of its other enumerated powers, to interfere with certain internal state 
arrangements, particularly those that relate to the structure, composi-
tion, or function of the state’s republican government itself.473 
But where the Guarantee Clause itself is invoked as a direct source 
of federal power, the international law interpretation suggests that the 
exercise of such power will always involve a threshold question regard-
ing whether the existing republican government within the state has, in 
fact, requested such assistance.  If no such assistance is sought or re-
quired by the state, the federal government lacks authority to invoke 
the Clause as a source of power, no matter how dissatisfied individual 
state residents may be with a state’s existing governmental arrange-
ments or how inconsistent such arrangements may be with federal au-
thorities’ shared conception of republican ideals. 
B.  Justiciability of Claims Asserted Under the Guarantee Clause 
In addition to shedding new light on the substantive content of the 
obligation the Guarantee Clause imposes on the national government, 
the international law interpretation also illuminates the more specific 
question of the federal courts’ role in ensuring the Clause’s enforcement.  
But whereas the international law interpretation may require a signifi-
cant rethinking of the way the provision is understood as a substantive 
matter, this interpretation may actually be quite consistent with the way 
in which federal courts have historically regarded the provision.  In fact, 
the international law interpretation may substantially strengthen and 
reinforce the Court’s longstanding practice of treating litigation 
grounded in the Guarantee Clause as nonjusticiable. 
As an initial matter, the international law interpretation has clear 
implications for the branch of justiciability doctrine relating to standing 
under Article III.  Standing doctrine is centrally concerned with who is 
entitled to assert a particular claim before a federal tribunal.474  One 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
600 (1870) (statement of Republican Sen. William Stewart) (asserting that a regulation which would 
“exclude from the ballot a large proportion of the citizens” would “infringe upon that clause of the 
Constitution which requires the Government of the United States to guaranty to each State a re-
publican form of government”), with, e.g., id. (statement of Republican Sen. Jacob Howard) (deny-
ing that the provision would restrict a state from adopting regulations that would effectively “dis-
franchise nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand of the colored population” of the state). 
 473 See, e.g., Merritt, supra note 20, at 41 (“The guarantee clause . . . restricts the federal govern-
ment’s power to interfere with the organizational structure and governmental processes chosen by 
a state’s residents.”); see also Smith, supra note 20, at 1949 (contending that the Guarantee Clause 
should “inform[] the background principle of state sovereign immunity in classes of cases not out-
lined in the Eleventh Amendment”). 
 474 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517–18 (1975) (ruling that “[t]he rules of standing,” id. 
at 517, require a plaintiff to demonstrate “that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of 
the dispute and the exercise of the court’s remedial powers,” id. at 518). 
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prominent strand of this doctrine focuses on the nature of the injury a 
plaintiff must claim in order to invoke the judicial power of the federal 
courts.475  But another important focus of standing addresses the ques-
tion of whether a particular plaintiff who has suffered an otherwise cog-
nizable injury can claim the benefit of a particular source of legal pro-
tection; this inquiry is sometimes framed as implicating the question of 
whether a plaintiff falls within the “zone of interests” that the relevant 
legal source was intended to protect.476  Although the doctrine was tra-
ditionally regarded as a limit on the courts’ power to adjudicate cases — 
though perhaps a mere “prudential” limit that might be relaxed or ex-
cused in an appropriate case477 — the Supreme Court has more recently 
suggested that this zone of interests inquiry might be more accurately 
characterized as a substantive limit on the availability of a plaintiff’s 
right of action.478 
Regardless of whether this zone of interests inquiry is characterized 
as a limit on justiciability or a merits-based inquiry into who possesses 
a substantive right of action under the relevant legal rule, it is plain that 
proper identification of the persons or entities who fall within the rele-
vant zone of interests for a particular provision has profound implica-
tions for the number of potentially successful legal claims that may be 
brought before the courts.  And for reasons already discussed in detail 
above, the international law interpretation suggests that states — acting 
in their collective sovereign capacity — constitute the only entities fall-
ing within the zone of interests that the Guarantee Clause protects.479 
But what of the more traditional basis for limiting judicial enforce-
ment of Guarantee Clause claims — namely, the political question doc-
trine?  As noted above, the parameters of the once-robust political ques-
tion limitation on Article III jurisdiction have been progressively 
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 475 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (declaring that “the irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing” requires, among other things, that the plaintiff “must have 
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and 
particularized” and not “conjectural” or “hypothetical” (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
756 (1984); and then quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990))). 
 476 See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–53 (1970) (noting 
that in addition to “injury in fact,” a plaintiff must also demonstrate that “the interest sought to be 
protected . . . is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or 
constitutional guarantee in question,” id. at 153). 
 477 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (classifying the “zone 
of interests” inquiry as among “the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine”). 
 478 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 & n.3 (2014). 
 479 Cf. Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court for the State of Mass., 373 F.3d 219, 224 n.5 (1st Cir. 
2004) (per curiam) (observing that “the bare language of the [Guarantee] Clause does not directly 
confer any rights on individuals vis-á-vis the states” but declining to resolve the standing question 
given the conclusion that the Guarantee Clause claim was nonjusticiable on other grounds, see id. 
at 224–25, 229); Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1140 (D. Colo. 2012) (noting that there 
is “little to no case law authority indicating who falls within the zone of interests intended to be 
protected by the Guarantee Clause”), vacated, 824 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2016).  
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narrowed by Supreme Court interpretation to the point where only “a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a co-
ordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it” will provide a predictable barrier 
to adjudication.480  The Supreme Court has recognized that these two 
inquiries — that is, the “textually demonstrable commitment” inquiry 
and the “judicially manageable standards” inquiry — are “not com-
pletely separate from”481 one another because “the lack of judicially 
manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a tex-
tually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”482 
Although many scholars have questioned whether the political ques-
tion doctrine is sensibly applied to limit adjudication of Guarantee 
Clause claims,483 the term “guarantee” itself — if understood to carry 
the connotations it would have held under the eighteenth-century law 
of nations — might well provide the type of “textually demonstrable 
commitment” that the Supreme Court has signaled is sufficient for the 
doctrine’s application. 
The linkage between the international law interpretation of the 
Guarantee Clause and the political question limit on justiciability stems 
from the nature of the political commitment that the term “guarantee” 
connotes.  As used in eighteenth-century treaties, the term “guarantee” 
signified a diplomatic pledge by one sovereign to come to the aid or 
assistance of another sovereign for protection of the particular rights or 
privileges that the guarantee secured.484  But such a pledge was never 
absolute.  As Vattel observed, the obligation to provide aid to an ally — 
even an ally to whom aid had been pledged by treaty — was always 
conditioned on and qualified by a number of factors, including the jus-
tice of the ally’s cause and the potential for destructive consequences to 
the assisting state itself.485  Thus, every invocation of a treaty of alliance 
or guarantee called for at least a tacit political judgment by the sover-
eign from whom assistance was sought regarding whether circumstances 
were such as to warrant invocation of the treaty. 
For this reason, a commonplace view expressed during the period 
immediately surrounding the Constitution’s ratification was that deci-
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 480 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012) (internal punctuation 
omitted) (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)); see also supra p. 604 (discussing 
the political question doctrine). 
 481 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228.  
 482 Id. at 228–29. 
 483 See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text (collecting sources). 
 484 See supra section I.B, pp. 615–20. 
 485 See VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XII, § 170 (“If the assistance and offices that are due 
by virtue of . . . a treaty, should on any occasion prove incompatible with the duties a nation owes 
to herself, . . . the case is tacitly and necessarily excepted in the treaty.”). 
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sions regarding those public rights of sovereigns that stemmed from in-
ternational treaty commitments were inappropriate subjects for judicial 
cognizance.  As early as 1674, the English Court of Chancery refused to 
send to “trial at law” a claim between English and Danish fishermen 
that would have depended, in part, on the enforcement of English fish-
ing rights reflected in a peace treaty between England and Denmark.486  
In rejecting the defendant’s effort to lift an antisuit injunction that 
would have allowed the case to proceed, the Chancellor declared that to 
send the case “to a trial at law, where . . . the Court must pretend to 
judge . . . of the exposition and meaning of the articles of peace” would 
be “monstrous and absurd.”487  In 1793, the Chancery Court refused 
jurisdiction over contract litigation between the East India Company 
and a local Indian ruler, concluding that the Company had entered into 
the contract in its sovereign capacity and that the contract therefore 
stood in the position of a treaty.488  The Chancellor declared that because 
this treaty had been entered into with the local officials “not as subjects, 
but as a neighbouring independent state,” it was therefore “the same, as 
if it was a treaty between two sovereigns and consequently . . . not a 
subject of private, municipal, jurisdiction.”489 
Early American interpreters seem to have shared a similar under-
standing regarding the incapacity of courts to adjudicate the mutual po-
litical obligations of sovereigns growing out of their respective treaty 
commitments.  In his first pseudonymous Pacificus essay defending 
President Washington’s 1793 Neutrality Proclamation, Alexander  
Hamilton insisted that, although the judiciary was “charged with the 
interpretation of treaties” in “litigated cases,” questions regarding “the 
external political relations of Treaties between Government and Govern-
ment” were “foreign to the Judiciary Department of the Government.”490  
Hamilton concluded this brief portion of his discussion by insisting that 
“[t]his position [was] too plain to need being insisted upon.”491 
At around the same time Hamilton published his Pacificus essay, 
John Jay — the first Chief Justice of the United States — authored a 
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 486 Blad v. Bamfield (1674) 36 Eng. Rep. 992, 992–93 (Ch.), 3 Swans. 605, 605–07. 
 487 Blad, 36 Eng. Rep. at 993, 3 Swans. at 607. 
 488 Nabob of the Carnatic v. E. India Co. (1793) 30 Eng. Rep. 521, 523 (Ch.), 2 Ves. Jun. 56, 60. 
 489 Nabob of the Carnatic, 30 Eng. Rep. at 523, 2 Ves. Jun. at 60 (internal punctuation omitted); 
see also, e.g., Nabob of Arcot v. E. India Co. (1793) 29 Eng. Rep. 841, 846 (Ch.), 4 Bro. C.C. 181 
(rejecting a similar claim against the East India Company on the same grounds); cf. Barclay v. 
Russell (1797) 30 Eng. Rep. 1087, 1091–93 (Ch.), 3 Ves. Jun. 424, 431–37 (rejecting a claim premised 
on confiscatory acts by the State of Maryland during the Revolutionary War as involving consider-
ations appropriate for “State to State” resolution, 30 Eng. Rep. at 1092, 3 Ves. Jun. at 435, rather 
than for resolution by a municipal court).  
 490 Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, GAZETTE OF THE U.S., June 29, 1793, reprinted in 
THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794, at 8, 11 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007). 
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circuit court opinion that endorsed a similar distinction between judi-
cially cognizable issues of treaty interpretation and questions that were 
reserved to the political branches of government.492  Chief Justice Jay 
acknowledged that certain matters going to the validity of a treaty — such 
as whether the persons who entered into it were authorized to do so and 
whether it “contain[ed] articles repugnant to the [C]onstitution” — could 
present appropriate subjects for judicial consideration.493  But questions 
going to what Chief Justice Jay termed the treaty’s “voluntary validity,” 
including whether the treaty had “been so violated as justly to become 
voidable by the injured nation” presented questions “of a political na-
ture” and were not referable to the judiciary but rather to “those depart-
ments which are charged with the political interests of the state.”494 
In a famous speech in the House of Representatives from 1800,  
Virginia Congressman (and future Chief Justice of the United States) 
John Marshall passionately insisted on this principle in arguing that the 
judiciary had no proper role in reviewing the Executive Branch’s deci-
sions regarding interpretation and implementation of an extradition 
treaty with Great Britain.495  Marshall’s speech covered a wide range of 
ground and is today most often remembered for its broad conception of 
the Executive’s power over foreign affairs.496  But Marshall also em-
phasized the limited capacity of the courts to adjudicate questions con-
cerning the extent to which the United States had complied with its 
treaty obligations.  
Although Marshall acknowledged that “[a] case in law or equity 
proper for judicial decision may arise under a treaty, where the rights of 
individuals acquired or secured by a treaty are to be asserted or de-
fended in court,”497 he insisted that the particular treaty obligation that 
had become the subject of political dispute — involving the asserted 
obligation of the United States to deliver up a British subject suspected 
of murder on a British ship — reflected a commitment “of a very differ-
ent nature.”498  And although this latter commitment was itself governed 
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 492 Jones v. Walker, 13 F. Cas. 1059, 1061–62 (C.C.D. Va. 1793) (No. 7,507).  
 493 Id. at 1062. 
 494 Id.; see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 260 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (concluding 
that certain questions going to treaty validity, including “[w]hether the treaty was first violated on 
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 495 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596–618 (1800) (statement of Rep. John Marshall).  The political con-
text of Marshall’s speech, as well as the events giving rise to its delivery, are explored in detail in 
Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229 (1990). 
 496 See Michael P. Van Alstine, Taking Care of John Marshall’s Political Ghost, 53 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 93, 99–104 (2008) (examining the influence of Marshall’s speech on twentieth-century theories 
of the Executive’s foreign affairs power).  
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by the law of nations applicable to treaty interpretation and enforce-
ment, Marshall insisted that these legal determinations were inappro-
priate for cognizance in a court of municipal jurisdiction.499  According 
to Marshall: 
  The casus fœderis [that is, the existence of circumstances giving rise to 
a duty owed to an ally500] of the guaranty was a question of law, but no 
man could have hazarded the opinion that such a question must be carried 
into court, and can only be there decided.  So the casus fœderis, under the 
twenty-seventh article of the treaty with Great Britain, is a question of law[,] 
but of political law.  The question to be decided is, whether the particular 
case proposed be one in which the nation has bound itself to act, and this is 
a question depending on principles never submitted to courts.501 
Marshall’s invocation in this speech of a distinction between judi-
cially enforceable private rights and “questions of political law, proper 
to be decided . . . by the Executive, and not by the courts”502 presaged 
the distinction he would draw three years later in his celebrated decision 
in Marbury v. Madison503 between the judiciary’s unquestioned entitle-
ment “to decide on the rights of individuals” and “[q]uestions, in their 
nature political, or which are, by the [C]onstitution and laws, submitted 
to the executive, [and] can never be made in this court.”504 
More than a quarter century after his Marbury opinion, Chief Justice 
Marshall applied this distinction between political questions and ques-
tions appropriate for the judiciary to a case specifically involving the 
applicability of a treaty.  In Foster v. Neilson,505 the Supreme Court was 
called upon to interpret a provision in a treaty between the United States 
and Spain providing that certain land grants in former Spanish territo-
ries ceded to the United States “shall be ratified and confirmed to the 
persons in possession.”506  Despite the seemingly mandatory language of 
this provision, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the treaty did not 
“act directly on the grants, so as to give validity to those not otherwise 
valid” but rather merely “pledge[d] the faith of the United States to pass 
acts which shall ratify and confirm them.”507  Chief Justice Marshall 
acknowledged that, under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, a treaty 
was “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the 
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 499 See id. at 613 (“The case was in its nature a national demand made upon the nation.  The 
parties were the two nations.  They cannot come into court to litigate their claims, nor can a court 
decide on them.  Of consequence, the demand is not a case for judicial cognizance.”).  
 500 VATTEL, supra note 39, bk. III, ch. VI, § 88 (defining casus fœderis). 
 501 10 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 495, at 613. 
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 503 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legisla-
tive provision.”508  But “when either of the parties” to a treaty “engages 
to perform a particular act,” Chief Justice Marshall concluded that “the 
treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and 
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for 
the Court.”509 
Standing alone, a conclusion that the Guarantee Clause reflects a 
type of commitment that had not traditionally been viewed as appropri-
ate for judicial resolution might not be sufficient to warrant the further 
conclusion that the provision should be viewed as outside the scope of 
the Article III judicial power.  For example, federal courts have long 
exercised jurisdiction over state boundary disputes notwithstanding the 
fact that such intersovereign controversies had not traditionally been 
perceived as a proper subject for municipal courts under English law.510  
But litigating such boundary disputes will usually require little more 
than applying preexisting rules to a particular set of facts.511  The re-
quirements imposed by the Guarantee Clause, by contrast, seem to hinge 
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 511 See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519–20 (1906) (“[W]hen a dispute arises about 
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deciding on boundary between states, than on lines between separate tracts of land . . . .”). 
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much more on discretionary considerations of the type traditionally as-
sociated with political, rather than judicial, decisionmaking.512 
Like the international treaty commitments that Chief Justice  
Marshall and other early commentators took as their principal illustra-
tion of matters not properly entrusted to the judiciary, the Guarantee 
Clause reflects a political commitment between separate sovereigns, the 
invocation of which must necessarily depend, in part, on a set of com-
plex and delicate judgments about the nation’s duties and its interests.513  
Such determinations require assessments that the judiciary is institu-
tionally ill equipped to make, both because they may hinge on infor-
mation not readily available to courts and because they may tend to 
implicate policy judgments more appropriately left to the electorally ac-
countable branches of government.514  More broadly, the types of policy-
based decisionmaking that determinations of this kind require fall out-
side the traditional conception of the judicial function, which requires 
determination by reference to preexisting legal sources rather than all-
things-considered judgments about what political theory and the na-
tional interest require.515  As Justice Woodbury observed in his dissent-
ing opinion in Luther: 
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 512 See, e.g., Rhode Island, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 738 (“[C]ontroversies between states” are “in their 
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[T]his court can never with propriety be called on officially to be the umpire 
in questions merely political. . . . These questions relate to matters not to be 
settled on strict legal principles.  They are adjusted rather by inclination, — 
or prejudice or compromise, often.  Some of them succeed or are defeated 
even by public policy alone, or mere naked power, rather than intrinsic 
right. . . . [J]udges, on the contrary, for their guides, have fixed constitutions 
and laws, given to them by others, and not provided by themselves.516 
Considerations such as these suggest that, despite the significant shift 
in understanding of the Guarantee Clause that the international law in-
terpretation reflects, the practical significance of the shift for the judici-
ary may be relatively minor.  If anything, the international law interpre-
tation tends to buttress the judiciary’s longstanding practice of refusing 
to adjudicate Guarantee Clause claims. 
CONCLUSION 
For those accustomed to viewing the judiciary as the principal ex-
positor of constitutional meaning, it is tempting to view the Guarantee 
Clause’s history as one of “missed opportunities and might-have-
beens.”517  The prospect of a judicially enforceable constitutional com-
mitment to “republican” state governance has tantalized generations of 
constitutional theorists, many of whom have placed their own unique 
gloss on what precisely a “Republican Form of Government” should be 
understood to entail.  But the alluring interpretive possibilities of this 
evocative phrase have led nearly all observers to ignore an equally crit-
ical inquiry that is essential to understanding the provision’s meaning 
and significance — namely, what it means for the United States to “guar-
antee” such republican government to the states. 
The available evidence strongly suggests that the use of this term 
was likely informed by a centuries-long practice of using similar lan-
guage to create binding international treaty commitments.  The parallels 
between the language of the Guarantee Clause and contemporaneous 
international treaties support the conclusion that the provision was in-
tended to signify a similar quasi-diplomatic obligation of protection 
flowing from the federal government to the sovereign “republican” gov-
ernments of the several states. 
Adopting this interpretation of the Guarantee Clause would require 
a rethinking of the obligations imposed by the Clause.  Although it has 
become common to view the provision as a source of obligations im-
posed on the states with respect to the maintenance of republican gov-
ernment, this understanding is nearly the opposite of the obligations 
suggested by the provision’s express terms.  By its terms, the Guarantee 
Clause imposes a duty on the “United States” for the benefit of the 
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“States.”  And under well-settled principles of international law applica-
ble to similarly worded “guarantee” provisions, such obligations con-
ferred no new rights or entitlements on the part of the guaranteeing state 
to intervene unasked in the internal affairs of the guaranteed state. 
At the same time, the international law interpretation would require 
markedly little practical change to the way in which courts have tradi-
tionally addressed claims asserted under the Guarantee Clause.  To the 
contrary, the available evidence regarding the provision’s original mean-
ing strongly supports the Supreme Court’s longstanding tradition of view-
ing Guarantee Clause claims as beyond the scope of judicial cognizance. 
 
 
